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ABSTRACT
Techniques for awarding personal injury damages assume an increasing inter-
est in times of frequent mobility of individuals. Assessing non-economic damages
might require more harmonized answers to provide justice and equal treatment
across the world. Indeed, in most countries a lasting debate surrounds non-
economic damages for personal injury. Specifically, an alleged constant increase
in awards and the difficulties linked to the subjectivity of their assessment, and the
selection of the institution that is best suited to award these damages and how it
should do so are but a few problems that are addressed by contemporary scholar-
ship. However, this extensive debate has not sufficiently explored the techniques
for awarding intangible loss damages in personal injury by using a comparative
law methodology. Filling this gap, this article explores the latest developments in
awarding non-economic damages. It proposes an analysis of the American and
European experiences that aims to bridge the two legal cultures for mutual benefit.
By way of comparative and historical analysis, Part I highlights the significant
trend in American and European jurisdictions, which consists of distinguishing
non-economic damages based on objective criteria stemming from an ascertainable
medical condition. Building on these results, Parts II and III develop a more effi-
cient conceptual framework and further propose better assessment tools in award-
ing these damages. This method demonstrates the benefits the United States could
gain by introducing innovative judicial scheduling, without triggering either consti-
tutional concerns or statutory intervention while building upon the existing
strengths of the European experience and the American judicial system. For in-
stance, Normalized Value Scheduling would endow actual judges and jurors with
the necessary expertise, increasing horizontal and vertical equality without neces-
sarily impeding an inevitable variability of awards among different jurisdictions.
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INTRODUCTION
Non-pecuniary damages for personal injury lie at the very center of contem-
porary legal debates primarily because of the alleged constant increase in awards,
but also because of the difficulties that stem from the inherent subjectivity of their
assessment.
Scholars have focused on denying or justifying the legitimacy of non-
economic damages' for personal injury; or scholars have debated about which in-
stitution is better suited to award these damages and how it should do so. Indeed,
several authors have proposed statutory intervention aimed at better management
of non-pecuniary loss assessment, regardless of the scholars' underlying wish to
curtail them. Though undoubtedly relevant, this extensive debate has not suffi-
ciently explored the techniques for awarding intangible loss damages in personal
injury suits by using comparative law methodology. Filling this gap, this article
explores the latest developments in awarding non-economic damages and further
proposes an analysis of the American and European experiences.
In particular, this article describes both the developments underpinning the
incremental evolution of these damages, and the tools used by different legal or-
ders in managing intangible loss in personal injury. It is asserted that awarding
damages for non-pecuniary loss has acquired a different rationale in personal in-jury suits that is aimed at protecting against damage to one's health and bodily in-
tegrity. Hence, Part I focuses on the debate over non-economic damages, empha-
sizing their social functions in light of an expanding economic context and
stressing the need for more American-European comparison. Further, the subse-
quent sections highlight the significant trend in American and European jurisdic-
tions, which consists of distinguishing non-economic damages with an "objective" 2
1. Non-economic damages are "general damages," and "include such items as physical pain
and suffering, inconvenience, and loss of enjoyment which cannot be measured definitively in
monetary terms." Sprague v. Cal. Pac. Bankers & Ins. Ltd., 74 P.3d 12, 22-23 (Haw. 2003) (cit-
ing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Dacanay, 952 P.2d 893, 896 n.3 (Haw. Ct. App. 1998)). At
least one jurisdiction also includes the loss of intellectual gratification and physical enjoyment in
this category of damages. Este v. Roussel, 833 So. 2d 999, 1010 (La. Ct. App. 2002); see also
Engles v. City of New Orleans, 872 So. 2d 1166, 1178 (La. Ct. App. 2004); Ford v. Bazile, 871
So. 2d 612, 617 (La. Ct. App. 2004); Marks v. OHMEDA, Inc., 871 So. 2d 1148, 1161 (La. Ct.
App. 2004); Plaissance v. McDonald, 865 So. 2d 1004, 1008 (La. Ct. App. 2004); Scramuzza v.
River Oaks Inc., 871 So. 2d 522, 531 (La. Ct. App. 2004); Simon v. Reel, 867 So. 2d 174, 178(La. Ct. App. 2004); Flint v. Trolley Stop, 843 So. 2d 635, 640 (La. Ct. App. 2003); Simmons v.
King, 833 So. 2d 1148, 1153 (La. Ct. App. 2002). According to one author, general damages
constitute about fifty-five to sixty percent of personal injury damages awards. See Neil Vidmar et
al., Jury Awards for Medical Malpractice and Post- Verdict Adjustments of Those Awards, 48
DEPAUL L. REv. 265, 296 (1998).
2. The use of "objective" refers to a general de-personalization of the assessment process.
According to the Collins Dictionary, "objective" means: "1. existing independently of perception
or an individual's conceptions... ; 2. undistorted by emotion or personal bias[;] 3. of or relating
to actual and external phenomena as opposed to thoughts, feelings, etc." Collins Word Exchange,
http://www.collins.co.uk/wordexchange/Sections/DicSrchRsult.aspx?word=objective (last visited
Nov. 21, 2005). This is the meaning intended here. In light of the European conception of non-
economic damages, medical condition is an "objective" parameter to avoid "subjective" (meaning
distorted by emotion or personal bias) description. Indeed, the Collins dictionary defines "objec-
[19.2
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basis in an ascertainable medical condition from other non-economic damages.
Some countries, such as the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, have adopted a
clear distinction between pain and suffering (or pretium doloris, which relies upon
a subjective perception of pain and suffering) and loss of enjoyment of life (per-
ceived as a more "objective" category of non-pecuniary damages susceptible of
assessment according to the severity of the resulting injury). Based on this distinc-
tion, the evidence of a condition - an illness or disability that a medical doctor
can ascertain in light of scientific knowledge - is a coherent screening test for in-
tangible loss, accompanying both physical injury and emotional distress, were the
latter to be recognized by law.
3
Part II seeks to highlight the second main thesis: that understanding the new
rationale for non-pecuniary damages in personal injury cases leads to a more effi-
cient framework and better assessment tools. Drawing on the examples offered,
Part III demonstrates the benefits the United States could gain, without triggering
constitutional concerns or statutory intervention. For instance, it envisages one
possible innovation in judicial scheduling in the United States: adopting a Normal-
ized Values Schedule at the court level, in order to increase horizontal and vertical
equality, 4 without necessarily preventing variability of awards among different ju-
risdictions. Moreover, courts could implement the Normalized Values Schedule
autonomously and without forgoing jurors' freedom in assessing damages.
Through the lens of comparative research, the explicit goal of this article is to
explore ways of improving the process of converting intangible loss into money.
The challenge is not to relinquish the task of awarding damages to technocrats, but
rather to endow actual judges and jurors with the necessary expertise, building
tive" as it applies to "disease symptoms" as meaning "perceptible to persons other than the indi-
vidual affected." Collins Word Exchange, http://www.collins.co.uk/wordexchange/Sections/
DicSrchRsult.aspx?word=objective (last visited Nov. 21, 2005).
3. For a recent account of the latest developments on pure emotional distress, see Christo-
pher P. Guzelian, Liability & Fear, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 713 (2004). On the historical changes in
American personal injury law, see Stephen D. Sugarman, A Century of Change in Personal Injury
Law, 88 CAL. L. REv. 2403 (2000). Furthermore, intentional infliction of emotional distress was
acknowledged only late in the 20th century. See State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 240
P.2d 282, 285-86 (Cal. 1952) (providing the landmark opinion of Justice Roger Traynor).
4. The principle of horizontal justice or equality imposes the avoidance of unjustified varia-
tions within levels of injury seriousness; the principle of vertical justice requires differentiation
according to injury seriousness and duration. This principle clearly guided the most recent inno-
vations in the U.K. regarding assessment of non-economic damages. See, e.g., Heil v. Rankin,
[2001] Q.B. 272, 309 (U.K.) stating:
We are satisfied that it is in the case of the most catastrophic injuries that awards are
most in need of adjustment and that the scale of adjustment which is required reduces as
the level of existing awards decreases. At the highest level, we see a need for the
awards to be increased by in the region of one third. We see no need for an increase in
awards which are at present below £ 10,000. It is our view that between those awards at
the highest level, which requires an upwards adjustment of one third, and those awards
where no adjustment is required, the extent of the adjustment should taper downwards
as illustrated by our decisions on the individual appeals.
See infra Part I.C.2.
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upon the existing strengths of the European experience and the American judicial
system.
I. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF INTANGIBLE Loss RECOVERY:
DISCOVERING THE EXISTING FRAMEWORK.
A. Non-Pecuniary Damages for Personal Injury in Context
1. Intangible Loss and Personal Injury: A Comparative Perspective.
Is there a better way of framing non-pecuniary damages for personal injury
suits and awarding compensation? Can comparative research offer useful hints for
application in the United States to these heated issues?
5
Attempting to answer these questions, we will use the terms non-pecuniary
loss or damages and non-economic damages or general damages indifferently,
making it clear that they are different from lost earnings or material damages. 6 As
emphasized in a recent comparative contribution, by these expressions:
5. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Mapping the Debate on Jury Reform, in VERDICT: ASSESSNG
THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 306, 325 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1994) (accurately summarizing the prob-
lematic argument we tackle in this article: "Quite apart from its unfairness, . . . variability [of
damages] has undesirable effects on the behavioral incentives of primary actors and on settle-
ments. If it can be reduced without unduly sacrificing other important values, justice requires that
we try to do so."); see also Charles D. Cole Jr., Charging the Jury on Damages in Personal-
Injury Cases: How New York Can Benefit from the English Practice, 31 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. &
CoM. 1, 20 (2004) (advocating that, if properly applied, the English system of providing the jury
with a reasonable compensation bracket does not eliminate the jury's role in awarding damages, a
necessarily nuanced and highly individualized determination in every case).
6. For a similar definition, see Steven. P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Non-Pecuniary
Costs of Accidents: Pain-and-Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 HARv. L. REV. 1785, 1789
(1995), who concludes that, although several significant impediments prevent the emergence of a
robust market for insurance against pain and suffering, consumers do demand such insurance,
thus, some amount of compensation for consumers' pain and suffering serves tort law's insurance
goal of providing insurance that consumers demand.
To receive damages for physical impairment, the injured party must prove that the effect
of his physical impairment extends beyond any impediment to his earning capacity and
beyond any pain and suffering to the extent that it produces a separate and distinct loss
that is substantial and for which he should be compensated.
Schindler Elevator Corp. v. Anderson, 78 S.W.3d 392, 412 (Tex. App. 2001) (citing Peter v.
Ogden Ground Serv., Inc., 915 S.W.2d 648, 650 (Tex. App. 1996)), overruled on other grounds
by Roberts v. Williamson, 111 S.W.3d 113 (Tex. 2003). The term "hedonic damages" refers to
"damages for loss of enjoyment of life ... [which] are included in the concept of general dam-
ages," which also includes pain and suffering. Abadie v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 804 So. 2d
11, 23 (La. Ct. App. 2001); see also Clement v. Consolidated Rail Corp, 734 F. Supp. 151, 154-
55 (D.N.J. 1989); Ogden v. J.M. Steel Erecting, Inc., 31 P.3d 806, 813 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001);
Eyoma v. Falco, 589 A.2d 653, 658 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991). For a further critical re-
view of the notion of hedonic damages, see Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Hedonic
Damages: The Rapidly Bubbling Cauldron, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1037 (2004) (concluding that
hedonic damages are problematic, especially when assessed as a separate element of an award,
and lead to excessive awards).
[19.2
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[W]e understand what is also referred to as non-patrimonial loss, that is
to say, loss which is not damage to a person's assets or wealth or income
and which is therefore incapable of being quantified in any objective fi-
nancial manner by reference to a market. What remains, however, is a
very broad field. It covers, for example, not only physical bodily injury
and injury to physical and mental health, except in so far as these matters
produce loss of income or generate expenses ... but also anxiety and
mental distress.
7
This definition allows us to refer to diverse title of damages in different countries
to capture a wider picture.
8
Based upon a comparative analysis of American and European experiences,
the proposed reasoning elaborates a comprehensive theoretical and operational
framework. 9 However, this article does not attempt to justify the existence of non-
economic damages in tort law, nor does it challenge the actual level of damages
awarded. By contrast, we ascertain the rising importance of these damages in the
legal systems as a reality that should be investigated, in order to conceptualize the
trends emerging over a number of years and to forecast their logical and beneficial
consequences. The main trend shows that damages for non-pecuniary loss have
acquired a different rationale in personal injury, which aims at protecting against
damage to one's health and bodily integrity.
Both the United States and Europe have always recognized non-pecuniary
loss as a proper title of damages. However, the last decades have witnessed an es-
calation in the amounts awarded for the non-pecuniary component of damages in
cases of personal injury1° - at least this is a shared perception in most western
7. W. V. Horton Rogers, Comparative Report, in DAMAGES FOR NON-PECUNIARY Loss IN
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 246 (W. V. Horton Rogers ed., 2001).
8. For a similar argument in the U.K., see the emblematic work of P. S. ATIYAH, THE
DAMAGES LOTTERY 14-15 (1997), who comments that "there is no way of putting any real finan-
cial figure [on pain and suffering] - there is no market for these 'losses."' Similarly in the
United States, such an argument can be found within the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
912 cmt. b (1977), where it is stated that "[t]here is no market price for a scar.., since the dam-
ages are not measured by the amount for which one would be willing to suffer the harm." See
also David W. Leebron, Final Moments: Damages for Pain and Suffering Prior to Death, 64
N.Y.U. L. REV. 256, 272 (1989); Frederick S. Levin, Pain and Suffering Guidelines: A Cure for
Damages Measurement "Anomie, " 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 303, 308 (1989).
9. The use of the comparative methodology in tort law has long been acknowledged by
scholars. Paradigmatic work includes RODOLFO SACCO, INTRODUZIONE AL DIRIT]O
COMPARATO (3d ed. 1980), who proposes in a civil law context comparison tools such as "legal
formants" in order to propose a dynamic approach which shall not be limited to black-letter law,
but rather expand to case law. For an account of his proposals, see Rodolofo Sacco, Legal For-
mants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 343 (1991).
10. For support on this argument, see, for example, Robert Litan et al., The U.S. Liability
System, Backgrounds and Trends, in LIABILITY: PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY 7-13 (Robert Litan
& Clifford Winston eds., 1988); George Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort
Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1536 (1987). Raising serious doubts about the accuracy of this conclu-
sion, compare, for example, Neil Vidmar, Empirical Evidence on the Deep Pockets Hypothesis:
Jury Awards for Pain and Suffering in Medical Malpractice Cases, 43 DUKE L.J. 217, 263
(1993), who states that "[i]t is intriguing to question why belief in the ... excessiveness of non-
20051
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countries.11 Similarly, most of these countries are experiencing a deeply divided
debate on the proper methods of awarding non-pecuniary damages and of defining
their theoretical boundaries.' 2 To a significant degree, this growth is one response
of legal systems' demand for protection of individual interests originating in soci-
ety;13 and it has triggered important modifications in the conceptualization of in-
tangible loss accompanying both physical and emotional harm.
economic damages [is] so widespread and why many authors and policymakers have failed to
recognize the flimsy or contrary evidence," with W. KiP VIscusi, REFORMING PRODUCTS
LIABILITY 100 (1991), who states that "[t]he absence of any well-defined criteria for setting com-
pensation levels has led many observers to speculate that there has been an escalation of pain and
suffering awards."
11. In this sense, see Giovanni Comandd, Risarcimento del Danno alla Persona e Alterna-
tive Istituzionali, Torino, Giappichelli, 1999, 3-45; DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURIES: A
EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 1 (Frederick J. Holding & Peter Kaye eds., 1993); A. GEERTS ET AL.,
COMPENSATION FOR BODILY HARM: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 95-98 (1977); WERNER
PFENNINGTORF & DONALD G. GIFFORD, A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LIABILITY LAW AND
COMPENSATION SCHEMES IN TEN COUNTRIES AND THE UNITED STATES 9-14, 77, 155-57 (1991);
Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, Twisting the Purpose of Pain and Suffering Awards: Turning
Compensation into "Punishment ", 54 S.C. L. REv. 47, 64 (2002). But see Mark Geistfeld, Plac-
ing a Price on Pain and Suffering: A Method for Helping Juries Determine Tort Damages for
Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 CAL. L. REV. 775, 777 (1995) ("Reforms limiting pain-and-suffering
damages have succeeded despite the lack of evidence (and, more fundamentally, the lack of ob-
jective standards) establishing that such awards tend to be excessively high."). Of course, recog-
nition of non-pecuniary damages as a proper title of damages does not preclude this expansive
trend from having experienced both misuses and abuses or, at least, misunderstandings. See gen-
erally PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988);
WALTER K.OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION (1991).
12. For a much more detailed clarification, see Comand6, supra note 11, at 3ff. According
to the formula emphasized by Izhak Englard, "personal injuries call for social solidarity," though
the idea is not entirely new to U.S. scholars. IZHAK ENGLARD, PHILOSOPHY OF TORT LAW 110
(1993); see also N.K. Komesar, Toward a General Theory of Personal Injury Loss, 3 J. LEGAL
STUD. 457, 459 (1974). For further commentary on these same issues, see P.S. Atiyah, Personal
Injuries in the Twenty-First Century: Thinking the Unthinkable, in WRONGS AND REMEDIES IN
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, (Peter Birks ed., 1996); ATIYAH, supra note 8, at 138 (criticizing
the U.K. tort system sharply). For a survey of different theories and policies on non economic
damages, see Bruce Chapman, Wrongdoing, Welfare, and Damages: Recovery for Non-Pecuniary
Loss in Corrective Justice, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 409 (David G. Owen
ed., 1995). For a recent critical perspective on awarding pain and suffering, see Paul V. Nie-
meyer, Awards For Pain And Suffering: The Irrational Centerpiece of Our Tort System, 90 VA.
L. REV. 1401, 1401 (2004), who argues that awarding damages for pain and suffering "without
rational criteria for measuring [them undermines] the tort law's rationality and predictability,"
and advocates legislative intervention.
13. As Roscoe Pound observed nearly one century ago:
A man's rights multiply as his opportunities and capacities develop ... The more 'civi-
lized' the nation, the richer he is in rights .... The idea here is that interests - that is,
demands of the individual - increase with increasing civilization, and hence the pres-
sure upon the law to meet these interests increases the scope and character of legal
rights.
Roscoe Pound, Interests of Personality, 28 HARV. L. REV. 343, 343 n.2 (1915) (quoting LUIGI
MIRAGLIA, COMPARATIVE LEGAL PHILOSOPHY APPLIED TO LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 324 (John
Lisle trans., 1921)).
[19.2
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The different levels at which supply and demand (to borrow a term from eco-
nomics) of legal protection meet, reflect the legal and economic development that
a country has achieved. In so-called rich societies, it is conceivable to grant
greater economic protection to individual interests, because there are more re-
sources to dedicate to them.14 At first, society established a form of compensation
for soldiers. Society then took time to develop an acceptable compensation
scheme for workers as well.' 5 It was not just a matter of political or social strug-
gle; it was, and it still is, a matter of resources. When a society can devote more
resources to single individuals, there is a tendency to characterize these individu-
als' new interests as legal rights and to develop juridical tools to protect these
rights by way of building on the pre-existent legal framework. In a way, both the
demand for protection of individual interests and the supply of protection depend
greatly upon the amount of available resources. These resources are comprised of
individual and social assets (both economic and non-economic), such as legal ex-
pertise and social awareness.1 6  Consequently, the increase in awards for non-
pecuniary loss, and its conceptual metamorphosis, may well be an attempt to match
demand for an offer of protection for specific interests.
14. The microeconomic argument is that "the higher a person's income, the larger will be
his or her purchases of most goods." LLOYD G. REYNOLDS, MICROECONOMICS: ANALYSIS AND
POLICY 33 (6th ed. 1988). This same argument could reasonably be used for the endowment a
society can offer to its citizens. Hence, for the demand of hedonistic purchases or possibility of
purchases an individual has in a given wealth of his or her society there will be a shift upward.
See A.M. Honor6, Causation and Remoteness of Damages, in XI INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 97 (1972) ("Although it is dangerous to generalize about
the varied experience of different countries, it is possible to discern, at least in developed socie-
ties, a progression by which compensation becomes fuller as the economy expands. The fault of
the injured party, at first complete bar to recovery, later leads only to a reduction of damages and,
finally, is completely disregarded unless it is especially serious or flagrant.").
15. It is not the goal of this paper to investigate whether such losses should stem from tort
principles or other different systems moving towards pure insurance or social insurance. For fur-
ther commentary on this topic, see MARC A FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAW AND
ALTERNATIVES 788 (7th ed. 2001), who states that in all, some 48 state legislatures have enacted
tort reform legislation of one sort or another. See generally Stephen D. Sugarman, Proposals for
Reform, 15 U. HAW. L. REV. 659, (1993); Stephen D. Sugarman, Alternative Compensation
Schemes and Tort Theory: Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 558 (1985) (illustrating
the shortcomings of the traditional negligence system and instead advocating for insurance
mechanisms). For a different perspective, see George L. Priest, Beyond Compensation: Eco-
nomic Problems of Accidents and Compensation, 15 U. HAw. L. REV. 544 (1993), who criticizes
alternative approaches to tort law, such as workers' compensation, and even predicts a reduction
of their scope.
16. See, for example, Peter H. Schuck, Introduction: The Context of the Controversy, in
TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST COMPETITION, INNOVATION, AND CONSUMER WELFARE
17, 19 (Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991), which stresses that "[Social] change has always been a driv-
ing force in tort law .... Today, as in the past, new social conditions demand new legal solutions.
Tort law, with great creativity and mixed success, struggle to devise them." See also Croley &
Hanson, supra note 6, at 1908 (referring extensively to VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE SOCIAL
MEANING OF MONEY 3 (1994), and stating that "Zelizer's account thus provides one strong piece
of evidence that whether quantifying life and limb is socially acceptable depends upon the context
in which it is done and, more specifically, that what many may resist in the insurance context,
they may praise in the tort context.").
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However, the goal of this article is neither to elaborate on the theory that
damages for intangible loss are a social response, nor to analyze different norma-
tive or efficiency theories in favor or contrary to compensation for intangible
loss. 17 The challenge is to provide decision-makers with the necessary expertise in
addition to that which the American judicial system is already able to provide.' 8
At the end of this comparison, better use of information in awarding non-pecuniary
damages for personal injury will emerge as a proposal for the United States. The
suggestions will not attempt to reduce the role of juries in civil trials, but will build
upon their expertise. Paradoxical as it may seem, standardization is a formidable
tool for maintaining jury power when reference can be made to previous judicial
assessment of non-economic damages.' 
9
2. Intangible Loss and Personal Injury: The Trend.
Having stated the goals of this article, there is a need to clarify the first claim:
the expanding trend 20 of non-economic damages in personal injury has both modi-
fied the conceptual underpinnings of these titles of damages and has increasingly
focused on protecting health and bodily integrity.
Almost one hundred years ago, a prominent scholar alleged that social judg-
ment (mostly compensation concerns) and economic rationales (mostly deterrence
concerns) dictate the safeguarding of protected interests. 2' The more a society de-
17. For a recent account of those theoretical frameworks in the United States see Ronen
Avraham, Pain-and-Suffering Damages in Tort Law: Revisiting the Theoretical Framework and
the Empirical Data (Feb. 2003) (unpublished Mich. Law & Econ. Research Paper), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=382120 (providing abstract) (complete text on
file with author).
18. Such expertise given from the outset may help the review of decisions by trial judges or
on appeal, but this is a sort of side benefit of the article, not its principal goal.
19. In other terms, this is not a quest for substituting judges and juries with an administra-
tive body of experts. See Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, & David Schkade, Assessing Pu-
nitive Damages (With Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2137-38
(1998) ("[A]n administrative or legislative body might create a kind of 'pain and suffering grid,'
'libel grid,' or 'sexual harassment grid,' combining the basic elements of disparate cases into pre-
sumptive appropriate awards. A judge would produce a dollar award by seeing where the case at
hand fits in the grid and perhaps by making adjustments if the details of the case strongly call for
them.") (citations omitted).
20. The idea of expansive and restrictive jurisdictions appeared in MARC A. FRANKLIN &
ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES: CASES AND MATERIALS 684 (3th ed. 1983).
The evolution of tort law and the movements for its alternatives, as well, can be traced to expan-
sive and restrictive trends in jurisdictions related to social evolution. For an analytical account,
see Robert L. Rabin, Some Reflections on the Process of Tort Reform, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 13,
15-23 (1988).
21. As one author states it, "A factor which is today recognized as parasitic will, forsooth,
tomorrow be recognized as an independent basis of liability. It is merely a question of social,
economic, and industrial needs as those needs are reflected in the organic law." PROSSER AND
KEETON ON TORTS 57 n.22 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984) (quoting THOMAS ATKINS
STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 460, 470 (1906)). For a review of literature claim-
ing tort damages' main goal is deterrence, and not compensation, see Richard Craswell, Instru-
mental Theories of Compensation: A Survey, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1135 (2003); Mark Geist-
feld, Negligence, Compensation, and the Coherence of Tort Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 585 (2003).
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velops (in economic terms), the greater the amount of resources it spends in recog-
nition of "new" interests and the greater the demand for legal recognition will be.
In a way, individual interests compete to move away from an unprotected area to-
wards the protected legal arena in light of the growth in the welfare and judicial
sophistication of the society. Before achieving protection, infringements of these
interests are randomly distributed (e.g., non-pecuniary losses are "ills of life, of
which every man ought to take his share") 22 and are sunk costs, haphazardly
spread.23 With the expansion of the resources and tools available to a society,
these individual interests emerge in the judicial arena seeking legal protection. It is
a long-lasting process, with many different steps leading eventually to subsequent
clarification points. At these stages, useless and burdensome residues of chaotic
growth are removed to adapt these new interests to the legal framework efficiently,
reshaping the original understanding to the point that the recognized interests are
well protected and at a lower cost.
24
The level and kind of protection (e.g., damages granted and their extent) are
mirror images of the wealth and social milieu of the nation and of its needs. In this
respect, national tort systems switched the compensatory focus from the wrong-
doer to the injured,25 moving the primary value of the individual's protection from
the periphery to the center of the tort system.26 This was, and largely is, the new
social and individual perspective involving personal injury damages. 27 Moreover,
this change did not need affirmation through heated political debate. 28 It only re-
quired time and incremental steps in the tort system. Generally, the evolution of
damages for non-pecuniary loss fits this framework precisely. The idea of expand-
22. Theobald v. Railway Passengers Assurance Co., (1862) 26 Eng. L. 8 Eq. R. 438.
23. See infra Part II.
24. See infra Part III, A 3-4; see also Sugarman, supra note 3, at 2409 ("In 1900, misfortune
was a more accepted part of life. Today, people are more willing to blame others for their injuries
and go to court to obtain redress.").
25. For a fruitful discussion about "the milieu in which automobile no-fault and workers'
compensation legislation were enacted," see ROBERT L. RABIN, PERSPECTIVES ON TORT LAW
288 (1990), who finds that "a serious challenge to the foundations of the tort system was mounted
only when a more comprehensive ideology of victims' rights achieved center stage."
26. A quite orthodox reading perceives this pro-plaintiff trend as a quest for a "good Sa-
maritan" system, always ready to grant compensation. This expression is borrowed from ROSCOE
POUND, NEW PATHS OF THE LAW 27-30 (1950), who used it in a very critical way against the
(then) new trend toward socialization of risks. The same kind of critiques are to be found in sev-
eral western countries. For commentary on France, see RENE SAVATIER, LES METAMORPHOSES
ECONOMIQUES ET SOCIALES DU DROIT CIVIL D'AUJOURD'Iti 255-56 (2d ed. 1952).
27. On the punitive function in tort law, see generally David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages
Overview: Functions, Problems and Reform, 39 VILL. L. REV. 363, 373 (1994). For historical
perspective, compare W. Malone, Ruminations on the Role of Fault in the History of the Common
Law of Torts, 31 LA. L. REV. 1 (1970), with Geoffrey MacCormack, Revenge and Compensation
in Early Law, 21 AM J. COMP. L. 69, 83 (1973), who argues that there is not enough evidence of
a switch from punishment to compensation in the law of torts.
28. The shift from the periphery to the center may be expressed by the move from the pro-
tection of non-economic interests via the protection of economic ones (e.g. individual well-being
protected indirectly by way of redressing lost earnings related to personal injuries) to a more di-
rect protection with the increased compensation of non pecuniary damages related to damages to
health.
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ing legal rights in growing societies sheds light on the puzzle of non-pecuniary
damages, at least in cases of personal injury, and it adds explicatory coherence to
their continuing history.29 The variation both in awards and in types of interests
protected by non-pecuniary damages also reflects the different levels of national
richness.
The expansive trend we are tracing has been a selective one; indeed, we dis-
cover titles of non-pecuniary damages in our legal systems, which are chiefly di-
rected towards protecting paramount values such as individual psychophysical in-
tegrity.30 Today, societies protect health and bodily integrity as such, regardless of
one's ability when healthy. It is natural for a society, in which the primary de-
mands of survival are usually more than satisfied, to deem one's bodily integrity
worthy of protection, without needing to justify it with reference to lost earnings or
out-of-pocket expenses. 31 Both pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life
have always been strictly related to a personal injury; but loss of enjoyment of life
can also be related to a loss of a faculty or a medical condition. It was not a ca-
price of the Parliaments if, at the end of the nineteenth century, statutes began to
protect workers, solely and exclusively, for physical impairment that had reduced
their capacity to work.32 In an earlier historical stage, most countries enacted stat-
utes to protect only the physical capacity of soldiers. At that time, economic de-
velopment barely allowed the protection of the productive capacity and the ability
to serve as a soldier. Resources were available only for these primary exigencies,
and the answer the legal systems gave was acceptable both economically and so-
cially.33
Undoubtedly, the frontiers of production and consumption in our societies
have moved upwards. Consequently, there has been an expansion in demand for
the protection of health, bodily integrity, and freedom, as paramount instrumental
values for personal enjoyment, as well as economic production. At the turn of the
last century, while revising English law for non-economic damages, the Law Re-
form Commission concluded that "Abolition of [non-economic damages] may be
29. It has already been argued that individuals lack the ability to make informed decisions
with respect to pain and suffering, and several supply side market failures prevented non-
economic damages from emerging in real markets. See Ellen Smith Pryor, The Tort Law Debate,
Efficiency, and the Kingdom of the Il: A Critique of the Insurance Theory of Compensation, 79
VA. L. REv. 91 (1993); Croley & Hanson, supra note 6.
30. For extensive data about the European experience, see generally DAMAGES FOR NON-
PECUNIARY Loss IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 7.
31. Indeed, in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: COMPENSATORY DAMAGES FOR
NONPECUNIARY HARM § 905 (1979), it is suggested that "[c]ompensatory damages that may be
awarded without proof of pecuniary loss include compensation (a) [flor bodily harm, and (b) [f]or
emotional distress." See infra Part III.
32. It is worth mentioning that in RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. e (1934), it is
stated that "the entire history of development of tort law shows a continuous tendency to recog-
nize as worthy of legal protection interest which previously were not protected." For further
analysis and data, see Frederick J. Holding, The Challenge of Personal Injuries to Medicine, Law,
and Economy, in DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURIES: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE, supra note
1l, at 86, 98.
33. It was the birth of the welfare state, but social security, as we know it today, did not ex-
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thought to discriminate unfairly against those, such as the unemployed, who do not
suffer any, or any substantial, pecuniary loss as a result of personal injury."
34
The investigation into the extent of the wealth of our societies is beyond the
scope of this article. However, reducing awards for intangible loss, as is often
proposed in legal literature because, for instance, it is asserted that consumers do
not demand insurance for them, merely eludes the problem of dealing with the al-
leged increase in these titles of damages. 35 On the contrary, if placed in the context
of the growth of society, we can better understand the increasing importance of
compensation for non-pecuniary damages and we can manage them effectively.
After all, damages for physical impairment related to the ability to work were
deemed an illogical request before the end of nineteenth century; but subsequently
they became vested rights. In the same way, compensation for intangible loss has
extended its reach to protect individual interests, such as health and bodily integ-
rity, from unlawful interference.
36
Non-economic damages for personal injury appear to be a tentative response
to an irrefutable demand by society for compensation for "limitations on the per-
34. THE LAW COMM'N, DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURY: NON-PECUNIARY Loss 5
(1999), http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/lc257.pdf. This was the perception of "almost all of the
accident victims who took part [in the] ... empirical survey" run by the Commission (97.5% of
consulted persons).
35. Often, proposals tend to push the amount for non-pecuniary losses downward. In this
sense, see Patricia Danzon, Medical Malpractice Liability, in LIABILITY: PERSPECTIVE AND
POLICY 101, 118-19, 122 (Robert E. Litan & Clifford Winston eds., 1988). Another project based
on previous assessment by judges and juries was developed by Levin, supra note 8, at 303 (con-
vincingly suggesting the implementation of a flexible system of guidelines). Since the 1950s,
several scholars have advocated a reduction of awards. See, e.g., Marcus L. Plant, Damages for
Pain and Suffering, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 200, 211 (1958) (proposing a 50% limitation of medical and
nursing expenses linked to pain and suffering, in change of a drastic reduction of what was one of
the greatest obstacle for plaintiff recovery: that is, contributory negligence rules); L. F. Scott,
Damages for Personal Injury, 8 INDUS. L. REV. 106, 108 (1956) (refusing any attempt to fix an
amount: "True compensation can, logically speaking, only be that figure which the plaintiff
would have accepted in order to undergo the injury"); William Zelermyer, Damages for Pain and
Suffering, 6 SYRACUSE L. REV. 27, 31 (1954) (suggesting that the only jury guide-posts in its task
of assessing damages for these matters are common sense and sound judgment). Other scholars
have suggested the abolition of pain and suffering awards in order to either reduce insurance pre-
miums or to avoid the financial burden stemming from accident compensation being imposed on
businesses. See, e.g., LEON GREEN, TRAFFIC VICTIMS: TORT LAW AND THE INSURANCE 88
(1958); Fleming James, Jr. Some Reflections on the Bases of Strict Liability, 18 LA. L. REV. 293,
297 (1958); Clarence Morris, Liability for Pain and Suffering, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 476 (1959).
Note however, that scholars have found both theoretical and empirical evidence of some degree
of willingness to pay for receiving non-economic damages compensation. See Croley & Hanson,
supra note 6. Most significantly, in 1999, the U.K. Law Commission based its recommendations
to increase pain-and-suffering damages upon public perceptions on the proper level of damages.
See THE LAW COMM'N, supra note 34. As a matter of fact, the Court of Appeals actually fol-
lowed these recommendations in the leading case of Heil v. Rankin, [2001] Q.B. 272 (U.K.). See
infra Part I.C.2.
36. Tort law as a whole has been understood, to some extent, as having this scope. See Pat-
rick Atiyah, Tort Law and the Alternatives: Some Anglo-American Comparisons, 1987 DUKE L.J.
1002, 1018 ("American tort law is a response to the demand of a society in which there are many
grievances not regarded as the responsibility of governments to redress.").
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son's life created by the injury. ' 37 Comparative research shows that this response
leads to a differentiation within the domain of traditional non-pecuniary loss, be-
tween loss of enjoyment of life38 and pain and suffering 39 (to use the language of
common law). Pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life seek to redress dif-
ferent intangible losses, despite the fact that courts often award them together. A
clear distinction between them fosters a profound innovation in the legal system,
too often misread or not read at all.40 It makes a distinction between those entirely
subjective non-economic damages for intangible loss and those damages with an
"objective" 4 1 basis for evaluation, due to the existence of an ascertainable medical
condition.42 This bifurcation reflects the choice of protecting health and bodily
37. McDougald v. Garber, 536 N.E.2d 372, 379 (N.Y. 1989) (Titone, J., dissenting) (citing
Thompson v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 621 F.2d 814, 824 (6th Cir. 1980)); see also Carleton
R. Cramer, Comment, Loss of Enjoyment of Life as a Separate Element of Damages, 12 PAC. L.J.
965, 972 (1981); Kyle R. Crowe, Note, The Semantical Bifurcation of Noneconomic Loss: Should
Hedonic Damage Be Recognized Independently of Pain and Suffering Damage?, 75 IOWA L.
REv. 1275 (1990).
38. For commentary on the problem of awarding damages for loss of enjoyment of life, also
known as "hedonic" damages, see, among others, Cramer, supra note 37; Stephen J. Fearon, He-
donic Damages: A Separate Element in Tort Recoveries?, 56 DEF. COUNs. J. 436 (1989); Eric L.
Kriftcher, Comment, Establishing Recovery for Loss of Enjoyment of Life Apart From Conscious
Pain and Suffering: McDougald v. Garber, 62 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 332 (1988); Paul E. Marth,
Comment, Loss of Enjoyment of Life: Should It Be a Compensable Element of Personal Injury
Damages?, 11 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 459 (1975); Ronald J. Mishkin, Comment, Loss of Enjoy-
ment of Life as an Element of Damages, 73 DICK. L. REV. 639 (1969); Stanley V. Smith, Hedonic
Damages in Wrongful Death Cases, A.B.A., Sept. 1988, at 70; Carel J.J.M. Stolker, The Uncon-
scious Plaintiff: Consciousness as a Prerequisite for Compensation for Non-Pecuniary Loss, 39
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 82 (1990); John A. Williamson, Note, Hedonic Damages in Section 1983
Actions: A Remedy for the Unconstitutional Deprivation of Life, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 321
(1987).
39. For further commentary on pain and suffering awards, see Peter A. Bell, The Bell Tolls:
Toward Full Tort Recovery for Psychic Injury, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 333 (1984); Mark A. Cohen,
Pain, Suffering, and Jury Awards: A Study of the Cost of Crime to Victims, 22 LAW & SOC'Y
REV. 537 (1988); Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CAL.
L. REV. 772 (1985); Peter N. Kalionzes, Case Notes, Infant Pain and Suffering: The Valuation
Dilemma, 1 PEPP. L. REV. 102 (1973); Leebron, supra note 8; Jeffrey O'Connell & Rita J. Simon,
Payment for Pain & Suffering: Who Wants What, When & Why?, 1972 U. ILL. LEGAL F. 1; Cor-
nelius J. Peck, Compensation for Pain: A Reappraisal in Light of New Medical Evidence, 72
MICH. L. REV. 1355 (1974); Margaret A. Somerville, Pain and Suffering at Interfaces of Medi-
cine and Law, 36 U. TORONTO L.J. 286 (1986); Neil Vidmar & Jeffrey J. Rice, Assessments of
Noneconomic Damage Awards in Medical Negligence: A Comparison of Jurors with Legal Pro-
fessionals, 78 IOWA L. REV. 883 (1993); Zelermyer, supra note 35.
40. Such a distinction in the American tort system has already been acknowledged. See,
e.g., Annotation, Loss of Enjoyment of Life as a Distinct Element or Factor in Awarding Dam-
ages for Bodily Injury, 34 A.L.R. 4TH 293 (1984); Cramer, supra note 37, at 972.
41. As already distinguished, "objective" means "existing independently of perception or an
individual's conceptions" as opposed to "distorted by emotion or personal bias." See supra note
2.
42. As per Lord Justice O'Connor in Housecroft v. Burnett, 1 All E.R. 332, 337 (1986),
"The human condition is so infinitely variable that it is impossible to set a tariff, but some injuries
are more susceptible to some uniformity in compensation than others." See also infra Part II.
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integrity as a reaffirmed social value, even with our imperfect tools of monetary
awards.43
3. Dealing with Pain and Suffering: A First Note for a Euro-American
Debate
Compensation for non-economic damages rests at the center of the debate
among scholars in both Europe and America. The theoretical question has often
been whether the legal system should compensate for non-economic damages
44
and, if so, how it can be done efficiently. The efficiency argument has led to either
the refusal to recognize compensation for non-economic damages 45 as legitimate,
or to advocate recognizing it
46 on empirical or theoretical grounds.
47
Framing the debate on non-economic damages in Europe and the United
States is a complex task, because very often, issues perceived as national and paro-
43. In addition, there is another argument, probably one of the strongest, for the purported
increase in the awards for non-pecuniary damages (even advocating a further increase in some
instances). In fact, it can be argued that medical science has advanced to such a degree that many
people survive accidents when in the 1970s, for example, they would have died. Several of these
people live longer than before, as in the case of a spinally-injured patient, whose life expectancy
is 25% longer today than it was in the 1970s. There is naturally a collateral argument to be taken
into account as well: advances in medical science mean that it is possible to treat many injuries
more effectively, so that their consequences are less severe today than in the past. This will
clearly modify the correct ordering of injuries on the scale of damages.
44. One of the most crude and classic expositions of a position contrary to non-economic
damages in the United States is offered by Louis L. Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Im-
pact of Insurance, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 219, 224-25 (1953), who argues that pain and
suffering is an injury, but allowing monetary awards as compensation is not defensible because it
requires the evaluation of the "imponderable" by a method of "arbitrary indeterminateness."
45. See Jennifer Arlen, Reconsidering Efficient Tort Rules For Personal Injury: The Case of
Single Activity Accidents, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 41 (1990) (suggesting that efficient deter-
rence does not require compensation for pain and suffering); John E. Calfee & Paul Rubin, Some
Implications of Damages Payments for Nonpecuniary Losses, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 371 (1992);
Robert Cooter, Towards Market in Unmatured Tort Claims, 75 VA. L. REV. 383, 392 (1989)
(admitting only "pain-and suffering that curtailed earnings"); Priest, supra note 10, at 1546-47,
1553 (arguing the efficient consumer rationale to deny pain and suffering compensation); Alan
Schwartz, Proposals for Product Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353,
362-67 (1988). For further commentary from the perspective of law and economics, see W. Kip
Viscusi, Pain and Suffering: Damages in Search of a Sounder Rationale, 1 MICH. L. & POL'Y
REV. 141, 156 (1996).
46. See WILLIAM LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW
186-87 (1987); Samuel A. Rea, Jr., Non-Pecuniary Loss and Breach of Contract, 11 J. LEGAL
STUD. 35, 39 (1982). On different grounds, see Croley & Hanson, supra note 6; Steven P. Croley
& Jon D. Hanson, What Liability Crisis? An Alternative Explanation for Recent Events in Prod-
ucts Liability, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 60 (1991); and Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The First-
Party Insurance Externality: An Economic Justification for Enterprise Liability, 76 CORNELL L.
REV. 129, 183-84 n.205 (1990), who advocates at least some level of pain and suffering damages
is certainly required by the system. For further commentary, see Patricia M. Danzon, Tort Re-
form and The Role of Government in Private Insurance Markets, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 517, 533
(1984), who argues in favor of damages for serious pain-and-suffering.
47. See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 133-34, 228-31
(1987) (arguing that optimal deterrence demands that enterprises bear the full costs of the injuries
they inflict).
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chial fill the debate. A good example might be the role of civil juries, unique to
the United States, and it is regularly perceived - on both sides of the Atlantic -
as such a distinctive feature as to render European and American experiences in
awarding non-economic damages incapable of comparison. One should also men-
tion the recurrent argument that European tort systems compensate for far less non-
economic damages, not only because they exclude juries in civil trials, but also be-
cause most items hidden in American awards for non-pecuniary damages are
overtly compensated in European countries, if sometimes outside the litigation sys-
tem. A non-exhaustive, but illustrative, list might include attorney fees (American
rule vs. the "loser pays" rule), welfare state benefits, and health care insurance.48
Without challenging these accounts, this article will make the argument that a
large and important part of both the American and the European experience re-
mained out of the picture, almost as if by design. In particular, legal literature has
insufficiently investigated the richness of experience on each side of the Atlantic.
Further, scholars have not framed the issues we labeled as parochial and national
insularities in a Euro-American debate on assessment of non-economic damages
and its relentless rising trend. Concentrating on the continuous process of award-
ing non-economic damages for personal injury, American and European systems
have tried to cope with the assessment problem. We should try to fill these gaps by
searching for potential examples of cross-fertilization that might throw light upon
these peculiarities as well.49 After all, the reasoning behind the attempts in justify-
ing (or refusing) non-economic damages, rests on theoretical assumptions of cross-
border validity.
The following sections will show how the evolution of compensation for non-
economic damages, accompanying both physical and pure emotional harm in
America and Europe, leads to a comprehensive framework for assessing these
damages based upon the emerging distinction between those non-pecuniary dam-
ages for which an "objective" evaluation basis (existing independently of percep-
tion) exists and those for which such an "objective" basis does not exist.
B. The Anglo-American View: Towards More Clarity for Intangible Loss
. Each country has its own history and local constraints in the development of
non-economic damages. For instance, statutory limits to recovery of non-
economic damages strongly influenced both the Italian50 and the German5' experi-
48. Comandd, supra note 11,142ff.
49. An example of this possible cross fertilization can be found in Richard Lewis, Methodsfor Calculating Damages for Loss of Future Earnings, 2 J. PERS. INJ. 151 (2002); Richard Lewis,
Robert McNabb & Victoria Wass, A New Way to Assess Damages for Loss of Future Earnings,
NEW L.J. 1042 (2002); and Richard Lewis, Robert McNabb & Victoria Wass, Loss of Earnings
Following Personal Injury: Do the Courts Adequately Compensate Injured Parties?, 113 ECON.
J. 568 (2003), where the authors compare North-American and English methods for assessing
future loss of earnings and proposing a new model based on the American experience.
50. The Italian civil code literally restricts non-economic damages to instances provided for
by the legislature. CODICE CIVILE [C.c.] art. 2059 ("Non-patrimonial damages shall be awarded
in cases provided by law.").
51. Recovery of non-pecuniary loss is generally excluded unless the statute explicitly pro-
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ence, while the physical impact requirement has strongly influenced common law
systems.5 The Anglo-American experience shows distinctive features as well.
However, we focus first on the United States and the United Kingdom, because
they shared the first evolutionary steps. We will identify some overall common
trends, despite different conceptions.
Indeed, it is relatively easy to chart the titles of non-pecuniary damages avail-
able to a personal injury victim in common law systems. 53 To some extent, the his-
tory of non-pecuniary loss recovery revolves around the sole pain and 
suffering. 54
It is still the main title of damages for intangible loss and it is present in every
common law country. 55 All other forms of non-pecuniary damages developed
from it, and judges and legislatures have always tried to drive non-pecuniary dam-
ages within its compass. Loss of amenity of life and loss of enjoyment of life
sprang from pain and suffering, both in the United Kingdom and in the United
States respectively. For these reasons, the notion of pain and suffering has
changed over time and we can clearly understand it only after recognition of the
other main titles of non-pecuniary damages.
Very often, the term of art "pain and suffering" is still used to encompass all
damages for intangible loss (a sort of synecdoche under which all non-pecuniary
damages are awarded), though its technical meaning has a more restricted connota-
tion.56 This Part will show, in all the countries surveyed, a trend to clearly identify
and distinguish between pain and suffering (as subjectively perceived pretium dol-
oris) and loss of enjoyment of life (as an "objective" damage to health and bodily
integrity). Therefore, we concentrate on these predominant titles of intangible
loss, 57 which have had a different evolution in each common law system.
vides the contrary. See, e.g., Birgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB][Civil Code] Jan. 1, 2002,
Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBI] § 253. An example of a code which allows recovery of non-pecuniary
loss is Btirgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB][Civil Code] Jan. 1, 2002, Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBI] §
847, regarding compensation for pain and suffering for bodily harm or impairments of health.
52. Traditionally, this provision required tortfeasor's fault and it did not apply to almost all
statutory strict liability regimes. The original version of § 847 has been replaced by § 253 par. 2
which provides that non-pecuniary loss has to be compensated in any case of injury of body,
health, freedom and sexual self-determination. For further details, see ULRICH MAGNUS, LE
RECENTI REIFORME DELLA RESPONSABILIT. CIVILE TEDESCA, 1N DANNO E RESPONSAB.ILITA,
1269-72 (2002).
53. Both tort law and contract law award damages for non-pecuniary loss. Under tort law
this is in fact the rule, but under contract law, the award constitutes an exception. See generally,
DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES, DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURY (2d
ed. 1993); HARVEY McGREGOR, McGREGOR ON DAMAGES § 92.2 (1988).
54. For a general introduction to pain and suffering and its main legal problems, see
STUART SPEISER, CHARLES KRAUSE & ALFRED GANS, THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS 70
(1990). If the damages are predictable, some civil law traditions do acknowledge the possibility
of awarding pain and suffering damages. See e.g., CODE CIVIL [C. C1v.] art. 1150 (Fr.); CIVIL
CODE OF QUEBEC art. 1607 (1991) (Quebec, Can.).
55. See Stephen D. Sugarman, A Comparative Law Look at Pain and Suffering Awards (un-
published manuscript, on file with author), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/faculty/
sugarmans/Depaul%202%20clean.doc.
56. See infra Part I.B.1.
57. Physical inconvenience and discomfort are two other types of non-pecuniary damages.
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1. Some Historical Hints on Pain and Suffering, its Description, and its
Functions
The history of pain and suffering discloses a shift first in its functions and
then in the kind of harm it actually redresses. A brief history of it helps to explain
how the move from an eminently punitive perspective to a more compensation ori-
ented one could have rested on the same notion of pain and suffering.58
Pain and suffering awards started with an obvious punitive intent in the sev-
enth century, 59 as a sort of fine for breach of the King's peace. When juries started
to assess it, they were still looking more to place blame than to compensate the ac-
tual loss. 60 In the eighteenth century, cases expressly mentioned the physical pain
and sorrow of the victim,61 but it is only in Scott v. Sheperd62 that the expression
"pain and suffering" is actually used. Chief Baron Pollock clearly synthesized the
common understanding of awards for non-pecuniary damages until the nineteenth
century:
They are more frequently assessed in England under breach of contract (Hipkiss v. Gaydan,
[1961] C.L.Y. 9042 (U.K.); Elmcroft Dev. Ltd. v. Tankersley-Sawyer, (1984) 15 H.L.R. 63(C.A.) (U.K.)); and only rarely as a different damage for deceit (Saunders v. Eduards, [1987] 1
W.L.R. 1116 (C.A.) (Eng.)); false imprisonment (MCGREGOR, supra note 53); or nuisance (Bun-
clark v. Hertfordshire County Council, (1977) 234 E.G. 381 (Q.B.) (U.K.)). Sometimes they are
awarded when the plaintiff shows some physical discomfort without any actual physical manifes-
tation. See JOHN MUNKMAN, DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURY AND DEATH 130 (10th ed.
1996). Sometimes they are awarded for discomfort other than physical. See Piper v. Daybell
Court-Copper, [1969] E.G.D. 535 (Q.B.) (U.K.). The ancient "social discredit" is sometimes
given for malicious prosecution and false imprisonment (Savil v. Roberts, (1699) 91 Eng. Rep. 14(K.B.); Walters v. Alltools, (1944) 61 T.L.R. 39 (C.A.) (Eng.)), but never for breach of contrac-
tual relationships (Addis v. Gramphone Co., [1909] A.C. 488 (U.K.); Bailey v. Bullock, [1950] 2
All E. R. 1167 (K.B.) (Eng.)). In the U.K., loss of society and relatives (loss of consortium) was
substituted by a fixed amount for bereavement by the Administration of Justice Act of 1982, § 3(U.K.). In the United States, it is sometimes awarded as an amount distinct from pain and suffer-
ing. For a list of minor types of non-pecuniary losses sometimes awarded as part of a larger
amount of pain and suffering, see H. STREET, PRINCIPAL OF LAW OF DAMAGE, 68-70 (1975).
58. See Jeffrey O'Connell & Keith Carpenter, Payment for Pain and Suffering Through His-
tory, 50 INS. COUNS. J. 411 (1983). The history began with the English tradition, though it ex-
perienced a subsequent split, creating one for the U.S. and one for the U.K. These days, the idea
persists of retaining pain and suffering only for intentional wrongdoing or for the most serious
cases. See, e.g., Ingber, supra note 39, at 809 (proposing full compensation for non-economic
damages only in cases of intentional wrongdoing); Warren A. Seavey, Torts and Atoms, 46 CAL.
L. REV. 3, 11-12 (1958) (proposing that pain and suffering damages be limited to cases involving
conscious wrongdoing and wrongful acts).
59. See BENJAMIN THORPE, ANCIENT LAW AND INSTITUTES OF ENGLAND 33 (1840).
60. See, e.g., SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW, 149-60 (2d ed. 1996) (1898); Anthony J. Sebok, The Fall and Rise of Blame
in American Tort Law, 68 BROOK. L. REv. 1031 (2003).
61. See Benson v. Frederick, (1766) 97 Eng. Rep. 1130 (K.B.); Beadmore v. Carrington,
(1764) 95 Eng. Rep. 790 (K.B.).
62. (1773) 95 Eng. Rep. 1124 (K.B.). In legal literature, the expression was only used for a
few years afterwards. See JOHN WENTWORTH, GEORGE TOWNSEND & JAMES CORNWALL, A
COMPLETE SYSTEM OF PLEADING 437 (1797-99); JOSEPH CHITTY & THOMAS CHITTY, A
TREATISE ON PLEADING (1809). The first British case on point seems to be Pippin v. Sheppard,
(1822) 25 Rev. Rep. 746, 749 (Exch. Div.) (Eng.).
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A jury most certainly have a right to give compensation for bodily suf-
fering, unintentionally inflicted. But ... I never made a claim in respect
of it, I look on it, not so much as a mean of compensating the injured
person, as of damaging the opposite party. In my personal judgment, it
is an unmanly thing to make such a claim. Such injuries are part of the
ills of the life, on which every man ought to take his share.
63
In the United States, compensation for pain and suffering has also been
awarded since early times.64 Nevertheless, it is only since the 1820s that we can
find frequent records of those awards.65 The usual rationale was that courts, in
awarding damages, should take into consideration the sufferings from pain endured
by the plaintiff.66 Already in the mid-nineteenth century, pain and suffering was a
clearly defined category of damages, and its function was compensation oriented.
For example, Morse v. Auburn & Syracuse Railroad,67 refused the dominant idea
of pain and suffering as a sort of punitive damage for intentional torts.
In fact, pain and suffering gained a larger hold in the legal system when its
main function started to shift from a punitive perspective toward a compensatory
one. 68 After World War II there was a significant increase in the amount of money
awarded; 69 an escalation that occurred in conjunction with the intensification of
63. Theobald v. Railway Passengers Assurance Co., (1862) 26 Eng. L. 8 Eq. R. 438 (em-
phasis added).
64. See, e.g., Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1 (1808).
65. See e.g., Lisley v. Bushnell, 15 Conn. 225 (1842); Worsters v. Proprietors of the Canal
Bridge, 33 Mass. 541 (1835); Sompson v. Henry, 28 Mass. 379 (1831); Reed v. Davis, 21 Mass.
216 (1826).
66. Lincoln v. Saratoga & Southern R.R., 23 Wend. 425 (Sup. Ct. Judicature N.Y. 1840).
67. 10 Barb. 621, 624-25 (N.Y. App. Div. 1851) (recovering damages for pain and suffer-
ing).
68. In the same period, most treatises began to discuss the issue. See, e.g., SIMON
GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1850); ISAAC F. REDFIELD, A
PRACTICAL TREATISE UPON THE LAW OF RAILWAYS (1858). For a detailed history of pain and
suffering, see Jeffrey O'Connell & Theodore M. Bailey, The History of Pain and Suffering, in
O'Connell & Simon, supra note 39, at 83-109.
69. See O'Connell & Carpenter, supra note 58 at 413. Indeed, case law analysis confirms
this hypothesis. See, e.g., Loftin v. Wilson, 667 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 1953) (awarding $300,000);
Runge v. Everbrite Elec. Signs, Inc., as quoted in 22 NACCA L.J. 404 (1958) (awarding
$95,000); Wolfe v. General Mills, Inc., 35 Misc. 2d 996, (N.Y. App. Div. 1962) (awarding
$240,300). This increase was explained as the outcome of the use of demonstrative evidence.
See O'Connell & Bailey, supra note 68 at 103-04. For demonstrative evidence on pain and suf-
fering, see MELVIN BELLI, MODERN TRIALS 1639 (1954); DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN
AMERICAN REMEDIES, CASES AND MATERIALS 150 (3d ed. 2002). For aper diem evaluation and
blackboard argument, see HAROLD LUNTZ, ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURY
AND DEATH 168-72 (1990); C. Hayes Cooney, Note, Per Diem Evaluation of Pain and Suffering:
Its Property in the Courtroom, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1303 (1962); J. Olender, Proof and Evaluation
of Pain and Suffering in Personal Injury Litigation, 1962 DUKE L.J. 344; and James 0. Pearson
Jr., Per Diem or Similar Mathematical Basis for Fixing Damages for Pain and Suffering, 3
A.L.R. 4TH 940 (1981).
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automobile circulation. 70  Moreover, the development of insurance policies for
third-party liability contributed to change monetary awards for pain and suffering
into compensation, rather than a surrogate for private retaliation.7 1
In summary, in common law systems, damages for pain and suffering evolved
from a tool of punishment and reprobation, as stated by Baron Pollock, to a com-
pensatory title of damages, as stressed in Morse. This important move occurred
almost without an apparent change in the actual notion of pain and suffering.
2. The Medical Notion of Pain and Suffering, and its Legal Implications
Pain and suffering is a term of art,72 used without any distinction between the
two component terms, although there are clear differences between them, both his-
torically and medically. Traditional definitions describe the term "pain" as a sud-
den affliction of the nerves related to a physical harm of the person who suffered
the injury.73 The term "suffering", on the other hand, describes an affliction not
directly related to a physical harm - it is more an individual emotional response.
Consequently, we associate the concept of suffering with the fear felt when the in-jury occurred 74 and the subsequent anguish 75 or embarrassment and fear for one's
health.76 In summary, we associate the term "suffering" with every kind of mental
suffering. However, usually damages can only be awarded for each of these men-
tal disturbances or distress if the plaintiff shows some verifiable psychiatric symp-
70. Some authors suggested this increase was related to the originally primary punitive goal
of pain and suffering. See O'Connell & Bailey, supra note 68, at 108.
71. See Deborah R. Hensler, Money Talks: Searching For Justice Through Compensation
For Personal Injury and Death, 53 DEPAUL L. REv. 417, (2003) (revising modem theories on
damages compensation). Hensler writes:
'Money talks.' Money is a medium of exchange for labor and products. But it is also a
medium for conveying social meaning. Voluntary monetary transfers can demonstrate
individuals' acceptance of responsibility for the consequences of wrongdoing, sympathy
for those less fortunate than they, solidarity with members of their community who have
suffered misfortune, or obligation to family members or others. Socially mandated
transfers - in the form of fines, civil damages, alimony, child support, social security
payments, or taxes - express group norms. Norms establishing the amount of money
that should be paid in these different circumstances also convey meaning about how
large an obligation one set of people has to another and about how much recipients de-
serve from these others. Whenever money changes hands, it carries with it multiple
messages about personal and social relationships and about personal and social worth.
But these messages are so embedded in the culture that many people rarely stop to con-
sider them.
Id. at 451-52.
72. DAVID KEMP & MARGARET KEMP, THE QUANTUM OF DAMAGES 1008 (Andrew
Ritchie ed., 1991).
73. Such a definition is proposed by CHARLES MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
DAMAGES § 88 (1935).
74. See Boston v. Cheasepeake & Ohio Ry. Co, 61 N.E.2d 326 (Ind. 1945).
75. See generally DeLoach v. Lanier, 125 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. Fla. 1954).
76. For a broad definition of the term, including embarrassment and sadness for a physical
disfigurement or fear for one's own health, see Administration of Justice Act, 1982, § 1 (U.K.).
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toms7 (e.g., some objectively ascertainable manifestations of an illness).78 Cer-
tainly, emotional distress is also an important non-pecuniary damage and, as we
will see, it can be conceptualized better according to the proposed framework. 79
In short, pain remains inherently a physical sensation due to a corporal harm
(a bodily experience), and suffering is mainly an emotional experience reacting to
the physical pain.80 A negative physical event is historically the real starting point
for any occurrence of pain and suffering. This feature has helped to overcome the
inherently contradictory tension between the compensation goal and the discour-
agement of trivial, or even fraudulent, claims.
Although the fertile ground for damage claims for non-pecuniary loss re-
mained mainly in the sphere of physical injury, the perspective of judges and juries
changed dramatically over time.81 The switch is still going on, and the physical
injury requirement that originally helped limit the claims has lost most of its effect
due to developments in medicine, psychology and psychiatry. 82 The physical in-
jury requirement, without more, is unable to help limit the claims, because it has
become the requirement of a mere (even minimal) physical impact.83 Nonetheless,
77. See R. DIAS & B. MARKENSINIS, TORT LAW 413 (1984) (underlining the need of psy-
chiatric symptoms). See generally DOBBS, supra note 53; DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., TORTS AND
COMPENSATION: PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY (4th
ed. 2001).
78. Indeed, the Supreme Court has defined negligent infliction of emotional distress in these
terms:
[M]ental or emotional injury apart from the tort law concepts of pain and suffering. Al-
though pain and suffering are mental harms, these terms traditionally have been used to
describe sensations stemming directly from a physical injury or condition. [Instead,
negligent infliction of emotional distress] is mental or emotional harm (such as fright or
anxiety) that is caused by the negligence of another and that is not directly brought
about by a physical injury, but that may manifest itself in physical symptoms.
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 544 (1994) (citations omitted).
79. This comment will discuss damages for emotional distress later because the process of
limiting (and thus acknowledging) these damages is better understood once the historical patterns
followed by non-economic damages accompanying a physical injury have been illustrated.
80. In this sense, see, for example, Cramer, supra note 37, at 972; and Yale David Koskoff,
The Nature of Pain and Suffering, 13 TRIAL 21, 22 (1977).
81. On the contrary, the physical impact requirement - the need of a physical contact caus-
ing the injury to health - has become more controversial in the last decades, revealing itself as a
residue of previous attempts to reduce the risk of uncontrollable trivial litigation. For general and
preliminary information, see MCGREGOR, supra note 53, at 53. See also Hinze v. Berry, [1970] 2
Q.B. 40 (U.K.).
82. See, e.g., RON MELZACK & PATRICK WALL, GATE CONTROL THEORY OF PAIN 11
(1968); Ben A. Rich, A Prescription for the Pain, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 18-21 (2000)
(revising the distinction between pain and suffering by revision of literature).
83. See, e.g., Cramer, supra note 37, at 969-70 (stating that "physical pain is the neurologi-
cal response to physical damage to the body"); Koskoff, supra note 80, at 22; N. Werchick, Un-
measurable Damages and a Yard Stick, HASTINGS L.J. 263, 266 (1965) (referring to "a more lo-
calized sensation of discomfort, distress, or agony resulting from the stimulation of nerve
endings"). However it seems clear that "pain" is still, in a medical sense, a feeling connected to a
physical injury. See, e.g., Cramer, supra note 37, 969-70; Koskoff, supra note 80, at 22. For a
scientific point of view, see 1 JOHN J. BONICA, THE MANAGEMENT OF PAIN (2d ed. 1990). Note
that these arguments stimulated deep reflections in the 1950s and 1960s among medical doctors
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84there is still resistance to awarding damages solely for mental suffering. In one
way or another, most of the ancient arguments against awarding damages solely
for mental suffering persist even now: the fear mainly being that equating the men-
tal suffering from both physical harms and from non-physical harms could widen
the field to imaginary claims. 8 5 In effect, when mental shock manifests itself with
some physical symptoms, courts see no problem in redressing the mental suffer-
ing 86 endured by the victim.
s7
The technical definition of pain and suffering, shared by all common law sys-
tems, better attaches to its most ancient notion in its continuous developing proc-
ess.88 This notion can be described in terms of pretium doloris (price of suffer-
ing)89 and it expresses the original aim to compensate only pain and sorrow that
and law scholars. See generally GREEN, supra note 35, at 88; James, Jr., supra note 35, at 297;
Plant, supra note 35, at 210.
84. See infra Part I.B.6-7.
85. See Victorian Ry. Comm'rs v. Coultas, [1888] 13 App. Cas. 222, 226 (P.C.) (U.K.) (ap-
peal taken from Vict.). Medical developments and psychologists' theories have made the con-
fines between physical and mental illnesses more diaphanous; moreover, the existence of physical
pain without any particular psychical pathological condition may restate the distinction between
"pain" and "suffering." For further commentary on this problem, see Somerville, supra note 39,
at 286-87, who advocates for greater analytical rigor in the use of pain on the one side, and suffer-
ing on the other.
86. See Dupey v. T.K. Maltby Ltd. & Strick Line Ltd., [1955] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 645 (Q.B.)
(Eng.).
87. Indeed, it is also useful to mention mental distress or mental anguish, nervous shock and
neurosis as separate titles of intangible loss not related to a bodily injury. Mental distress (or
mental anguish) does not always stem from a physical injury. See MUNKMAN, supra note 57, at
121-23. Mental distress can, nevertheless, sustain autonomously an action for damages recovery.
Therefore, it is different from mental suffering that cannot sustain an action for damages by itself,
as acknowledged by case law. See, e.g., Lynch v. Knight [1861] 9 H.L.C. 577 (Eng.) ("The gen-
eral principle embedded in the common law is that mental suffering caused by grief, fear, anguish
and the like is not assessable" or "mental pain or anxiety the law can not value, and does not pre-
tend to redress, when the unlawful act complained of causes that alone."). However, damages
have been given "for the mental suffering arising from the apprehension of the consequences of
the publication." Goslin v. Corry, [1844] 135 Eng. Rep. 143, 147 (C.P.); see also Ley v. Hamil-
ton, [1935] 153 L.T. 384, 386 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (giving damages "[for] the insult
offered or the pain of a false accusation"); McCarey v. Associated Newspapers, [ 1965] 2 Q.B. 86,
104 (U.K.) (giving damages for "injury to the feelings"); Saunders v. Eduards, [1987] 1 W.L.R.
1116 (C.A.) (Eng.) (giving damages for deceit); Millington v. Duffy, [1984] 17 H.L.R. 232 (C.A.)
(giving damages for trespass to property). Damages have also been denied for mere disappoint-
ment. See Hamlin v. Great Northern Ry. Co., [1856] 1 H&N 408, 411 (Eng.); MCGREGOR, supra
note 53, at 53.
88. This understanding of pain and suffering is clearly summarized by 2 AM. L. INST.
ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY: APPROACHES TO LEGAL AND
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, 199-200 (1991) ("Pain and suffering is a term that actually covers a
number of categories of non-pecuniary loss.., tangible physiological pain suffered by the victim
at the time of injury and during recuperation ... anguish and terror felt in the fact of impending
injury and death, .... immediate emotional distress and long-term loss of love and companionship
resulting from the injury or death of a close family member ... the enduring loss of enjoyment of
life by the accident victim who is denied the pleasures of normal personal and social activities
because of his permanent physical impairment.") (emphasis added).
89. See Jean Limpens et al., Liability for One's Own Act, in XI INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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accompanies a physical injury,90 in order to exclude imaginary or fraudulent
claims. It also helps to explain why consciousness is an essential requirement for
awarding pain and suffering, and why the so-called unconscious plaintiff doctrine
is the crucial legal issue from which other titles of non-pecuniary damages flowed
from pain and suffering.
3. The Semantic Bifurcation in Damages for Intangible Loss, and the
Unconscious Plaintiff.
In all common law countries, in a claim for pain and suffering, the plaintiff
must show both duration and consciousness of the pain and suffering.9 1 Con-
sciousness refers to the mental situation of a human being aware of his/her own
condition and of the surrounding world. An unconscious person is not aware and
does not react to external stimuli.92 There are several categories of unconscious
persons, for example, comatose people 93 and seriously brain-damaged individuals,
who are all unconscious of the changes they have suffered due to a personal injury;
and, at the extreme of this doctrine, should not recover anything for pain and suf-
fering.94 In the end, the unconscious plaintiff doctrine apparently leads to the
paradoxical result that the "greater the degree of brain injury inflicted by a (negli-
gent) defendant, the smaller the award the plaintiff can recover in general dam-
ages." 95 Since 1962, this paradoxical situation has lead the United Kingdom to re-
fuse to reward an unconscious plaintiff with damages for pain and suffering,96 but
to still allow damages for loss of amenity of life.97
Legal systems following the Western legal tradition tackle the unconscious
plaintiff differently. However, in general we find one of two possible solutions.
The first one awards only a symbolic sum or nothing to unconscious plaintiffs. 98
Following an alternative path, some countries, such as the United Kingdom,
France, and Italy, have adopted a clear distinction between pain and suffering (as
pretium doloris that relies only on personal perception) and loss of enjoyment of
COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 14.
90. See AM. L. INST., supra note 88, at 199-200. Each of the components (pain, suffering)
of the locution have progressively changed their meaning and now it seems that they include even
psychical suffering even not connected with bodily harm. Id.
91. See Leebron, supra note 8, at 268.
92. MARK MUMENTHALER, NEUROLOGY 12-13, 163-64 (2d ed. 1986); FRED PLUM &
JEROME B. POSNER, THE DIAGNOSIS OF STUPOR AND COMA 19 (3d ed. 1982).
93. Regarding awards for loss of enjoyment of life, two separate and sometimes confusing
issues exist. The first is whether such awards should constitute a separate category. The second is
whether they should be payable to comatose plaintiffs.
94. See, e.g., Heidi Li Feldman, Harm and Money: Against the Insurance Theory of Tort
Compensation, 75 TEX. L. REv. 1567, 1593 (1997) (arguing that courts must compensate coma-
tose victims to increase their recovering capacity).
95. McDougald v. Garber, 504 N.Y.S.2d 383, 386 (N.Y. 1986).
96. "Because of its nature, sorrow can be compensated only by happiness." Stolker, supra
note 38, at 257.
97. Wise v. Kay, [1962] 1 Q.B. 638 (U.K.).
98. Hans Stoll, Penal Purposes in the Law of Tort, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 3, 94 (1970); see
also Rogers, supra note 7, at 257 (detailing the solution adopted in Belgium and the Netherlands).
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life (as a more "objective" title of non-pecuniary damages susceptible of being
framed according to the severity of the resulting health and bodily injury). In these
legal systems, it is the actual damage to the victim's health that matters and not the
victim's own perception of it. Moreover, compensation for loss of amenity of life
reaffirms the social value of bodily and health integrity. For instance, in the
United Kingdom, damages for loss of amenity of life "are awarded for the fact of
deprivation; a substantial loss, whether the plaintiff is aware of it or not."
99
Notwithstanding the distinction between pain and suffering and loss of amen-
ity of life, the former plays the role of a catch-all category. 100 It is still somewhat
prevalent in all common law countries to grant a single award without distinguish-
ing between pain and suffering and loss of amenities of life or loss of enjoyment of
life. 10 1 Hence, it is difficult to parse out the award for the physical injury itself and
for the suffering.'0 2 Therefore, even with a clear distinction between suffering and
physical impairment, between subjective and "objective" basis, as we will see, pu-
nitive and compensative perspectives might be still unreasonably commingled.
4. Loss of Amenity of Life in the British Commonwealth
The history of loss of amenity of life is a peculiar one. It was first assessed in
the United Kingdom and it was not recognized in the United States until more re-
cent times. Since the nineteenth century, it has been clear that "[i]n assessing...
compensation the jury should take into account ... the injures [the] victim sus-
tained in his person, or his physical capacity of enjoying life."'0 3 In fact, "loss of
99. Lim Poh Choo v. Camden & Islington Area Health Auth., [1980] A.C. 174, 188 (U.K.).
In the 1960s, Judge Morris had already pictured the distinction between the two different titles of
damages in his opinion in H. West & Son Ltd. v. Shepard, [1964] 2 A.C. 326, 349 (U.K.):
An unconscious person will be spared pain and suffering and will not experience the mental
anguish which may result from knowledge of what has in life been lost or from knowledge
that life has been shortened. The fact of unconsciousness is therefore relevant in respect of,
and will eliminate, those heads or elements of damage that can only exist by being felt or
thought or experienced. The fact of unconsciousness does not, however, eliminate the actual-
ity of the deprivation of the ordinary experience and amenities of life that may be the inevita-
ble result of some physical injury.
However, see the opinion of Lord Pearce in that same decision: "[W]here there is little or no con-
sciousness of deprivation there can be little or no damages." Id. at 364-68. In 1972, the Pearson
Commission suggested abolishing all damages for the unconscious plaintiff. PEARSON COMM'N,
1 REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON CIVIL LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL
INJURY 393 (1978).
100. See, e.g., Capelouto v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 500 P.2d 880, 883 (Cal. 1972) ("[P]ain
and suffering" is a "unitary concept" that "has served as a convenient label under which a plain-
tiff may recover not only for physical pain but for fright, nervousness, grief, anxiety, worry, mor-
tification, shock, humiliation, indignity, embarrassment, apprehension, terror or ordeal.").
101. See KEMP & KEMP, supra note 72, at 302; see also 3 J. F. CLERK& W. H. LINDSELL,
ON TORTS 231 (7th ed. 1982) ("The practice is for judges to make one assessment of damages in
respect of pain and suffering and loss of amenities of life."). It is also the same in the United
States. See Cramer, supra note 37, at 984 (stating that separate awards could make non-
pecuniary damages more foreseeable).
102. A. I. Ogus, Damages for Loss of Amenities: For a Foot, a Feeling or a Function?, 35
MOD. L. REV. 1, 2 (1972).
103. Fair v. London & North Western Ry., [1869] 21 L.T. 326, 327 (D.C.) (Eng.).
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amenity" is the name commonly and conveniently (but not very happily) given to
the non-economic consequences of the destruction or diminution, permanent or
temporary, of a faculty, which deprives the injured person of the ability to partici-
pate in normal activities, and thus, to enjoy life to the fullest and to take full advan-
tage of the opportunities that it otherwise might offer. 1 4 Very often, loss of fac-
ulty 10 5 and loss of enjoyment of life10 6 are alternative phrases for this expression in
the United Kingdom. In particular loss of faculty makes it clear that loss of amen-
ity of life is strictly related to damage to one's health.
An opinion, in a well-known Australian case, clearly illustrates the view
widely adopted in the British Commonwealth:
Loss of amenities.., is not a loss of something in the same sense of loss
of a possession of an earning capacity is. A man who loses a limb, his
eyesight, or his mind, does not lose a thing that is his, as his ox or his ass
or his motor car is his, but something that is part of himself, something
that goes to make up his personality. 1
104. Teubner v. Humble, (1963) 108 C.L.R. 491 (Austl.). For further commentary, see
LUNTZ, supra note 69, at 172.
105. See CLERK & LINDSELL, supra note 101, at 23; W. SALMOND & R. HEUSTON, LAW OF
TORTS 642 (1996).
106. MUNKMAN, supra note 57, at 126; STREET, supra note 57, at 62.
107. This clear discussion comes from an Australian decision. See Skelton v. Collins,
(1966) 115 C.L.R. 94, 130 (Austl.). The opinion continues:
Money may be a compensation for him if having it can give him pleasure or satisfaction. If
his expected years of life have been made less, money may enable him to cram more into the
time that remains.... But the money is not then a recompense for a loss of something having
a money value.
Id. at 131. See generally Harvey McGregor, Compensation Versus Punishment in Damages
Awards, 28 MOD. L. REV. 629, 649-53 (1965); SALMOND & HEUSTON, supra note 105, at 643.
The Skelton v. Collins case partially reflects the so-called functional approach as it was adopted in
1978 by the Supreme Court of Canada in three decisions, widely referred to as "the trilogy." See
Arnold v. Teno, [1978] 83 D.L.R.3d 609; Thornton v. Bd. of Sch. Trustees of Sch. Dist. No. 57,
[1978] 83 D.L.R.3d 480; Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alta. Ltd., [1978] 83 D.L.R.3d 452. In one of
the "trilogy" cases, the Court explained that this approach provides a rationale as to why money is
considered compensation for non-pecuniary losses: "Money is awarded because it will serve a
useful function in making up for what has been lost in the only way possible, accepting that what
has been lost is incapable of being replaced in any direct way." Andrews, 83 D.L.R.3d at 454.
For general information on the Canadian experience of personal injury damages, see A. Bisset &
A. Johnson, Damages for Personal Injuries - The Supreme Court Speaks, 25 McGILL L.J. 316
(1978); B. Feldthusen & J. McNair, General Damages in Personal Injury Suits: The Supreme
Court Trilogy, 28 U. TORONTO L.J. 381 (1978); M. Trebilcock, The Social Insurance-Deterrence
Dilemma of Modern North American Tort Law: A Canadian Perspective on the Liability Insur-
ance Crisis, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 929 (1987); S. M. Waddams, Compensation for Non-
Pecuniary Loss: Is There a Case for Legislative Intervention?, 63 CANADIAN L. REV., 734
(1985). See also R. Devlin, Liability Versus No-Fault Automobile Insurance Regimes: An Analy-
sis of the Experience in Quebec, in CONTRIBUTIONS TO INSURANCE ECONOMICS (Georges
Dionne ed., 1992); Marc Gaudry, The Effects on Road Safety of the Compulsory Insurance, Flat
Premium Rating and No-Fault Features of the 1978 Quebec Automobile Act, in REPORT OF THE
INQUIRY INTO MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT COMPENSATION IN ONTARIO 1-28 (1988).
The functional approach is rather opposed to the diminution of value approach adopted by
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Under U.K. law, when the victim is unconscious there will only be an award
for loss of amenity of life and nothing for pain and suffering.' 0 8 Even a permanent
state of euphoria due to a brain injury receives compensation. 0 9 The focus is on
the relevance of the injury to health, objectively ascertainable because it amounts
to an illness medical expertise can categorize apart from individual perception. In
fact, the main question regarding loss of amenity of life is whether we should
evaluate it subjectively or objectively. 110 A shift from the former approach to the
latter happened in England in 1937, awarding compensation to the estate of a de-
ceased victim."' Later, it became clear that U.K. courts assessed the main portion
of the damages for non-pecuniary loss as compensation for the loss of the faculty
itself;"12 for the damages to health that impairs a life that continues.
5. Loss of Enjoyment of Life in the U.S. Experience
There is almost no difference between "loss of enjoyment of life" and "loss of
amenity of life," but for the fact that the latter expression is commonly used in the
British Commonwealth and the former in the United States to distinguish these
terms from pain and suffering." 3 This trend is a logical development of the tradi-
tional notion of pain and suffering. 14 Although the distinction between pain and
suffering and loss of enjoyment of life is less clear and more questioned among
courts and scholars in the United States than in the United Kingdom, it is possible
to identify a similar trend to distinguish loss of enjoyment of life as damage to
health and bodily integrity in the meaning described above. 115 In the United States,
all examined countries. In this latter approach, damages are meant to put a value on what the
claimant has lost, irrespective of how the sum awarded will be spent. THE LAW COMM'N, supra
note 34, at 11 (clearly stressing that a truly functional approach is inimical to the "development of
a tariff of damages for different injuries, as the level of awards depends on what substitute pleas-
ures are appropriate for particular claimants").
108. Lim Poh Choo v. Camden & lslington Area Health Auth., [1980] A.C. 174, 188 (U.K.)
(clearly stating that damages for loss of amenities of life are awardedfor the fact of deprivation, a
substantial loss, whether the plaintiff is aware of it or not). But see Wise v. Kay, [ 1962] 1 Q.B.
638 (U.K.); H. West & Son Ltd. v. Shepard, [1964] A.C. 326 (U.K.).
109. For a list of English cases, see STREET, supra note 57, at 63.
110. Then, the overriding issues were unconsciousness and immediate death. See generally
John Fleming, The Pearson Report: Its "Strategy, " 42 MOD. L. REv. 249 (1979) (analyzing the
main policy concerns and proposal of the Pearson Commission).
111. Rose v. Ford, [1937] A.C. 826 (U.K.).
112. H. West & Son Ltd., [1964] A.C. 326.
113. Although various other terms, such as "right to live as a whole man" or "inconven-
ience," have been used to describe much the same element of damages.
114. As a more detailed analysis could confirm, pain and suffering has historically compen-
sated only pain and sorrow that follows from a physical injury. But each of the components (pain
and suffering) of the locution have progressively changed their meaning and now it seems that
they include even psychical suffering not connected with biological damage. However, note that
the physical impact/injury requirement is still in the focus of the debate. For a detailed history of
pain and suffering, see O'Connell & Bailey, supra note 68.
115. Because compensation for suffering can be awarded to third persons not directly physi-
cally injured in a given accident, the distinction between pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment
of life will be decisive in restoring clarity to the non-pecuniary losses category and its adjudica-
tion. See Loss of Enjoyment of Life as a Distinct Element or Factor in Awarding Damages for
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one can distinguish three main understandings of non-pecuniary damages in this
regard. Some jurisdictions deny any autonomy to loss of enjoyment of life as a title
of damages. On the contrary, it is relevant in a large number ofjurisdictions today,
but often as a parameter for awarding damages for pain and suffering. For a third
position, in a growing number of jurisdictions, loss of enjoyment of life is a form
of damages clearly distinct from both loss of earning capacity and pain and suffer-
ing. 1
1 6
From a technical standpoint, most of the cases regarding loss of enjoyment of
life turn upon arguments about jury instructions. More particularly, the issue is
whether it is permissible to instruct a jury on loss of enjoyment of life, and, if so,
how this is to be done. In fact, several jurisdictions either accept or request evi-
dence on loss of enjoyment of life, even if they do not award a separate amount for
it. The reason is often to justify, on appeal, the amount awarded. 117 The dominant
interpretations on this issue take into account loss of enjoyment of life in assessing
damages, by either considering it as a factor in a pain and suffering award or as a
singular form of damages clearly distinct from pain and suffering. Both sets of ju-
risdictions instruct juries accordingly.
. a. Loss of Enjoyment of Life as a Factor to Assess Pain and Suffering
The best way to sketch this developing trend in those jurisdictions in which
loss of enjoyment of life is only a factor of pain and suffering is to illustrate some
leading cases." 8 For instance, in Grunenthal v. Long Island Railway Co. the court
instructed the jury on the necessity of considering all the effects of the injury on
the "normal pursuit and pleasure of life, in assessing pain and suffering." ' 19 On the
other hand, in Huff v. Tracy120 the court justified its denial of a separate jury in-
struction on loss of enjoyment of life to avoid the risk of a double recovery, be-
cause pain and suffering already includes loss of enjoyment of life as a compo-
nent.121 In Willinger v. Mercy Catholic Medical Center the argument used to
refuse damages for loss of enjoyment of life was the requirement of consciousness.
The court stated that awarding non-pecuniary damages to an unconscious plaintiff
goes against "the compensatory objective of awarding damages to tort victims. ' 122
Sometimes, courts award loss of enjoyment of life together with pain and suf-
Bodily Injury, supra note 40, at 293.
116. Id. at 294.
117. McAlister v. Carl, 197 A.2d 140 (Md. 1964).
118. For background information, see Marth, supra note 38, at 459; Mishkin, supra note 38,
at 639; Peck, supra note 39, at 1355.
119. 388 F.2d 480, 484 (N.Y. 1968).
120. 129 Cal. Rptr. 551 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
121. This seems to be the reading of the California case offered by Cramer, supra note 37
(reporting Huff v. Tracy as one of the cases that accepts a bifurcation in the non-pecuniary losses).
122. 393 A.2d 1188, 1191 (Pa. 1978) (stating that compensation for the loss of life's ameni-
ties is recoverable only if the victim survives the accident giving rise to the cause of action). In
this case, the issue on appeal was whether or not there was a right to give instructions to the jury
regarding loss of enjoyment of life. See id; see also Loss of Enjoyment of Life as a Distinct Ele-
ment or Factor or Awarding Damages for Bodily Injury, supra note 40, at 302.
20051
HeinOnline  -- 19 Temp. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 267 2005
TEMPLE INT'L & COMP. L.J.
fering and physical disability. 12 3 In the landmark case Flannery v. United States,
the court noted that the evaluation of loss of enjoyment of life, even as a pain and
suffering component, should be "objective," otherwise in some extreme cases there
could be serious problems. 124 Where courts would rely on a victim's own sense of
deprivation there could be almost no non-pecuniary damages when the injured
party is a child, or a "sad" person who almost does not know anything about the
"pleasures of life." On the other hand, in some States, such as Utah, loss of en-
joyment of life is strictly considered a component of mental suffering only. 125
Courts in Texas provide representative examples of the continuous metamor-
phosis of loss of enjoyment of life.126 In 1901, the Court of Civil Appeals of Texes
acknowledged, "[t]he matter, though pleaded, is too vague to furnish any informa-
tion upon a definite subject upon which damages would arise or be allowed."
Hence, the court did not award anything for "loss of capacity for the enjoyment of
pleasure of life."' 127 Almost sixty years later, in Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v.
Handley, the same court justified its high assessment for pain and suffering be-
cause of the difficulty to continue living a life without the median fingers of one
hand.1 28 This meant that even under the rubric of pain and suffering, Texas took
into account bodily integrity'as a relevant individual interest protected by the law,
when it was not speculative (i.e., objectively discernible in terms of illness or dis-
ability).129
The cases reported reveal that in several jurisdictions courts are confident that
non-pecuniary damages, as a whole, take into account the interest protected by loss
of enjoyment of life (health and bodily integrity as an instrumental tool and a value
as such); but, due to the lack of a clear distinction, there is still a significant fear of
duplicate damages. It is still the old and wise argument based on the suspicion of
double recovery or trivial claims that accompanies the entire history of pain and
suffering. 130 These cited cases also express the need/search for objective parame-
ters of evaluation, as opposed to the unreliability of the victims' 131 own apprecia-
123. At times those awards are quite big, as in a West Virginia case in which $1,300,000
was awarded for loss of enjoyment of life, $364,000 for past and future medical expense or nurs-
ing, and $535,855 for loss of wages to a semi-comatose plaintiff, unaware of his situation.
Flannery v. United States, 297 S.E.2d 433, 435 (W. Va. 1982).
124. Id. at 438.
125. See Judd v. Rowley's Cherry Hill Orchards Inc., 611 P.2d 1216 (Utah 1980) (stating
that loss of enjoyment of life overlaps with damages for pain and suffering).
126. See generally Loss of Enjoyment of life as a Distinct Element or Factor in Awarding
Damages for Bodily Injury, supra note 40, at 294.
127. Locke v. Int'l & Great Northern Ry. Co., 60 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901).
128. Mo. Pac. R.R. v. Handley, 341 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
129. However, in a recent N.Y. case, loss of enjoyment of life was not considered a separate
element of damages deserving a distinct award, but only a factor in assessing damages for con-
scious pain and suffering, thereby requiring a demonstration that plaintiffs have suffered some
physical injury or pain. Golden v. Manhasset Condo., 770 N.Y.S.2d 55 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003).
130. But see discussion infra Parts 1.6-7 (stating with some certainty that a well-defined line
between pain-and-suffering and loss of enjoyment of life can entirely avoid the problem of trivial
or even fraudulent claims).
131. See Collins Dictionary, supra note 2 (defining "objective").
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tion of the loss incurred. 132 In the next section, we find an attempt to solve this
problem in the other trend mentioned in American case law that we are analyzing:
the recognition of the loss of enjoyment of life as a separate source of damages.
b. Loss of Enjoyment of Life as a Separate Element of Damages
A more recent trend has developed in some American jurisdictions: 133 this
trend recognizes loss of enjoyment of life as a remedy for bodily injury, leaving
the task of redressing anguish and mental suffering to a more limited notion of pain
and suffering. This trend started in the 1960s. Serious bodily injuries were the
driving force for a different perspective on awarding damages for non-pecuniary
loss, implying that the less clear allegations of loss of enjoyment of life were con-
cealed in awards for pain and suffering.
134
Indeed, loss of enjoyment of life was the point of distinction between a
mainly punitive perspective and a more compensatory one. The former perspec-
tive reflects individual mental consequences and social disapproval for the wrong
132. See infra Part lI.
133. See, e.g., Lousteau v. K-Mart Corp., 871 So. 2d 618 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (arguing loss
of enjoyment of life is a separate element of general damages which must be determined by the
trial judge and which is not necessarily included in an award for general pain and suffering);
Blocker v. Rapides Reg'l Med. Ctr, 862 So. 2d 1220 (La. Ct. App. 2003); Hebert v. Old Republic
Ins. Co., 807 So. 2d 1114 (La. Ct. App. 2002); Brown v. Glaxo, Inc., 790 So. 2d 35 (La. Ct. App.
2001). But see Golden v. Manhasset Condo., 770 N.Y.S.2d 55 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (arguing it
is only a factor to be considered by the jury in assessing damages for conscious pain and suffer-
ing).
134. In a 1965 case, a court recognized loss of enjoyment of life as a separate element of
personal injury damages to compensate for the loss of the normal pursuit and pleasures of life.
Culley v. Pa. R.R. Co., 244 F. Supp. 710 (D. Md. 1965). Four years later, another court stated
that under Michigan law there was no differentiation of loss of enjoyment of life and pain and
suffering. Pierce v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 409 F.2d 1392 (6th Cir. 1969). On the contrary, the
Pierce court said that a clear distinction would facilitate every check upon the fairness of the
amount awarded. Id. In reaching its decision, the Sixth Circuit recognized the distinction be-
tween loss of enjoyment of life and pain and suffering to be lawful. Id. However, it was unwill-
ing to allow a distinct instruction to the jury, fearing that the speculative character of that form of
damages would excessively influence the jury. Id. However, another court restated the specula-
tive argument that:
The rule against recovery of 'speculative damages' is generally directed against uncer-
tainty as to cause rather than uncertainty as to measure or extent ... [t]hat is, if it is un-
certain whether the defendant caused the damages, or whether the damages proved
flowed from his act, there may be no recovery of such uncertain damages; whereas, un-
certainty which affects merely the measure or extent of injury suffered does not bar a re-
covery.
Sherrod v. Berry, 629 F. Supp. 159, 164 (N.D. I11. 1985). See also DOBBS, supra note 53, § 3.2-
3.4; FOWLER V. HARPER, FLEMING JAMES, JR., OSCAR S. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 25.3.
(1986). The Minnesota Supreme Court took a completely different. perspective. In 1978, it de-
cided that a jury could consider loss of enjoyment of life in awarding damages. Amunti v.
Payette, 268 N.W.2d 52 (Minn. 1978). A year later, the Nebraska Supreme Court stated that it
was not normally proper for a jury to have a separate instruction for pain and suffering and loss of
enjoyment of life. Swiler v. Baker's Super Market Inc., 277 N.W. 2d 697 (Neb. 1979). Neverthe-
less, when loss of enjoyment of life was the consequence of a serious personal injury and there
was enough evidence of it, courts should admit distinct instructions. Id.
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complained of, while the latter indicates a clear protection of individual health and
bodily integrity from third-party interference. Loss of enjoyment of life reveals its
conceptual autonomy in the United States, even if its redress is often still offered
by the traditional title of pain and suffering. Indeed, complete acknowledgement of
this bifurcation was not so far away. In 1980, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit conceived loss of enjoyment of life as entirely independent from pain
and suffering, denying any risk of duplicate recovery in cases of personal injury. 135
The court defined the nature and goal of compensating the loss, explaining that
pain and suffering compensates physical and mental discomfort for the injury
while loss of enjoyment of life compensates the victim "for the limitations of per-
son's life created by the injury.' 136
Thus, it is possible to divide the reported cases into two main sets. Before the
1960s, loss of enjoyment of life, whether recognized distinctly or not, was mainly a
factor in the assessment of pain and suffering. 37 Since then, loss of enjoyment of
life was more often awarded independently from pain and suffering, becoming a
central element of damages, moving from the periphery of tort law. 138 However,
as we have seen, courts have already recognized loss of enjoyment of life as a
proper title of damages and the real change could be in awarding it to unconscious
or dead plaintiffs. Still, these changes contributed to fundamental alterations. Fur-
ther, the trend of making a distinction between pain and suffering and loss of en-
joyment of life is increasing, judging from the reported cases. An open and com-
plete recognition of these differences would clarify the state of the law in the
United States, contributing to a reduction in uncertainty and deflation in the overall
debate on non-economic damages. In addition, it would ease the trade-off between
the need for an equitable evaluation of the damages and the countervailing need to
frame more objective evaluation criteria to make the loss predictable in insurance
terms. 139
6. Loss of Enjoyment of Life: A Notion Toward Compensating Damages
to Health and Bodily Integrity
Today, loss of enjoyment of life could be defined as a material modification
of the capacity to enjoy life, as clearly distinguished from the capacity to work and
from the suffering related to the injury. All of the precluded activities are not prof-
135. Thompson v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 621 F.2d 814 (6th Cir. 1980).
136. Id. at 824; see also Mariner v. Marsden, 610 P.2d 6 (Wyo. 1980) (finding that loss of
enjoyment of life is a compensable damage and a fact finder may either make a separate award
for loss of enjoyment of life or take into consideration the loss of enjoyment of life in arriving at
the total general damages).
137. See Burke v. United States, 605 F. Supp. 981 (D. Md. 1985).
138. See Cramer, supra note 37, at 966 (reporting that almost a half of the states in the U.S.
have acknowledged this metamorphosis). However, as we saw before, loss of enjoyment of life
was recognized before and the real change could be its award to unconscious or dead plaintiffs.
See generally Fearon, supra note 38, at 436-37.
139. The chronic lack of information does not affect insurance companies directly because
they should have some actuarial data to set the premiums. However, the poor information courts
have (e.g. juries always assess non-pecuniary damages for their first time), produces uncertainty
and affects both insurance companies' data and incentive litigation.
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itable ones in the sense that they do not allow money earning as such and are
wealth neutral. 140 The impaired activities are all expressions of one's individual
personality and pursuits; these impairments are "limitations on the person's life
created by the injury."'
14 1
Loss of enjoyment of life distinguishes itself today both from the loss of earn-
ing capacity, as well as from pain and suffering. It is a new title of damages that
has sprung from pain and suffering, the historical type of reparable losses that
comprehended all non-economic damages. 142 In the past, society could only de-
vote resources to ensure survival, and damages for loss of earning capacity and
out-of-pocket expenses conformed accordingly. 143 There was also a time in which
a moral sense of judgment and desire for deterrence forced the compensation of
some irreparable losses.' 44 Non-pecuniary loss assessment in the form of pain and
suffering expressed only societal blame for wrongful acts. Today, health and bod-
ily integrity have become central issues and primary interests worth compensation
and protection for their own sake, regardless of their utility to produce wealth or
their national protection. 145 In the United States, compensation for health and bod-
ily integrity use the vehicle of damages for loss of enjoyment of life.
This is not just a semantic bifurcation of non-economic loss. 146 Pain and suf-
fering and loss of enjoyment of life seek to redress different losses, despite the fact
they are often lumped together. The method of proving them is also different. To
establish loss of enjoyment of life, it is sufficient to demonstrate the victim's pre-
vious way of life and how the injury impaired it; that is, the degree of the health
impairment. This way, damages for loss of enjoyment of life correspond to the ex-
tent of the injury to individual health more objectively. The proof for pain and suf-
fering is theoretically more difficult because the plaintiff must show a physical in-
140. See Croley & Hanson, supra note 6, at 1778-79 (discussing that non-pecuniary losses
are wealth-neutral in the sense that they do not have an impact on wealth such as requiring an
elevator in the house after injury).
141. Cramer, supra note 37, at 972.
142. DOBBS, supra note 53, § 8.1; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 924 (1977).
143. RABIN, supra note 25, at 34 (stressing the need of a historically contextual perspective
on personal injury and more generally on tort law).
144. See, e.g., Richard Abel, Should Tort Law Protect Property Against Accidental Loss?,
23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 79, 99-100 (1986) ("At the same time that tort law affects the allocation
of resources ... it also reinforces the system of symbols by which the allocation is justified.").
Perhaps a significant role in moving forward the boundaries of compensation was performed by
the rules of negligence. After all, a fault-based system is better able to justify an award that re-
flects society's dislike or moral blame thorough an award otherwise not measurable in money.
See also Leebron, supra note 8 (arguing that deterrence is a better justification than compensation
for non-pecuniary losses).
145. See Stephen R. Perry, Tort Law, in A COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND
LEGAL THEORY 57 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1995) (arguing health is at the hearth of protected in-
terests in legal systems).
146. Crowe, supra note 37, at 1275 (using the expression "semantic bifurcation" and elabo-
rating on the idea it is possible to distinguish subjective and objective components in non-
pecuniary damages).
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jury, the suffering endured and the emotional responses to it 147 - a basket of ex-
tremely subjective evaluations for the jury. 148
Nevertheless, this is not entirely the actual situation because comprehensive
awards for non-pecuniary damages are still common, and several jurisdictions do
not expressly recognize loss of enjoyment of life as a separate element. 149 How-
ever, loss of enjoyment of life is developing rapidly as a different kind of remuner-
able loss from pain and suffering aimed at compensating health and bodily integ-
rity as such. As we have seen, historical rationales strictly link physical injury to
all non-economic damages. The reference to compensation for non-economic
damages accompanying pure emotional harm further elucidates these rationales.
7. From Physical Impact to Bystander Recovery: Accounts of Non-
Pecuniary Damages Accompanying Physical and Pure Emotional Harm
The evolution from the original unique title of non-economic damages (pain
and suffering) has led to a progressive fragmentation of the category into several
types; mainly to add loss of enjoyment of life to pain and suffering or to alter the
meaning of the latter to encompass the former. It appears also that health and bod-
ily integrity have become an interest deserving non-economic damage compensa-
tion, realized through damages for loss of enjoyment of life. This article previ-
ously described this evolution in damages for non-pecuniary loss accompanying
physical harm. These losses have a quite different history than pure emotional dis-
tress claims, which the common law recognized only later and in circumstances
that are more limited. 150 For instance, nobody doubts that embarrassment for dis-
figurement has received compensation since ancient times. In contrast, it has been
very questionable whether, for example, bystanders can recover non-pecuniary
damages.' 5 1 Indeed, it is inherently more difficult to evaluate how a person wit-
nessing an accident can suffer damage to his/her own health. The ancient dictum
"mental pain or anxiety the law cannot value, and does not pretend to redress,
147. See Cramer, supra note 37, at 979.
148. However, proof is usually given by testimony, frequently that of relatives; furthermore,
expert testimony is not necessary and usually it only serves to prove the reality of pain and suffer-
ing. See Cook v. Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co., 626 F.2d 746, 752 (9th Cir. 1980); Curnow v.
W. View Park Co., 220 F. Supp. 367, 369 (W.D. Pa. 1963). Note, yet, that all non-pecuniary
damages are general damages and it is not necessary to prove the exact amount of them; it is
enough just to demonstrate their existence. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §
905 (1977).
149. See Fearon, supra note 38, at 429.
150. For a description of the prima facie elements of negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress and a discussion of its status, see Annotation, Modern Status of Intentional Infliction of
Mental Distress as Independent Tort: "Outrage", 38 A.L.R. 4TH 998 (1985); Charles E. Cantu,
An Essay on the Tort of Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress in Texas: Stop Saying It Does
Not Exist, 33 ST. MARY'S L.J. 455 (2002); and Barry J. Koopman, Note, A Rule of Which Pro-
crustes Would be Proud: An Analysis of the Physical Injury Requirement in Negligent Infliction
of Emotional Distress Claims Under Iowa Law, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 361 (2003).
151. See, e.g., David J. Leibson, Recovery of Damage for Emotional Distress Caused by
Physical Injury to Another, 15 J. FAM. L. 163 (1977); Pamela Cogan Thigpen, Negligent Inflic-
tion of Emotional Distress: New Horizons After Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hosps., 13 PAC.
L.J. 179 (1981) (stressing the growth in the number of such claims).
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when the unlawful act complained of causes that alone" still appears to
command.152 Nevertheless, the titles of non-pecuniary damages accompanying
both physical harm and pure emotional distress are theoretically the same.
Emotional distress is by definition a psychologically caused damage. It usu-
ally consists of psychological disturbances, often accompanied or followed by
physical ones, the material cause of which is not an immediate physical injury. It
is beyond the scope of this article to discuss whether the legal system should re-
dress intangible loss accompanying pure emotional harm. Nor is the aim of this
section to discuss whether pure emotional distress is a proper basis for a claim.
Rather, its purpose is to connect the problems already solved in redressing non-
pecuniary loss accompanying physical harm to the limits historically imposed on
emotional distress, in order to identify a possible comprehensive framework for
awarding damages for intangible loss, regardless of the physical or emotional event
that gave rise to them.
This article discussed earlier how questions surrounding the notion of pain
and suffering and the attempt to anchor mental suffering to objective evidence
(usually a physical harm or an ascertainable illness) contributed to create "pain and
suffering" as a term of art. Intangible loss caused by pure emotional distress rests
on emotional harm in which the dividing line between mere mental suffering and
ascertainable illnesses tends to be even more diaphanous. Quite often, issues of
causation and policy are commingled in deciding whether to award damages for
emotional distress. 53 However, several arguments on the proper grounds for the
claim are, surprisingly, connected to the notion - and proof - of the non-
economic damages to be awarded. Further, the main policy argument used to re-
fuse payment for non-pecuniary damages accompanying both physical and emo-
tional harm is the prevention of trivial or fraudulent claims.'
54 Sometimes, fear of
excessive burdens posed by civil liability allies itself with this policy considera-
tion 155 or with the obvious uncertainty of evaluation. In reality, the sole rationale
152. Lynch v. Knight, (1861) 11 Eng. Rep. 854 (K.B.). *A different story seems to be appli-
cable for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court's reluctance to recognize a legally
.protectable independent interest in emotional distress had to do with presumed difficulties of
proof and valuation and a fear of fraudulent claims and a flood of litigation. Today, however, a
majority of jurisdictions acknowledge the existence of an independent tort of intentional infliction
of emotional distress, and few refuse it expressly. See Modern Status of Intentional Infliction of
Mental Distress As Independent Tort: "Outrage ", supra note 150.
153. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 12 (5th
ed. 1984); DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 229 (2000).
154. This is an old argument (Spade v. Lunn & Boston R.R. Co., 47 N.E. 88, 89 (Mass.
1897)), though it was sometimes criticized (Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 917-18 (Cal. 1968)).
In fact, the original rationale for denying recovery for such losses relied mostly on the risk of
speculative or fraudulent claims: it is the "flood of litigation" argument. Mitchell v.'Rochester
Ry. Co., 45 N.E. 354 (N.Y. 1896).
155. See, e.g., Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress: The Case for an Independ-
ent Tort, 59 GEO. L.J., 1237, 1244 (1971); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 313,
cmt. d, § 436 cmts. f-h (1965) (applying to negligent infliction of emotional distress, and noting
that actions causing unintentional emotional distress are not actionable unless the actor should
have realized his or her conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing the distress).
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for this denial was either fear of an unlimited liability burden for defendants and
society as a whole, or the burden of administering such uncertain claims. It is a
policy argument, and courts treated it accordingly. Therefore, the debate was
mainly about causation. This was true to an even greater extent in the awarding of
non-pecuniary damages accompanying pure emotional harm. Consequently, courts
created several doctrines, attempting to provide reliable guidance for solving the
dilemma between either denying compensation altogether or assuming the risk of
fraudulent and trivial claims in cases of emotional distress.156
The first legal doctrine elaborated with this end in view was the so-called
"physical impact" rule. At the end of the nineteenth century, the legal principle
was that the law does not compensate nervous shock without physical harm. 157
The argument was approximately this: emotional distress without physical harm
was too remote a consequence; it would only increase the litigation rate.' 58 Hence,
easily verifiable proof of physical impact became the key to the trial, offering a
rule of thumb. Today the lack of a logical ground for the theory is easy to per-
ceive, once we either reflect on the fact that psychiatry is still unable to say how
much of a disease is due to organic modification, or consider such expressions as
"to die of fright" and "to go mad with pain," which express a possible reality that
might happen and which medicine can prove.
The physical impact theory, although it was losing much of its grip in view of
the alleged goal of screening claims, ruled for a long time. In fact, "impact has
been found to mean any physical contact, however slight."' 159 Moreover, medical
156. The point is clearly expressed by Eugene Kontorovich, The Mitigation of Emotional
Distress Damages, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 491, 493 (2001), who stated that "[t]he history of emo-
tional distress represents an ongoing attempt by courts to balance the conflicting goals of full
compensation and precluding fraudulent or de minimis claims - with the balance shifting ever
more towards compensation."
157. See Victorian Ry. Comm'rs. v. Coultas, [1888] 13 A.C. 222 (P.C.) (appeal taken from
Vict.) (U.K.); Mitchell, 45 N.E. 354; Ward v. W. Jersey & Seashore R.R. Co., 47 A. 561, 561
(N.J. 1900) (holding that emotional harm without physical injury was not a basis for fear dam-
ages).
158. Note, however, that the argument applies only for negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress. In fact, there are no doubts for non-pecuniary loss awards in case of intentional infliction of
emotional distress. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965). In this case intent per-
forms as a proxy for legal causation.
159. KEETON ET AL., supra note 153, § 54. The policy concerns underlying this kind of
damages are also clearly recognized in George v. Jordan Marsh Co., 268 N.E.2d 915, 918 (Mass.
1971), where the court stated:
The right to recover for these items of damages [emotional distress that results in physi-
cal harm] should not be denied just because they do not fit in any of the exiting niches in
the ancient walls surrounding the law of torts. If the current needs of society require andjustify so doing, the walls may be extended and additional niches built to accomplish
justice.
The court also quotes Spade, 47 N.E. 88, and its policy reasons (noting that recognizing them
would open a wide door to unjust claims and the extreme difficulty to administer such tort rules).
See generally R. EPSTEIN, CHARLES 0. GREGORY & HARRY KALVEN, JR., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TORTS 1039 (8th ed. 1990) (distinguishing between remoteness and fear of ex-
cessive litigation as a distinct early argument to deny recovery). In the U.K., both remoteness and
floodgate arguments were refused. Dulieu v. White & Sons, [1901] 2 K.B. 669 (U.K.) (refusing
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development eased proving impact, whatever it could be, and it became an anach-
ronistic requirement, easy to manipulate. 160 In 1921, Goodrich realistically said:
"the magic formula 'impact' is pronounced; the door opens to the full joy of a
complete recovery."1 61 The fiction of treating intangible loss accompanying pure
emotional distress as if it was accompanying a physical harm is rather clear, and it
finds a reasonable explanation, though not a justification, in the historical evolu-
tion of non-economic damages.
Since the 1960s, American courts have started to depart from this theory;
ceasing to look for a physical impact, they instead searched for the danger of
physical impact.' 62 Indeed, the next shift was toward the so-called "zone of dan-
ger" rule. 163 Under the zone of danger doctrine,164 victims who were not directly
physically injured could seek compensation for their intangible loss. All they
needed to prove was that they reasonably feared for their own bodily 
integrity. 165
Implicitly, to be in the zone of danger meant that the. damages complained of were
foreseeable and plausible because they could have occurred. Indeed, this doctrine
gave only a reasonable proxy for non-fraudulent actions and for negligent behav-
ior. The existence of non-pecuniary damages was still closely reliant upon a
physical bodily injury, though in an even more fictitious way: the material danger
of it. Clearly, this theory too is a mere pretext 166 to filter the number of potential
the "actual impact" requirement). Note that the improvement in the law was limited to "shock
which arises from a reasonable fear of immediate personal injury to oneself' (emphasis added);
that is, to the "zone of danger" rule. Id.
160. Even dust in the eyes (Porter v. Del., Lackawanna & W. R.R Co., 63 A. 860 (N.J.
1906)) or a horse defacating onto plaintiff's lap (Christy Bros. Circus v. Turnage, 144 S.E. 680,
681 (Ga. Ct. App. 1928)) were a sufficient impact to allow compensation. For a critical comment
on these evolutions, see Andrew J. Simons, Psychic Injury and the Bystander: The Transconti-
nental Dispute Between California and New York, 51 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1, 8 (1976).
161. Herbert F. Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 MICH. L. REV.,
497, 504 (1922). In the mid-eighties, five jurisdictions in the United States were still applying the
physical impact doctrine. Glenn M. Troost, Workers' Compensation and Gradual Stress in the
Workplace, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 847, 858 n.46 (1985).
162. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 379 P.2d 513 (Cal. 1963), overruled by Dil-
lon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968). Indeed, before Dillon, California allowed recovery only
under the zone of danger test. See Robert J. Rhee, A Principled Solution for Negligent Infliction
of Emotional Distress Claims, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 805 (2004) (offering a complete and well-
reasoned analysis of the evolution and rationale for negligent infliction of emotional distress).
163. Williams v. Baker, 572 A.2d 1062 (D.C. 1990) is a recent application of the rule. See
also Tibbetts v. Crossroads, Inc., 411 N.W.2d 535, 538 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) ("A plaintiff may
not recover damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress unless the plaintiff shows that
the defendant's action resulted in either physical injury or physical danger to the plaintiff.").
164. After courts acknowledged the arbitrariness of the physical impact rule, fear of physi-
cal impact to oneself or the zone of danger was enough. See Richard N. Pearson, Liability to By-
standers for Negligently Inflicted Emotional Harm - A Comment on the Nature of Arbitrary
Rules, 34 U. FLA. L. REV., 477, 478 (1982).
165. At first glance, the argument appears illogical because it assumes that everybody fears
only for himself and not for someone else, such as a sibling. See Leibson, supra note 151, at 172.
166. This assumption seems to be clearly stated by Kontorovich, supra note 156, at 493,
who stated that "at each stage of the liability expansion, courts have attempted to limit recovery to
categories of cases where the emotional distress seems most likely to be genuine and substantial,
such as where the distress flows from a physical injury to a plaintiff." But see Julie A. Davies,
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claims, despite the famous assertion of Judge Keating that, "[a]ny limitations, if
needed, should be developed on a case by case basis, using proximate cause and
foreseeability as a means to avoid anomalous results.' 67 He added: "The only real
requirement ... which policy and justice dictate, is stringent evidence of causa-
tion and of actual injury to deter those who would use sound and just rule as a
cover for spurious claims."'
168
The real target of this theoretical construction was the search for a legal de-
vice to screen claims, and - once again - it failed to match its objective by
merely linking the claim to the fear of bodily injury without framing it in a broader
setting. Continuing the historical analysis can help develop a better understanding
of the origin and rationale of these doctrines, as well as the reasons for their short-
comings and the possibility of developing a clearer framework.
8. Historical Patterns Towards a Framework: From Physical Harm to
Recognizable Illness and Disability
As previously discussed, initially damages for pain and suffering - then the
only title of intangible loss accompanying physical and mental harm - prevented
private retaliation, especially for intentional wrongs. Moreover, the ancient notion
of pain and suffering revolved around physical pain. Hence, physical impact was
the usual way to cause intangible loss before formally becoming a legal require-
ment. Pain and suffering was mostly physical pain due to a physical harm, 69
which of course implies a physical impact, and it was also the only non-pecuniary
damage for emotional distress. Because the physical origin of the intangible loss
was the only reasonable proxy for the cause of action, physical harm was an easy
rule of thumb to determine the fraudulence of a claim, as it merely photographed
the reality. Later on, loosening its grip and fading into the "zone of danger" doc-
trine for pure emotional distress claims, the original factual reasons of the doctrine
were lost, but the artificiality of the zone of danger doctrine soon became apparent
as well.
The landmark case of Dillon v. Legg clearly shows the artificiality of the zone
of danger, rejecting the rule on appeal. 170 The California Supreme Court elabo-
rated on the original physical injury/impact requirement, looking for justifications
of "the rights of the victim and the scope of the defendant's responsibilities."' 71 In
Direct Actions for Emotional Harm: Is Compromise Possible?, 67 WASH. L. REv. 1, 22-23(1992) (appreciating the results this doctrine produces).
167. Tobin v. Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419, 425 (N.Y. 1969) (Keating, J., dissenting).
168. Id.
169. At that time, only few cases alluded to pain other than physical. See, e.g., Lisley v.
Bushnell, 15 Conn. 225 (1842).
170. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968) (expressly overruling Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply
Co., 379 P.2d 513 (Cal. 1963)).
17 1. Martha Chamallas & Linda K. Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the Law of Fright: A His-
tory, 88 MICH. L. REv. 814, 857 (1990).
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Dillon, Erin Lee Dillon's mother and sister witnessed her death in a car accident.
The trial court gave compensation to the sister for her emotional and physical suf-
fering. However, it dismissed the mother's complaint because, despite proximity
to Erin Lee, the accident never threatened the mother's life. In reversing the trial
court judgment, the Supreme Court of California challenged all of the arguments
for the zone of danger rule, marking it as an "artificial abstraction which bar[s] re-
covery, contrary to the general rules."' 172 Then the court tried to enumerate new
guidelines, such as the need for a close relationship between direct victim and by-
stander and psychological proximity to the place of the accident, 73 to make more
plausible the causal connection between the alleged health injury and the accident
involving the third-party. Ten years later, an independent cause of action for neg-
ligent infliction of serious emotional distress was recognized. In Molien v. Kaiser
Foundation Hospitals, the Supreme Court of California said: "The attempted dis-
tinction between physical and psychological injury merely clouds the issue. The
essential question is one of proof; whether the plaintiff has suffered a serious and
compensable injury should not turn on this artificial and often arbitrary classifica-
tion scheme."'
174
Again, in this decision the important issue for us it is not whether a viable
cause of action exists in any American jurisdiction, but the actual notion of dam-
ages for intangible loss the court uses. The reported opinion in Molien recalls a
clear recognition that humans have a physical and a psychological component,
both of which contribute to one's health. However, it also acknowledges that, be-
cause health integrity (both physical and psychological) is the interest protected by
some non-pecuniary damages for intangible loss in personal injury, it does not
make a difference if the harm is inflicted by a physical or an emotional injury.
Damage to health caused only through a physical harm or only through a psychical
wrongdoing share a common feature: both are damages to one's health that deeply
alters a victim's life. Having acknowledged these evolutions, it is possible to sig-
nal how a coherent screening test for intangible loss, accompanying both physical
harms and pure emotional ones - when the latter are recognized by law - is the
presence of a pathology: an illness or disability that a medical doctor can ascertain
according to scientific knowledge. Furthermore, as we will see, according to the
172. Dillon, 441 P.2d at 925.
173. For a critical list and analysis of these guidelines, see, for example, Rosalee A. Miller,
Bystander Recovery for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress in Iowa: Implementing an Op-
timal Balance, 67 IOWA L. REV. 333 (1982), where the author compares several cases; and Pam-
ela Cogan Thigpen, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: New Horizons After Molien v.
Kaiser Found. Hosps., 13 PAC. L.J. 179 (1981). Note also that this comment does not deal with
the interplay between risk perception and fear. For general information on this subject, see Guze-
lian, supra note 3, where the author debates the latest developments in federal courts and offers a
reconstruction of the restrictions imposed by American law to emotional harms.
174. 616 P.2d 813, 821 (Cal. 1980); see Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 819-30 (Cal.
1989) (providing a modem reading of the impact/injury requirement that sets bright line rules and
acknowledges the problems of the test devised in Dillon); Michael Jay Gorback, Negligent Inflic-
tion of Emotional Distress: Has the Legislative Response to Diane Whipple's Death Rendered the
Hard-Line Stance of Elden and Thing Obselete?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 273 (2002) (providing gen-
eral information on the legislative response to cases dealing with emotional distress).
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European experiences this selecting criterion helps to assess damages for loss of
enjoyment of life (or compensates damage to health and bodily injury, as we would
prefer to call it).
Thus, historical reasons explain the evolution of the titles of damages for in-
tangible loss accompanying both physical and pure emotional harm. Both physical
injury and reasonable fear for physical injury were initially trustworthy proxies to
check the validity of a claim and reliable tools to set guidelines for the evaluation
of each claim, but they are not any more. 75 In addition, these historical rationales
reinforce the continuous expansion of damages for intangible loss, with the aim of
offering compensation for damage to health and bodily integrity.
Furthermore, this historical path leads to envisaging a more efficient and co-
herent screening test than the current one for intangible loss relying on the pres-
ence of an ascertainable medical condition. Of course, this test requires a clear dis-
tinction between pain and suffering, defined as pretium doloris, and loss of
enjoyment of life, conceived as attempting to compensate damage to health and
bodily injury. Under the suggested framework either direct victims of a physical
injury - e.g, a person run over by a car - and those claiming intangible loss ac-
companying pure emotional distress - e.g., a mother witnessing the accident
from the safety of a balcony - have to prove that the alleged wrong actually
caused the illness complained of and the extent of health damages they suffered.
In providing the correct evidence, both victims could recover loss of enjoyment of
life (compensation for damage to health and bodily injury) and, to a different ex-
tent, pain and suffering. What is important to evaluate is the impairment of health
suffered, and not whether it accompanies a physical or purely emotional harm. 76
C. The European Views of the Cathedral: Experimental Circulation of
Awarding Approaches
American case law shows some hesitancy to openly acknowledge health and
bodily integrity as a deserving interest. A trend in this direction is entirely clear,
but it is not uniform yet among American jurisdictions. It would be better to opt
entirely for a plain distinction between pain and suffering (with the sole meaning
to redress mental-moral suffering) and loss of enjoyment of life (an attempt to take
175. W. Horton Rogers, England, in DAMAGES FOR NON-PECUNIARY Loss IN A
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 7, at 57 ("[W]here there is no physical injury the claim-
ant must establish that his loss falls within the principles governing psychiatric trauma or, as we
have traditionally said, 'nervous shock.'. . . The claimant must have suffered a recognizable psy-
chiatric illness."); see also infra Part II.A.3.
176. The theoretical equivalence between physical and emotionally caused harms appear to
be stressed with transparent clarity by Judge Mosk, stating:
In the light of contemporary knowledge we conclude that emotional injury may be
fully as severe and debilitating as physical harm, and is no less deserving of redress;
the refusal to recognize a cause of action for negligently inflicted injury in the ab-
sence of some physical consequence is therefore an anachronism. We further con-
clude that it is no less regressive to deny recovery for loss of consortium simply be-
cause the plaintiffs spouse has suffered a disabling but non-physical injury.
Molien, 616 P.2d at 814.
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care of health and bodily integrity as such, whether it accompanies a physical in-
jury or purely emotional harm), as often happens in Europe. This move could help
to set clear guidelines in their evaluation.
Such a clear distinction is enforced in the United States, although it is not
universally acknowledged. Comparison with European experiences, where the dis-
tinction operates more clearly, will show: (1) the benefits of this different reading
of non-pecuniary damages; and (2) its applicability to American jurisdictions in
order to provide guidelines for the judicial decision-making process. 177 Indeed, it
is worth following the venerable idea that when the movement of the law is not
straight and its "direction not always visible," all that "can be done is to point out a
tendency and to justify it." 178
1. The Distinctions Among the European Models; Their Convergent
Paths to Judicial Scheduling
So far, we have used the traditional common law language and its conven-
tional distinction within the category of non-pecuniary damages, between loss of
enjoyment of life (or loss of amenity as it is called in the United Kingdom) and
pain and suffering. However, when shifting to international scenarios this lan-
guage may be misleading in non-common law jurisdictions. In dealing with per-
sonal injury damages outside the common law world, we should not surrender to a
babel of languages and different notions across and within legal experiences. Ap-
parently, these notions are very diverse. Even if they come from the same inspir-
ing principles in terms of legal protection, their disparate significance could arouse
confusion in different cases and contexts of accidents. It may be the case of the
meaning given to expressions like smartengeld, pain and suffering, prejudice cor-
porel, prejudice d'agr~ment, daho corporal, daho moral, danno alla salute,
Schmerzensgeld, danno morale.
17 9
As seen with respect to common law experiences, tort systems have eventu-
ally acknowledged various titles of non-pecuniary damages. In addition, as the
previous sections show, the kinds of losses compensated under titles of damages,
such as pain and suffering or loss of enjoyment of life, have dramatically changed,
revealing a need for different parameters or new categories. Referring back to our
very first assumption, we argued that the changes in and the enlarged awards for
177. Again, the idea here is to offer some reliable guidelines. This comment suggests that
reliable guidelines are the other side of the problem, which is nicely pointed out by Lord Pearce
in H. West & Son Ltd. v. Shepard, [1964] A.C. 326, 368-69 (H.L.) (U.K.), who stated "[i]t would
be lamentable if the trial of a personal injury claim put a premium on protestations of misery and
if a long face was the only safe passport to a large award." However, this "safe passport" exists
only if there is not a bright line between "objectively" ascertainable non-economic damages, and
those that are not. For instance, in the U.K. in the 1970s, a sharp trend towards the use of stan-
dardized awards was discernable. See R. F. V. HEUSTON, SALMOND ON THE LAW OF TORTS 592
(16th ed. 1973).
178. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 77 (1881).
179. For information on several European Community member States, see generally Rogers,
supra note 7, at 245-96; Bernard A. Koch & Helmut Koziol, Comparative Analysis, in
COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURY IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 407, 419-34 (Bernard
A. Koch & Helmut Koziol eds., 2003); and Comand6, supra note 11, at 17-45.
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non-pecuniary loss correspond to substantial social modifications in Western so-
cieties. Those modifications happened through profound transformations of the
tort system or, stated otherwise, by using the tort system to match the demand for
protection of individual interests. Those transformations have enhanced the ful-
fillment of fundamental social values deeply rooted in the Western legal tradition
and in the modem Western constitutions. Indeed, in light of the results of an inter-
national working group, it is possible to find shared trends and values within the
European legal orders,' even using the broad definition of non-economic dam-
ages adopted at the beginning of this article.' 18 Protection of human dignity and
health, granted by Eurpeon Union Member States' constitutions and embedded in
international agreements and treaties, calls for the respect of an equal treatment
principle as well.' 82 They impose considerations of the same injuries and facts, but
call for the different treatment of dissimilar ones. Otherwise stated, these princi-
ples impose the avoidance of unjustified variations within levels of injury serious-
ness (principle of horizontal justice) and differentiation according to injury seri-
ousness and duration (principle of vertical justice).
Indeed, in Europe, it is undeniable that the health protection principle is a
shared fundamental value, which, as an offspring of the preservation of human
dignity, 183 finds its first common application in terms of a compensatory protection
for damages sustained by victims. 184 It finds its explicit or implicit articulation in
European constitutions and receives a similar specification iri the health protection
principle, both as a general interest and as an individual right.' 85 Still, we need to
identify non-economic damages worthy of compensation in cases of psychophysi-
cal integrity impairment and to draw guidelines for their compensation. Besides, it
is not possible to make any clear differentiation between psychological and physi-
cal health, both under legal technical and medical scientific profiles.'8 6 For these
reasons as well, several European countries found it useful to distinguish - at
least defacto - between damage to health and bodily integrity and mere psycho-
logical alterations or subjective predispositions. As evidenced before, the ascer-
tainable medical condition - documented illnesses and disabilities - objectively
180. See the results in Francesco D. Busnelli, Prospettive Europee di Razionalizzazione del
Risarcimento del Danno Non Economico, DANNO E RESPONSABILTA, Jan. 2001, at 5-11.
181. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
182. See Busnelli, supra note 180, at 5-11.
183. See Busnelli, supra note 180, at 6-8.
184. See Suzanne Galand Carval, France, in DAMAGES FOR NON-PECUNIARY LOSS IN A
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 7, at 87 ("[l]n personal injury cases, ... it is widely felt
- among both judges and scholars - that damages for non-pecuniary loss perform the funda-
mental fumction of expressing the society's acknowledgement of what is currently called the
'eminent dignity of the human being' (l'minente dignit de la personne humaine). And indeed, it
has been a decisive step to admit that the loss suffered by the victim of a personal injury is not
limited to the negative consequences of the accident on his working capacity.").
185. See, e.g., COSTITUZIONE [COST.] art. 32 (Italy).
186. See, e.g., Constitution of the World Health Organization, pmbl., July 22, 1946, 2
OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION 100 ("Health is a state of complete
physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity."); see
also supra Part I.B.6-7.
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appreciable by medical experts and judges, characterizes the former and better
identifies with the harms to health, however caused. Mere psychological altera-
tions, not amounting to an ascertainable condition, cannot be appreciated according
to objective parameters and would encompass transient sufferings such as anger or
temporary stress.
In several European jurisdictions, medical evidence plays a key role in distin-
guishing damages for intangible loss. Indeed, all European awarding systems
count on one form or another of medical description or evidence for non-economic
damages that would be pigeonholed as compensation for damage to health and
bodily injury, regardless of the actual words used to describe them.1 87 This role of
medical evaluation has proved critical in the presentation of an "objective" and
uniform estimation of non-economic damages to psychophysical integrity.
On these grounds, many European legal orders have adopted monetary
bareme (standardization using scheduling) based upon age and confirmed perma-
nent disability, or other economic values deriving from case law.' 88 These systems
rely upon the differentiation shown in non-pecuniary damages (objective vs sub-
jective assessment). As discussed herein, these are good examples of how the dis-
tinction between damages to health and pure pain and suffering eases the stan-
dardization process, which lays down the basic parameters needed to guarantee the
respect of the paramount equality principle in all legal systems.
2. The United Kingdom as a Paradigmatic Evolution of Awarding
Damages for Intangible Loss
Assessment of damages for non-pecuniary loss under English law experi-
enced a drastic change since the Court of Appeal decided to carefully monitor
awards after World War II and began to set standards, crafting brackets of values
on review of trial courts awards. Most likely, the policy for this innovation rests
on ease of calculation, consistency across cases, and predictability (to promote set-
tlements and maintain insurability). 189 A prominent English scholar has put it in a
187. See generally, Rogers, supra note 7, at 268-75 (stressing the different systemic impact
of medical evidence in several European Countries).
188. See infra Part I.C.2.
189. See, e.g., Ward v. James, [1966] 1 Q.B. 273, 299-300 (U.K.). The background idea in
this assessment evolution is clearly summarized in Wright v. British Rys. Bd., [1983] 2 A.C. 773,
784-85 (H.L.) (U.K.), where the court stated:
[I]t is an important function of the Court of Appeal to lay down guidelines both as to the
quantum of damages appropriate to compensate for various types of commonly occur-
ring injuries and as to the rates of 'interest' . . . . [S]uch guidelines . . . should be simple
and easy to apply though broad enough to permit allowances to be made for special fea-
tures of individual cases which make the deprivation caused to the particular plaintiff by
the non-economic loss greater or less than in the general run of cases involving injuries
of the same kind. Guidelines laid down by an appellate court are addressed directly to
judges who try personal injuries actions; but confidence that trial judges will apply them
means that all those who are engaged in settling out of court the many thousands of
claims that never reach the stage of litigation at all or, if they do, do not proceed as far
as trial will know very broadly speaking what the claim is likely to be worth .... A
guideline as to quantum of conventional damages or conventional interest thereon is not
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plain and straight forward way: "[I]f we cannot say what a leg or an arm is worth,
we can at least say that a leg today is worth the same as a leg tomorrow and we can
also say that an arm must be worth more than a hand."1 90 Lord Diplock clarified
the point, saying:
Any figure at which the assessor of damages arrives cannot be other than
artificial and, if the aim is that justice meted out to all litigants should be
even-handed instead of depending on idiosyncrasies of the assessor...
the figure must be 'basically a conventional figure derived from experi-
ence and from awards in comparable cases.' 19'
On these ideals, the British experience has developed, in the course of half of
a century, an approach to assess pain and suffering and loss of amenity of life. 192
As anticipated, very often courts award a single lump sum in respect of these titles
a rule of law nor is it a rule of practice. It sets no binding precedent; it can be varied as
circumstances change .... But though guidelines should be altered if circumstances
relevant to the particular guideline change, too frequent alteration deprives them of their
usefulness in providing a reasonable degree of predictability in the litigious process and
so facilitating settlement of claims without going to trial .... As regards assessment of
damages for non-economic loss in personal injury cases, the Court of Appeals creates
the guidelines as to the appropriate conventional figure by increasing or reducing
awards of damages made by judges for various common kind of injuries. Thus so called
'brackets' are established, broad enough to make allowance for circumstances which
make the deprivation suffered by the individual ... greater or less than in the general
run of cases, yet clear enough to reduce unpredictability of what is likely to be the most
important factor in settlement of claims. 'Brackets' may call for alteration not only to
take account of inflation, for which they ought automatically to be raised, but also, it
may be to take account of advances in medical science which may make particular kinds
of injuries less disabling or advances in medical knowledge which may disclose hitherto
unsuspected long term effects.
See also MUNKMAN, supra note 57, at 186-93.
190. P. S. ATIYAH, ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW 189, 216 (2d ed. 1975),
stating:
Although the courts have now definitely committed themselves to the 'tariff approach,
it is clear that many judges have had misgivings about the selection of particular arbi-
trary figures for particular disabilities. The main reason for this is that the fixing of arbi-
trary figures is, in the English legal system, generally seen as a legislative and not a ju-
dicial act. The drawing of arbitrary lines is not, on the whole, a common law process.
191. Wright, [1983] 2 A.C. at 777; see also Rushton v. Nat'l Coal Bd. [1953] 1 Q.B. 495,
502 (U.K.), stating:
The only way. .. in which one can achieve anything approaching a uniform standard is
by considering cases which have come before the courts in the pasts and seeing what
amounts were awarded in circumstances so far as may be comparable with the case
which the court has to decide.
192. See Rogers, supra note 175, at 66 (discussing standardization in personal injury com-
pensation); W. V. Horton Rogers, Compensation for Personal Injury in England, in
COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURY IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 179, at 76-
91 (providing a case as an example of the monetary assessment of pain and suffering and loss of
amenity of life). See generally THE LAW COMM'N, supra note 34.
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of damage.' 93 Trial judges and the Court of Appeal look at a sort of scale describ-
ing the severity of injury and offering a bracket of sample awards from precedents
on quantum. Since 1992, the Judicial Studies Board, 194 an independent body set up
in 1979, periodically publishes versions of these guidelines, updated to take into
account both inflation and new increasing/decreasing trends.' 95 Before, only pri-
vate collections containing disability descriptions and previous awards were avail-
able.
19 6
This system has brought about a great deal of standardization, because it led
to a sort of table based on the relative seriousness of different injuries. The large
collection of cases that has piled up over the years makes possible "quite precise
answers and in any case will give at least a starting point for reasoned argu-
ment."' 97 Note, however, that even where injuries are comparatively uniform and
produce very similar physical effect (e.g., loss of an arm) the guidelines are neither
a fixed tariff nor binding. Decision-makers will regard the effect on the actual
claimant. The focus is on the injury and the age of the victim, though decisions
rarely mention age expressly.
The British system is in slow but relentless evolution. After a consultation
paper in 1996, the English Law Reform Commission issued a report in 1999 urging
the "Court of Appeal and/or the House of Lords, using their existing powers to lay
193. Other common law countries such as Australia have that instead of making a global
award of damages, as a jury would, trial judges should itemise the particular heads of loss and, at
least provisionally, assign to each head the amount to be awarded as a component of the final
judgment". See Harold Luntz, Turning Points in the Law of Torts in the Last 30 Years, Address
Before the National Conference of the Australian Insurance Law Association (Aug. 14, 2003), in
15 INS. L. J. 1, 1-23, (2003), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-482162.
194. The Civil and Family Committee of the Judicial Studies Board is in charge of the
guidelines. See generally Judicial Studies Board, http://www.jsboard.co.uk (last visited Nov. 23,
2005). It is presently chaired by an Appeal judge and is composed of two High Court Judges, two
Circuit Judges, three District Judges, two scholars, one solicitor, one barrister, and a representa-
tive of the Ministry of Justice. See generally id. For the guidelines, see JUDICIAL STUDIES
BOARD, GUIDELINES FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF GENERAL DAMAGES IN PERSONAL INJURY CASES
(6th ed. 2002). These Guidelines are not in themselves law, since the Judicial Studies Board has
no legislative power but the Guidelines should be regarded with the respect accorded to the writ-
ings of any specialist legal author. See Arafa v Potter [1994] P.I.Q.R. 73, 79. Note also that the
Master of the Rolls, Lord Woolf, in his foreword to the third edition of the JSB Guidelines noted
that they are "the most reliable tool, which up to now has been made available to courts up and
down the land as to what is the correct range of damages for common classes of injuries."
JUDICIAL STUDIES BOARD, GUIDELINES FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF GENERAL DAMAGES IN
PERSONAL INJURY CASES (3d ed. 1996).
195. To the best of my knowledge, a reducing trend has never appeared in awards for non-
economic damages.
196. There are several british sources describing both injuries and awards. See, e.g.,
JUDICIAL STUDIES BOARD (6th ed.), supra note 194 (using an eight category classification based
on type and location of injury, with subcategories for more specific parts of the body); DAVID A.
KEMP ET AL., THE QUANTUM OF DAMAGES IN PERSONAL INJURY AND FATAL ACCIDENT
CLAIMS (4th ed. 2000) (using a thirteen category classification system based on both the area and
severity of the injury, with subcategories for more specific parts of the body); MUNKMAN, supra
note 57 (18-category classification system based on both the area and severity of the injury, with
subcategories for specific parts of the body and more specific types of injuries).
197. See Rogers, supra note 7.
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down guidelines as to quantum in the course of personal injury litigation" to adopt
recommendations for increasing non-pecuniary loss awards.1 98 The Court of Ap-
peal, in an unusual five-judge decision, finally followed the Law Commission's
recommendations and incremented the non-economic damage amounts awarded
for the most serious injuries. 199 The evolution of the English system required some
necessary components. Some of them are clearly present in the United States.
Obviously, one example is the considerable body of case law in which facts and
reasons for the decision are expressed in a quite detailed way.200 Other components
require a policy decision by the judicial system. This is a case of a conscious at-
tempt to improve control of non-economic damages by a centralized Court of Ap-
peal, while offering more guidance from the outset to the decision-maker, be it a
judge or a jury. Moreover, as put by a prominent scholar, the information made
available should be "easily accessible both at a 'simple' and a 'complex' level."2 0°
However, a note or comment comparing English and American experience
would emphasize that, contrary to the United States, the English system does not
usually use juries in civil trials. Notwithstanding this, in our opinion, there would
be no difference if knowledge of the permissible ranges for different injury types
were provided to judges or juries.20 2 Actually, the possible cross-fertilization be-
tween judges and juries is clearly stressed in the United Kingdom. For instance,
Lord Clyde, in Currie v. Kilmarnock and Loudoun District Council, emphasized:
In a system in which damages may be assessed in different cases either
by a jury or by a judge it is essential, not only for the profession, but also
for the court both in the making of awards and in the consideration of
awards which have been made, for there to be available a convenient re-
cord of awards by juries as well as by judges.20 3
Moreover, some authorities suggest that judges should take account of jury
awards in their own assessments of damages.204 A second obvious comment is that
English judges itemize their verdicts while American juries do not always do so.
However, this is a tradition courts can easily overcome, as has happened in Great
198. THE LAW COMM'N, supra note 34, at 7.
199. Heil v. Rankin, [2000] 3 All E.R. 138 (C.A.) (Eng.); see Richard Lewis, Increasing the
Price of Pain: Damages, the Law Commission and Heil v Rankin, 64 MOD. L. REV., 100 (2001)
(providing general information about this decision and its implication in the U.K. legal system).
200. See also infra Part III.B.3.
201. Rogers, supra note 7, at 276. An example of simplicity is offered by the Judicial
Board's Guidelines, which are revised and republished at least biennially. See supra note 194.
But see KEMP & KEMP, supra note 72 (providing an example of complexity).
202. The concept is clearly expressed by Sir Thomas Bingham who stated that "[alny legal
process should yield a successful plaintiff appropriate compensation, that is, compensation which
is neither too much nor too little. That is so whether the award is made by judge or jury. No
other result can be accepted as just." John v. MGN Ltd., (1995) Eng. Rep. 586, 611 (C.A.)
(Eng.).
203. THE LAW COMM'N, supra note 34, at 64.
204. Jury trials for personal injury are still available in Scotland.
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Britain without statutory intervention, and has already been overcome by some
American jurisdictions. 20 5
3. The German Approach and Its Similarities with the United Kingdom
The awarding model for non-pecuniary damages accompanying damage to
health and bodily integrity in Germany is similar to the British practice. In effect,
German practitioners and courts constantly refer to private compilations offering a
description of the case and of non-economic damages awarded.
Reforms that have recently taken effect, provide that non-pecuniary loss has
to be compensated in any case of injury of body, health, freedom, and sexual self-
determination.20 6 However, German practice had previously developed a sort of
indicative scheduling system to assess non-pecuniary damages for harm to health
and bodily integrity: namely to award Schmerzensgeld. Trial courts enjoy great
discretion in awarding compensation. Their assessment can be reviewed on appeal
only to check whether the outer limits of a reasonable award in like cases have
been respected and whether all relevant circumstances of the case in question and
the rules of logic or science have been regarded.20 7 Guidance has been available
since the late 1950s in the form of privately elaborated tables reporting the sums
and circumstances of decided cases (so-called Schmerzensgeldtabellen) for both
trial court and appellate judges.20 8
The wide use and relevance of these private compilations have in some way
exercised control over judicial discretion, by providing reasoned patterns for stan-
dardization without reducing the decisiveness of the individual circumstances of
each case. These Schmerzensgeldtabellen, as demanded by the German rules of
civil procedure, describe the injury suffered by the victim and the amounts
awarded according to claimant's request.
205. See infra Part III.B.3. See also James F. Blumstein, Randall R. Bovbjerg & Frank A.
Sloan, Beyond Tort Reform: Developing Better Tools for Assessing Damages for Personal Injury,
8 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 179-80 (1991), stating:
Our presumptive scheduling approach also, to a limited extent, resembles the British
model, except that we propose more systematic use of information by juries as well as
judges. The British apparently view their approach as taking judicial notice of prior
valuations rather than as binding judicial precedent. Our proposal calls for similarly
non-binding information, but its intent is to create a presumptive benchmark. In this re-
gard, our approach is more analogous to the federal criminal sentencing guideline,
which also provide a presumptive schedule of punishment from which judges can only
deviate by reference to factors not included in the calculus used by the scheduling
ranges.
206. Bargerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB][Civil Code] Jan. 1, 2002, Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBI] §
253, 2.
207. See, e.g., Ulrich Magnus, Schadensersatz ffir K6rperverletzung in Deutschland, in
COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURY IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 179, at
148-76.
208. There are several publications available on the market. See, e.g., SUSANNE HACKS,
AMELI RING & PETER BOHM, SCHMERZENSGELDBETRAGE (2004); LOTHAR JAEGER & JAN
LUCKEY, SCHMERZENGELD (2003); WALTER HAMPFNG & ARZTLICHE FEHLER,
SCHMERZENSGELDTABELLEN (1989).
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4. The French Original Experience of Judicial Scoring and Scheduling
Several other European jurisdictions show a tendency to use "objective" pa-
rameters to evaluate non-economic damages for health impairments linked to per-
sonal injuries. 20 9 Medical scientists mainly offer those parameters, which courts
use together with monetary scheduling often elaborated on by themselves or by
scholars relying upon previous decisions. In any event, the role of medical experts
is crucial in several, if not all, European jurisdictions where courts usually appoint
their own impartial experts.
In France, 210 prejudice physiologique (ou deficit physiologique ou deficit
fonctionnel) is the title that best expresses the notion of non-economic damages for
health and bodily harm. It encompasses non-economic damages for the permanent
reduction suffered by the victim, regarding physical, psychological or intellectual
functions. The medical expert (m~decin expert) has a fundamental role in award-
ing le prejudice physiologique,2 1 1 because they describe and quantify it in percent-
age points (le taux de 1'incapacitg permanente partielle) by way of authoritative
disability scorings, such as the "Bar~me indicatifdes deficits fonctionnels s9quel-
laires en droit commun. " This list of medical scoring points sets a rate for disabili-
ties, by recommending either a specific rate or a scale of rates for each of them.
Rates are expressed in percentage points and different chapters are devoted to dif-
ferent disabilities. These medical scorings tables are neither compulsory nor offi-
cial, although both the Cour de Cassation and the Ministry of Justice have ac-
knowledged them as a useful tool for uniform decision-making. Their authority
stems from widely recognized merit in the scientific arena.212
Courts usually appoint a medical expert (as usually happens in Italy as well)
and the expert assigns a percentage value to plaintiffs disability according to the
evaluation provided by her/him and by each litigant's medical expert. After this
209. In order to foster standardization, objective parameters, such as medical expertise are
important in Spain; also, over the last decade, Spanish scholars have begun to develop an
autonomous category of personal injury for non-economic damages (daho corporal). See gener-
ally Miquel Martin-Casals, Jordi Ribot & Josep SolM, Non-Pecuniary Loss Under Spanish Law, in
DAMAGES FOR NON-PECUNIARY Loss IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 7, at 192.
In Austria, in cases of bodily injury (defined as any negative effect on bodily or spiritual health
and integrity) objective clues for the difficult assessment of immaterial loss justify the award of
non-damages. See, e.g., E. Kamer & H. Koziol, Austria, in DAMAGES FOR NON-PECUNIARY
Loss IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 7, at 4.
210. For information on the French experience of awarding damages for personal injuries,
see Christophe Rad6 & Laurent Bloch, La Riparation du Dommage Corporel en France, in
COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURY IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 179, at
101-04.
211. See S. Galand-Carval, France, in DAMAGES FOR NON-PECUNIARY LOSS IN A
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 7, at 90. Galand-Carval also argues that along with ob-jective parameters, medical experts have an important role in measuring the so-called "personal
temporary incapacity" (l'incapacitg traumatique temporaire 6 caractAre personnel). Id. at 89.
212. Id. at 90 (quoting C. Rousseau that "one of the conditions for a fair compensation for
the victims' losses is that the criteria of their medical assessment be the same in Dunkerque, Men-
ton, Charleville and Bayonne." Commentaires sur le Bar~me "droit commun " dit du Concours
m~dical, in GAZETTE DU PALAIS (1994)).
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decision, courts only need to multiply the given percentage, decided in reliance on
medical testimony, by the monetary value currently assigned by the court for
claimants in similar circumstances. The monetary value assigned by the court de-
creases with age and increases with the disability rate. "Le calcul au point" (cal-
culation by percentage points) is the name commonly given to this second step of
the assessment; and it is determined by multiplying the victim's disability rate ex-
pressed in percentage points by the corresponding monetary value. In other words,
in a two by two matrix, at the intersection of each age and disability percentage,
the court finds a monetary value to multiply for the actual disability percentage it
has assigned to the plaintiff in its fact-finder capacity. 213 The system was first de-
veloped to assess the victim's future loss of earnings, but later the methodology of
the "calcul au point" was extended to non-economic damages as well.
It is important to stress that medical scoring and monetary scheduling were
developed independently of each other. Medical scientists developed the former at
a different time to propose uniform descriptions of health impairments. Courts de-
veloped monetary values to introduce some consistency in the assessment of dam-
ages. In a way, given the absence of external limitations (e.g., legislative tariffs)
the French Courts attach great importance to their previous awards and, averaging
these values, obtained their first monetary assessment for the calcul au point. Pe-
riodically, courts update the monetary value of the calcul au point to reflect both
inflation and different perceptions of the complained non-pecuniary loss. 214 Data
is collected on a local basis and each court of appeal keeps an updated local sched-
ule. Of course, this decentralized information elaboration process may appear
more costly than a centralized one. Still, it makes it easier to keep evaluation rea-
sonably uniform, but nevertheless close to the local public perception. A specific
statute dealing with traffic accidents (the so-called "loi Badinter" of 1985) re-
quired the periodic publication of all awards, judicial and by way of settlement, in
215personal injury cases.
Finally, the two sets of tables (the medical scoring ones and the monetary
scheduling ones) are neither rigidly binding for judges nor compulsory; indeed
they must not be so, according to the French Cour de Cassation.216 They only of-
fer a uniform starting point for fulfilling the principle of full compensation based
on individualized assessment of the personal, individual, and concrete situation of
the victim.
213. See supra Part I.C.5-6.
214. See. Galand-Carval, supra note 211, at 101. Note also that damages for disfigurement
and physical pain are assessed according to schedules calculated by reference to previous awards,
and judges indicate the lowest, largest and dominant awards of the past year for each of the sev-
eral scale degrees.
215. Article 26 of this statute provides: "Sous le contrdle de l'autoritd publique, une publica-
tion pdriodique rend compte des indemnitrs fixres par les jugements et les transactions." Law
No. 85-677 of July 5, 1985, Journal Officiel de la Rrpublique Frangaise [J.O.] [Official Gazette
of France], July 6, 1985.
216. Cass. 2e civ., Feb. 1, 1995, Bull. civ. II, No. 42.
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5. The Italian Synthesis, and the Role of Medical Scoring in Europe
The calcul au point has a corresponding, but more highly developed counter-
part in Italy, which is used for awarding damages for the impairment of physical
and psychical health (so-called danno alla salute or danno biologico): Indeed, It-
aly deals with non-economic damages for personal injury by way of awarding
damages for "danno alla salute" as an independent, indispensable title of non-
economic damages. This is distinguishable from pain and suffering, which is only
"awarded in cases provided by law." 217 Damages for danno alla salute have a
compensatory goal and, considering the constitutional protection devoted to fun-
damental individual rights, health "cannot suffer limits to the compensation for
damage done to it." 218 However, until the acknowledgement of this title of non-
economic damages by courts in the early 1980s, loss of earnings was the parameter
for awarding personal injury damages.
Within the old framework, personal injury damages included only the eco-
nomic loss to the injured coming from a diminution of his/her ability to work. All
the remaining losses were "ills of life" (to use Baron Pollock's expression).
Clearly, this interpretation was not satisfactory, especially in light of the 1948 Ital-
ian Constitution holding health as a paramount value and a collective interest. 219
Hence, trial courts in Pisa and Genoa followed a constitutional approach to per-
sonal injury damages, by establishing that everyone is entitled to health and by re-
shaping the category of damages for non-pecuniary loss through the creation of
danno alla salute. Since the 1980s, both the Italian Supreme Court (Corte di Cas-
sazione) and the Constitutional Court (Corte Costituzionale) have upheld these
creative case law trends, holding that courts are bound by the principle that dam-
ages caused by the infringement of the right to health must be compensated. Com-
pensation should ensue, even though damage to health and bodily integrity neither
reduced the ability to generate earnings nor caused pain and suffering (as pretium
doloris).220  Therefore, Italian case law has developed a distinction in the non-
217. Recently the Italian Corte di Cassazione and the Corte Costituzionale revisited the pro-
vision of art. 2059, reading it in a broader way in order to give non-economic damages in cases of
serious injury to fundamental rights. See Cass., sez. III, 31 may 2003, n.8827-28, in DANNO E
REsPONSABILIT,., Aug.-Sept. 2003, at 816 (with commentary by Francesco D. Busnelli, Chiaro-
scuri d'estate. La Corte di Cassazione e il danno alla persona, at 826; Giulio Ponzanelli,
Ricomposizione dell 'universo non patrimoniale: le scelte della Corte di Cassazione, at 829; An-
tonino Procida Mirabelli Di Lauro, L 'art. 2059 c.c. Va in Paradiso, at 831). For further commen-
tary on this evolution of Italian case law, see generally IL "Nuovo" DANNO NON PATRIMONIALE(Giulio Ponzanelli ed., 2004); I DANNI NON PATRIMONIALI (Emanuela Navarretta ed., 2004); IL
Nuovo DANNo NON PATRIMONIALE (M. Bona & P. G. Monateri eds., 2004).
218. Corte cost., 14 july 1986, n.184, Foro It. 1986, I, 2053 (with commentary by Giulio
Ponzanelli, La Corte Costituzionale, il Danno Non Patrimoniale e il Danno Alla Salute).
219. COSTITUZIONE [COST.] art. 32 (Italy).
220. See Cass., 6 june 1981, n.3675, in LA VALUTAZIONE DEL DANNO ALLA SALUTE 398(M. Bargagna & F. D. Busnelli eds., 1995). In this work, most of the leading decisions on per-
sonal injury damages can be found as an appendix, in addition to other materials and commentary
from members of the Research Group on Danno Alla Salute of Pisa under the auspices of the Ital-
ian National Research Council. See also RAPPORTO SULLO STATO DELLA GIURISPRUDENZA IN
MATERIA DI DANNO ALLA SALUTE (M. Bargagna & F. D. Busnelli, eds., 1996) (analyzing over
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pecuniary damage category most comprehensively, by establishing an independent
category of damages to the person ("danno alla salute"), which has gained a pri-
mary and crucial role in personal injury. In fact, the Constitutional Court22 1 soon
stated danno alla salute is "a first, essential, priority compensation that conditions
every other one. 222 This new title of damages absorbed various other titles for
non-pecuniary damages, bringing disparate case law under a unified theory.
The Italian Supreme Court identified the need for an equitable evaluation that
must be coherent with the kind of loss involved223 for this fundamental title of
damages. This quest for coherence led to the search for a formula that had a dou-
ble means of assessing damages, which would primarily base uniformity on a
medical evaluation of the psychophysical disability and on the possibility of ex-
trapolating homogeneous monetary guidelines from prior awards. In practical
terms, a medical evaluation gauges permanent disability, through assigning to it a
percentage according to specific scientific parameters commonly available in re-
puted scientific and practitioners' publications. Following this expert medical
evaluation, which yields a verifiable medical condition element, judges assign a
monetary value to the percentage point and multiply it by the number ascertained,
which represents the victim's disability. In addition, the system safeguards that the
judgment is equitable, because it is for the court to define the monetary value of
each point according to previous awards,224 and it is also for the court to ascertain
the disability and its correspondence to a severity percentage, according to the
medical evidence given by expert medical witnesses. 225 Finally, the court adapts
the scheduled result obtained for the case under consideration by multiplying the
selected monetary point value by the ascertained percentage.226
1,000 decisions) [hereinafter RAPPORTO].
221. See, e.g., Corte cost., 14 july 1986, n.184, Foro It. 1 1986, 2053 (arguing that lost earn-
ings and out of pocket expenses may not accrue in an actual case, but danno alla salute must al-
ways be compensated). The Corte Costituzione (Constitutional Court) also fostered the extension
from tort liability to work related injuries of the "constitutional principle of full and not limitable
compensation of danno alla salute." Corte cost., 27 dec. 1991, n.485, in RESPONSABILITA
CIVILE E PREVIDENZA 58 (1992) (with commentary by Emanitela Navarretta, CapacitI lavorativa
generica, danno alla salute e nuovi rapporti tra responsabilitb civile ed assicurazione sociale (In
margine a Corte Costituzionale 485/1991)). For more details on danno alla salute in work and
traffic related accidents, see DIANORA POLETTI, DANNI ALLA PERSONA NEGLI ACCIDENTI DA
LAVORO E DA AuTOMOBILE (1996).
222. Corte cost., 14 july 1986, n.184, Foro It. 1 1986, 2053 (with commentary by Giulio
Ponzanelli, La Corte Costituzionale, il Danno Non Patrimoniale e il Dahno Alla Salute).
223. Cass., civ. sez., 13 jan. 1993, n.357, in IL CORRIERE GIURIDICO 303 (1993) (with
commentary by V. Carbone, I Contrasti Giurisprudenziali sui Criteri di Liquidazione).
224. In comparison with the U.S. system, the idea of supplying information about ranges of
evaluations to the juries without binding them to these past evaluations is generally stated by
Schuck, supra note 5, at 326.
225. In American scholarship more than seventy years ago, H. F. Goodrich sought guidance
by medical doctors in this evaluation, since law "has already recognized the possession of a
pleasant mental state as a subject for protection." Goodrich, supra note 161, at 513.
226. Cass., sez. III, 14 apr. 1995, n.4255, in 60 RESPONSABILITA CIVILE E PREVIDENZA 519
(1995) (with commentary by G. Ponzanelli, La Corte di Cassazione ed il criterio equitativo nella
valutazione del danna alla salute, confirming the criteria summarized in the text and referring to
them as "the results reached by the most sagacious courts of merits").
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Indeed, the Italian Constitutional Court expressly fostered: "a criterion fulfill-
ing both the need for basic monetary uniformity and [the need] for elasticity and
flexibility to adjust awards to reflect the actual effects of the ascertained disable-
ment on activities of daily life. 227 These are also goals shared by the other Euro-
pean systems mentioned; and thus, an agenda for standardizing non-economic
damages accompanying personal injury in all systems, including the United States,
may be established.
Furthermore, as in France, each court can develop local tables of monetary
values and use them together with medical scorings (called barbme, after the
French legal usage), widely accepted by medical scientists. Of course, in both
countries, the standardizing process applies only to non-economic damages (danno
alla salute and prejudice physiologique) for which medical expertise can clearly
offer an "objective" basis for evaluation, in the form of evidence of a medical con-
dition.228
Finally, it is also worth remembering that the use of monetary tables or medi-
cal barbme is not compulsory in either France or Italy. They are followed because
of their scientific authority and/or because they constitute shared information
among the players in the personal injury compensation arena. Last but not least, it
should be noted that the Italian Court of Appeals and the Italian Supreme Court
will not question the amount of damages awarded by trial courts if the criteria used
for calculation and the ratio decidendi are consistent. Therefore, when the reason-
ing ofjudges is logically consistent and coherent with the evidence, a Court of Ap-
peal would not question the amount or the criterion adopted for awarding personal
injury damages.2 29
6. Exemplifying the Disability Schedule and Value Table Judicial
Scheduling
We could call the Franco-Italian approach to awarding objective non-
economic damages the "disability schedule and value table" judicial scheduling.
Tribunals and experts have worked out orientation tables over the last thirty years
or so. It has been a long process of judicial creation. This process makes these
non-pecuniary damages easy to ascertain and assess "objectively," because:
1. It finds its primary ground for uniformity in medical-legal evaluations of
psycho-physical disabilities, which gives objective uniformity and measurability in
the sense stressed from the ouset;
2. It offers the possibility of establishing homogeneous grounds for evalua-
tion of damages caused by the ascertained disabilities from past case law on the
merits; and
3. The system safeguards the equitable power of each judge to adjust this ob-
jective measurement to the peculiarities of the case.
227. Corte cost., 14july 1986, n.184, Foro It. 1986, 1, 2067.
228. Still, in France courts assess dommage moral (moral suffering) based on a scale of se-
riousness in seven degrees. See Goodrich, supra note 161.
229. As a side note, it is also important to stress that both the theoretical evolutions and
awarding methods were case law developments within the civil law system.
[19.2
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In order to clarify their actual operation, it is useful to describe a representa-
tive scheduling table for monetary values, using the Italian experience as an exam-
ple.
As previously mentioned, the court assesses the percentage of the invalidity
suffered by the plaintiff on the basis of the evidence presented in the case, in order
to establish a monetary value corresponding to this disability, bearing in mind the
age of the victim, as set out in the following table of examples. At this point, the
judge multiplies the monetary value, identified by the personal injury percentage
points allocated, and if necessary in the judge's opinion, the judge will adjust the
uniform result according to the individual circumstances of the victim. For exam-
ple, the value in the table is E 2.784.66 for each damage percentage point for a
twenty-year-old with an ascertained health and bodily injury of 42%.230
230. RAPPORTO, supra note 220, at 216 (showing values as an example of the criteria for
construing a sample table).
2005]
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Sample Monetary Values Schedule:
231
0 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 15 6 7 8 9
1% 643,55 641,93 639,01 636,04 632,93 629,79 626,53 623,19 619,77 616,26
2% 720,57 718,76 715,48 712,16 708,69 705,16 701,51 697,77 693,94 690,02
3% 808,63 806,60 802,93 799,20 795,30 791,34 787,25 783,05 778,75 774,34
4% 909,50 907,22 903,09 898,89 894,51 890,06 885,45 880,73 875,90 870,94
5% 1.025,27 1.022,70 1.018,04 1.013,31 1.008,36 1.003,35 998,16 992,84 987,39 981,80
6% 1.158,38 1.155,48 1.150,21 1.144,87 1.139,28 1.133,61 1.127,75 1.121,74 1.115,58 1.109,27
7% 1.311,73 1.308,44 1.302,48 1.296,43 1.290,10 1.283,68 1.277,04 1.270,24 1.263,26 1.256,11
8% 1.488,73 1.485,00 1.478,23 1.471,36 1.464,18 1.456,90 1.449,36 1.441,64 1.433,72 1.425,61
9% 1.693,44 1.689,19 1.681,49 1.673,68 1.665,51 1.657,23 1.648,65 1.639,87 1.630,86 1.621,64
10% 1.930,64 1.925,80 1.917,02 1.908,11 1.898,80 1.889,36 1.879,58 1.869,56 1.859,30 1.848,78
11% 1.959,11 1.954,21 1.945,29 1.936,26 1.926,81 1.917,22 1.907,30 1.897,14 1.886,72 1.876,05
12% 1.988,07 1.983,09 1.974,05 1.964,88 1.955,29 1.945,56 1.935,50 1.925,18 1.914,61 1.903,78
13% 2.017,52 2.012,46 2.003,29 1.993,98 1.984,25 1.974,38 1.964,16 1.953,70 1.942,97 1.931,98
14% 2.047,46 2.042,34 2.033,02 2.023,58 2.013,70 2.003,69 1.993,32 1.982,69 1.971,81 1.960,65
15% 2.077,92 2.072,71 2.063,26 2.053,68 2.043,65 2.033,49 2.022,97 2.012,19 2.001,14 1.989,81
16% 2.108,89 2.103,61 2.094,01 2.084,28 2.074,11 2.063,80 2.053,12 2.042,18 2.030,96 2.019,47
17% 2.140,39 2.135,03 2.125,29 2.115,42 2.105,09 2.094,62 2.083,78 2.072,68 2.061,30 2.049,64
18% 2.172,42 2.166,98 2.157,10 2.147,08 2.136,60 2.125,97 2.114,97 2.103,70 2.092,15 2.080,31
19% 2.205,00 2.199,48 2.189,45 2.179,28 2.168,64 2.157,86 2.146,69 2.135,25 2.123,53 2.111,51
20% 2.238,14 2.232,53 2.222,35 2.212,03 2.201,23 2.190,29 2.178,95 2.167,34 2.155,44 2.143,24
21% 2.271,85 2.266,16 2.255,82 2.245,34 2.234,38 2.223,27 2.211,77 2.199,98 2.187,90 2.175,52
22% 2.306,13 2.300,35 2.289,86 2.279,22 2.268,10 2.256,82 2.245,14 2.233,18 2.220,92 2.208,35
23% 2.341,00 2.335,14 2.324,49 2.313,69 2.302,40 2.290,95 2.279,09 2.266,95 2.254,50 2.241,74
24% 2.376,48 2.370,52 2.359,71 2.348,75 2.337,29 2.325,66 2.313,63 2.301,30 2.288,66 2.275,71
25% 2.412,56 2.406,51 2.395,54 2.384,41 2.372,77 2.360,97 2.348,76 2.336,24 2.323,41 2.310,27
26% 2.449,26 2.443,13 2.431,99 2.420,69 2.408,87 2.396,89 2.384,49 2.371,78 2.358,76 2.345,41
27% 2.486,60 2.480,37 2.469,06 2.457,59 2.445,60 2.433,44 2.420,84 2.407,94 2.394,72 2.381,17
28% 2.524,59 2.518,26 2.506,78 2.495,13 2.482,96 2.470,61 2.457,83 2.444,73 2.431,30 2.417,55
29% 2.563,23 2.556,81 2.545,15 2.533,33 2.520,97 2.508,43 2.495,45 2.482,15 2.468,52 2.454,55
30% 2.602,55 2.596,03 2.584,19 2.572,19 2.559,63 2.546,90 2.533,72 2.520,22 2.506,38 2.492,20
31% 2.642,55 2.635,93 2.623,91 2.611,72 2.598,97 2.586,05 2.572,67 2.558,95 2.544,90 2.530,50
32% 2.683,24 2.676,52 2.664,32 2.651,94 2.639,00 2.625,87 2.612,29 2.598,36 2.584,10 2.569,48
33% 2.724,65 2.717,82 2.705,43 2.692,86 2.679,72 2.666,39 2.652,60 2.638,46 2.623,97 2.609,13
34% 2.766,78 2.759,85 2.747,26 2.734,50 2.721,15 2.707,62 2.693,61 2.679,25 2.664,54 2.649,47
35% 2.809,65 2.802,61 2.789,82 2.776,86 2.763,31 2.749,57 2.735,34 2.720,76 2.705,82 2.690,52
36% 2.853,26 2.846,11 2.833,13 2.819,97 2.806,21 2.792,25 2.777,81 2.763,00 2.747,83 2.732,28
37% 2.897,64 2.890,38 2.877,20 2.863,84 2.849,86 2.835,69 2.821,01 2.805,98 2.790,57 2.774,78
38% 2.942,81 2.935,43 2.922,05 2.908,47 2.894,28 2.879,88 2.864,98 2.849,71 2.834,07 2.818,03
39% 2.988,76 2.981,28 2.967,68 2.953,89 2.939,48 2.924,86 2.909,73 2.894,22 2.878,33 2.862,04
40% 3.035,53 3.027,93 3.014,12 3.000,12 2.985,48 2.970,63 2.955,26 2.939.51 2.923,37 2.906,83
41% 3.083,13 3.075,40 3.061,38 3.047,15 3.032,28 3.017,20 3.001,59 2.985,59 2.969,20 2.952,40
42% 3.131,56 3.123,72 3.109,47 3.095,03 3.079,92 3.064,60 3.048,75 3.032,50 3.015,85 2.998,78
AGE
231. RAPPORTO, supra note 220, at 216 (showing the above table).
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10 I 11 1 12 1 13 1 14 1 15 1 16 1 17 1 18 19 20
612,67 608.98 605,21 601,38 597,42 593,40 589,33 585,16 580,97 576,64 572,26
685,99 681,87 677,64 673,36 668,92 664.42 659,86 655,19 650.51 645,66 640.75
769,83 765,20 760,46 755,65 750,67 745,63 740,51 735,26 730,01 724,57 719,05
865,86 860,66 855,33 849,92 844,32 838,64 832,88 826,99 821,07 814,95 808,75
976,07 970,21 964,20 958,10 951.79 945,39 938,90 932,25 925,58 918,68 911,70
1.102,80 1.096,17 1.089,38 1.082,49 1.075,36 1.068,13 1.060,79 1.053,28 1.045,75 1.037,96 1.030,06
1.248,79 1.241,28 1.233,59 1.225,79 1.217,72 1.209,53 1.201,22 1.192,72 1.184,19 1.175,36 1.166,42
1.417,30 1.408,78 1.400,05 1.391,20 1.382,03 1.372,74 1.363,32 1.353,66 1.343,98 1.333,97 1.323,82
1.612,18 1.602,49 1.592,56 1.582,49 1.572,07 1.561,49 1.550,77 1.539,79 1.528,78 1.517,39 1.505,85
1.838,00 1.826,95 1.815,63 1.804,15 1.792,27 1.780,21 1.767,99 1.755,47 1.742,92 1.729,93 1.716,77
1.865,11 1.853,90 1.842,41 1.830,76 1.818,70 1.806,47 1.794,07 1.781,37 1.768,63 1.755,45 1.742,09
1.892,68 1.881,30 1.869,64 1.857,82 1.845,58 1.833,17 1.820,59 1.807,70 1.794,77 1.781,39 1.767,84
1.920,71 1.909,17 1.897,34 1.885,34 1.872,92 1.860,32 1.847,55 1.834,47 1.821,35 1.807,78 1.794,03
1.949,22 1.937,51 1.925,50 1.913,32 1.900,72 1.887,94 1.874,98 1.861,70 1.848,39 1.834,61 1.820,66
1.978,21 1.966,32 1.954,14 1.941,78 1.928,99 1.916,02 1.902,86 1.889,39 1.875,88 1.861,90 1.847,74
2.007,70 1.995,63 1.983,27 1.970,72 1.957,74 1.944,58 1.931,23 1.917,55 1.903,84 1.889,65 1.875,28
2.037,68 2.025,44 2.012,89 2.000,16 1.986,98 1.973,62 1.960,07 1.946,19 1.932,28 1.917,88 1.903,29
2.068,18 2.055,75 2.043,01 2.030,09 2.016,72 2.003,16 1.989,41 1.975,32 1.961,20 1.946,58 1.931,77
2.099,20 2.086,58 2.073,65 2.060,54 2.046,97 2.033,20 2.019,24 2.004,95 1.990,61 1.975,77 1.960,74
2.130,75 2.117,94 2.104,82 2.091,51 2.077,73 2.063,76 2.049,59 2.035,08 2.020,52 2.005,47 1.990,21
2.162,84 2.149,84 2.136,52 2.123,01 2.109,02 2.094,84 2.080,46 2.065,73 2.050,95 2.035,67 2.020,18
2.195,47 2.182,28 2.168,76 2.155,04 2.140,85 2.126,45 2.111,85 2.096,90 2.081,90 2.066,39 2.050,67
2.228,67 2.215,28 2.201,55 2.187,63 2.173,22 2.158,60 2.143,79 2.128,61 2.113,38 2.097,64 2.081,68
2.262,44 2.248,85 2.234,91 2.220,78 2.206,15 2.191,31 2.176,27 2.160,86 2.145,41 2.129,42 2.113,22
2.296,80 2.282,99 2.268,85 2.254,50 2.239,65 2.224,58 2.209,31 2.193,67 2.177,98 2.161,75 2.145,31
2.331,74 2.317,73 2.303,36 2.288,80 2.273,72 2.258,43 2.242,93 2.227,05 2.211,12 2.194,64 2.177,95
2.367,29 2.353,06 2.338,48 2.323,69 2.308,39 2.292,86 2.277,12 2.261,00 2.244,83 2.228,10 2.211,15
2.403,45 2.389,01 2.374,20 2.359,19 2.343,65 2.327,89 2.311,91 2.295,54 2.279,12 2.262,14 2.244,93
2.440,24 2.425,58 2.410,55 2.395,30 2.379,52 2.363,52 2.347,29 2.330,68 2.314,01 2.296,76 2.279,29
2.477,67 2.462,78 2.447,52 2.432,04 2.416,02 2.399,77 2.383,30 2.366,42 2.349,50 2.331,99 2.314,25
2.515,75 2.500,63 2.485,14 2.469,42 2.453,15 2.436,66 2.419,93 2.402,79 2.385,61 2.367,83 2.349,82
2.554,49 2.539,14 2.523,41 2.507,45 2.490,93 2.474,18 2.457,19 2.439,80 2.422,35 2.404,30 2.386,01
2.593,91 2.578,32 2.562,35 2.546,14 2.529,37 2.512,36 2.495,11 2.477,45 2.459,73 2.441,40 2.422,83
2.634,02 2.618,19 2.601,97 2.585,51 2.568,48 2.551,21 2.533,69 2.515,75 2.497,76 2.479,15 2.460,29
2.674,83 2.658,75 2.642,28 2.625,57 2.608,27 2.590,73 2.572,95 2.554,73 2.536,46 2.517,56 2.498,41
2.716,35 2.700,03 2.683,30 2.666,33 2.648,77 2.630,95 2.612,89 2.594,39 2.575,84 2.556,64 2.537,19
2.758,61 2.742,03 2.725,04 2.707,80 2.689,97 2.671,88 2.653,53 2.634,74 2.615,90 2.596,41 2.576,66
2.801,60 2.784,76 2.767,51 2.750,01 2.731,89 2.713,52 2.694,89 2.675,81 2.656,67 2.636,88 2.616,82
2.845,35 2.828,25 2.810,73 2.792,95 2.774,56 2.755,90 2.736,98 2.717,60 2.698,16 2.678,06 2.657,68
2.889,88 2.872,51 2.854,71 2.836,66 2.817,97 2.799,02 2.779,80 2.760,12 2.740,38 2.719,96 2.699,27
2.935,19 2.917,55 2.899,47 2.881,13 2.862,15 2.842,91 2.823,39 2.803,40 2.783,35 2.762,61 2.741,59
2.981,30 2.963.38 2.945,02 2.926,40 2.907,12 2.887,57 2.867,74 2.847,44 2.827,08 2.806,01 2.784,66
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11. LEARNING THE COMPARATIVE LESSONS
A. Paths Toward a Better Use of Information in Awarding Intangible Damages
in Personal Injury
Part I set the debate on non-economic damages in a comparative framework,
stressing the need for more Euro-American comparison. It also demonstrated a
significant trend, both in the United States and Europe, to distinguish non-
economic damages for intangible losses that have an "objective" basis for assess-
ment, due to the existence of an injury to health ascertainable by medical evidence.
This comparison anticipated that there are gains in acknowledging this different
framework and behaving accordingly. This Part will highlight these benefits and
illustrate some examples for utilizing them. Drawing on these examples, Part III
will demonstrate how the United States could obtain these benefits as well, without
triggering constitutional concerns or statutory intervention.
1. Towards Effective Compensation for Damage to Health and Bodily
Injury: A Synthesis
Surprisingly enough, the results reached by the approaches of Italy, France,
and the United Kingdom are actually similar. Under English common law, the ba-
sis for the assessment of damages for non-pecuniary loss rests on collections of
leading cases on quantum 232 which set out the sum of money awarded and a de-
scription of the medically ascertainable condition suffered. This approach is simi-
lar to the German one, even though Germany is a civil law country, because pri-
vate editors publish similar compilations of previous cases.
233
The two patterns emerging from the reported European experiences have been
rightly called the "disability schedule and value table" model and the "precedent
model. 234 They can hybridize with one another, resulting in reciprocal benefit.235
Nevertheless, the starting point looks different. The French or Italian
lawyer, having obtained medical evidence which places the injury at the
relevant level of disability in terms of points, then turns to the relevant
'value' table to convert that into a sum of money. The English lawyer,
232. See supra Part I.C.2.
233. See supra Part I.C.3. Of course, this system requires a large set of case law that con-
tains extensive descriptions of the facts, and it could only then be applied within the legal orders
where court decisions are not limited to recitals.
234. See Rogers, supra note 7, at 274.
235. See Giovanni Comand6, Danno biologico: si al modello anglo-tedesco per superare le
incongruenze del sistema, GUIDA AL DiRITro, June 12, 2004, at 11 (proposing for the Italian
system to adopt a descriptive system, such as the one in the U.K., for the most serious injuries
falling above a severity score of 70%); see also LA VALUTAZIONE DELLE MACROPERMANENTI:
PROFILI PRATICI E DI COMPARAZIONE (Giovanni Comandd & Ranieri Domenici eds.) ETS, 2005.
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having obtained evidence on the nature and effects of the injury, then
tends to regard it in 'descriptive' terms and goes to the standard sources
of specialist material reporting court awards, to look for something simi-
lar.
Both prototypes present strengths. To operate either method requires differ-
ent sets of information and probably a different attitude of mind. The disability
schedule and value table approach is probably the easiest to put in place, because it
can build on existing accepted medical scoring systems and mathematical formu-
las,237 and it is much more accurate with reference to age. It is simpler and easier
to implement, especially where a complete set of former decisions is not readily
available. Yet, it is likely to trigger competing expert views on the accuracy of the
scoring and the proper part of the matrix to which the actual disability should be
allocated.238 Of course, a requirement that the court be bound by expert evidence
would resolve the problem, but that implies statutory reform.239 One main differ-
ence in the descriptive Anglo-German model is that it requires a more complex set
of information, which nonetheless seems to have developed in both a common law
country, such as the United Kingdom, and in a civil law system, such as Germany.
Moreover, American scholars have already investigated the methodology for gath-
ering and using such data in courts.24 °
As mentioned previously, the pre-requisite for making these methods univer-
sal is the ability to distinguish from among non-economic damages or damages for
which an objective criterion for selecting and assessing damages is possible, and
those for which it is not possible. Indeed, through medical expertise, we can ob-
jectively ascertain and score non-economic damages for bodily and health impair-
ment. In Europe, the innovative approaches to awards rely on the ability of the
medical sciences to evaluate health impairments objectively, in light of scoring
percentages (e.g., France or Italy)241 or as revealed by descriptive tables (as in
Germany or the United Kingdom).242 The history of damages for intangible loss in
236. See Rogers, supra note 7, at 274-75.
237. See infra Part III.
238. See supra Part I.C.4-6.
239. We exclude from the outset this solution for the United States in order to avoid some
complex constitutional issues.
240. See generally David Baldus, John C. MacQueen, M.D. & George Woodworth, Improv-
ing Judicial Oversight of Jury Damages Assessments: A Proposal for the Comparative Addi-
tur/Remittitur Review of Awards for Nonpecuniary Harms and Punitive Damages, 80 IOWA L.
REV. 1109 (1995) (suggesting: (1) the use of a comparative review methodology; (2) a more sys-
tematic and fully explained comparative review and case reporting practices; (3) the use of rudi-
mentary quantitative methods; and (4) an enhancement of existing databases and long term devel-
opment of state-wide databases); Randall R. Bovbjerg, Frank A. Sloan & James F. Blumstein,
Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling "Pain and Suffering", 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 908 (1989)
(discussing various advantages and concerns of scheduling damages).
241. See supra Part I.C.3-6. A complex scoring system was also adopted in Spain for traffic
accidents. See generally Casals et al., supra note 209, at 209-12.
242. See supra Part I.C. Moreover, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Un-
ion now strongly supports health, although this document only has political value only. See Char-
ter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 18, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1.
2005)
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the Anglo-American world proves that the United States can follow a similar pat-
tern. 43 Furthermore, the European legal systems and the arguments we set out in
this Part reveal that if information is collected and shared and a theoretical starting
point for the evaluation of courts is chosen, non-economic damages may become
reasonable and predictable, 244 and what is more, they become easily insurable.
245
Under this perspective, judicial awards rendered in the past are an efficient
substitute both for an ex ante hypothetical evaluation and for an ex post analysis,
which have usually mislead246 potential victims' own evaluations before the acci-
dents and actual victims' after they have occurred.247 This is true when courts are
provided with "objective" parameters and information. 24 8 The solution suggested
by our comparative analysis consists of an ex ante macro evaluation of the ex-
pected payments (damages) and an ex post case-by-case award (micro-
valuation). 249 The macro-evaluation ideally results from the bulk of the single mi-
243. See infra Part II.
244. At least this is true if referred to each case under judgment. See generally Leebron, su-
pra note 8. It is suggested that we view juries as a survey mechanism and "if a survey is the best
available pricing mechanism, the jury seems well suited to this task. As part of its task of deter-
mining liability, the jury is in a position to gather facts at least with respect to a specific case."
Id. at 318.
245. Comand6, supra note 11, 269-78 (arguing this point more extensively).
246. See generally Edward J. McCaffery, Daniel J. Kahneman & Mattew L. Spitzer, Fram-
ing the Jury: Cognitive Perspectives on Pain and Suffering Awards, 81 VA. L. REV. 1341 (1995)
(arguing that there is likely to be a substantial disparity between the willingness-to-pay and the
willingness-to-accept measures of damages used to compute compensation awards). However,
perceptions differ. One interesting study summarizes several surveys in the United States and the
United Kingdom on the willingness to pay for non-economic damages. See generally Avraham,
supra note 17; see also Roselle L. Wissler, Allen J. Hart & Michael J. Saks, Decisionmaking
About General Damages: A Comparison of Jurors, Judges, and Lawyers, 98 MICH. L. REV. 751,
757 (1999) ("If art can acquire a market value, in principle, so can the loss of sight. The problem
is that people do not normally buy and sell the sorts of sensory, motor, cognitive, and other ca-
pacities that are injured in accidents. The result is that to compensate for noneconomic losses, the
law must turn to an alternative source of values, namely the social judgment of the community,
typically supplied by juries.").
247. Giovanni Comand6, Towards a Better Use of Information in Personal Injury Damages,
in LIBER AMICORUM PIERRE WIDMER 49, 58-61 (H. Koziol & J. Spier eds., 2003) (arguing this
point more extensively).
248. See Croley & Hanson, supra note 6, at 1898 ("Solving the problem posed by the high
costs of many ex ante calculations of numerous expected losses, the civil jury, already mobilized
to determine causation and violation of the applicable liability standard, is well positioned to per-
form ex post calculations of one actual loss. Thus, the individual consumer need never perform
the innumerable ex ante calculations involving the probabilities of various possible losses, their
severity, and their insurance consequences."); see also Geistfeld, supra note 11, at 773, 804 (gen-
erally discussing variability of assessment of damages and arguing methods that "enable jurors to
determine pain-and-suffering damages in a manner that is consistent with the case law.").
249. An ex ante perspective refers to valuation before the experience of pain and suffering.
In contrast, an ex post perspective refers to valuation after the experience. Still, even the percep-
tion of victims may underestimate enduring pain and suffering if the U.K. Law Commission
found:
[D]amages for non-pecuniary loss in respect of serious personal injury are too low for
two reasons: first they provide further evidence that those damages are not generally
perceived to be commensurate with the claimant's losses; secondly, they suggest that the
[19.2
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cro-evaluations. In turn, these rely on the macro-evaluation as a guideline for
awarding damages. ° When accidents have occurred, courts can base their opin-
ions on the evidence shown at trial, and insurance companies can gather informa-
tion to spread the risk efficiently. 251 Litigants - both victims and wrongdoers -
can exploit the system even more efficiently and at the least cost.
25 2
An awarding method, which transforms ex ante non-measurable, non-
pecuniary costs to expected costs, captures the solutions adopted to fine-tune judi-
cial assessment in Europe. These models circulated in Europe, as both the Anglo-
German and the Franco-Italian approaches show, nurture standardization and a
more efficient use of resources for compensation, which derive from a better use of
information. Possibly, they may lead to a universal model for standardizing (at
least some) non-economic damages in a way that grants both predictability of
awards and flexibility for a case-by-case approach, as the jury system requires in
the United States.253 In this respect, this article argues that a settled legal frame-
work and a standardization process with proper information could help to produce,
in the United States as well in other countries, homogeneous and consistent as-
sessments of non-economic damages, objectively ascertainable in light of the seri-
ousness of the injury to health.254 Moreover, these methods do not automatically
produce a binding scheduled assessment of damages. Again, European experience
shows that individualized determination is not inherently in conflict with the
search for clear guidelines, if the decision-maker can coherently justify departing
from the guidelines. 255 Such a method can actually coexist with a set of uniform
ongoing non-pecuniary effects of many injuries are far greater than anticipated by vic-
time at the time that they receive their compensation. If victims tend to under-estimate
the future effects of their injuries on their lives, it seems very likely that judges, entirely
understandably, do so too, which would inevitably lead to lower awards than a fuller
appreciation of the future would have elicited.
THE LAW COMM'N, supra note 34.
250. But see Jettre v. Healy, 60 N.W.2d 541, 546 (Iowa 1953) ("We have carefully exam-
ined the case cited by counsel, but comparison of verdicts is not a satisfactory method of deter-
mining the reasonableness of an award in a particular case.").
251. This comment claims it is untrue that insurers have no interest and incentive to find
actuarial data on damages for non-pecuniary losses. However, this argument would require a
more extensive discussion.
252. See infra Part II.A.4.
253. As this comment aims to demonstrate, several European countries show that it is possi-
ble to set up a system which is both predictable and flexible. This practice relies upon a stan-
dardization process capable of taking account of individual cases by shifting information from the
pre-accident to the post-accident scenario. Indeed, non-pecuniary compensation management is
often a problem of scarce and unbalanced information among the players of the compensa-
tion/deterrence game of tort law (judge, victim, defendant, and insurers). See Geistfeld, supra
note 11, at 797-800 (demonstrating that taking into account deterrence, a rational consumer will
always require at least some pain and suffering protection).
254. See Schuck, supra note 5, at 308-12.
255. See Blumstein et al., supra note 205, at 179 ("An unexplained outlier should constitute
a prima facie case for either remittitur or additur by the trial judge or an appellate holding of in-
adequacy or excessiveness of the judgment.").
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standards,2 56 helping to change the system from one which allows windfalls 257 for
small injuries to one that trully recompenses for serious permanent impairments.2 5 8
Indeed, there are large potential benefits for improving the American system
by adopting one of these ways. Nevertheless, we do not expressly advocate the
adoption of either the so-called "disability schedule and value table" approach or
the Anglo-German "precedent" approach.259 However, Part III of this article ana-
lyzes the possible circulation of the European models described above in the
United States, and proposes, by way of example, a scheme as to how a normalized
values schedule could be developed, to which medically recognized scoring sys-
tems and monetary indicative values relate.
2. The Models at Work, Their Applicability and Potential for Self-
Implementation
There are systems which exist and combine reasonable predictability with the
tailored assessment of damages. At the risk of oversimplifying, European courts
often tackle the problem of uncertainty and justice (both vertical and horizontal)
either using leading cases on quantum or building upon scientific tables. These are
the converging models: (1) the "disability schedule and value table" judicial
scheduling of France and Italy; and (2) the "descriptive" one of the United King-
dom and Germany. These systems give full information about past evaluations not
only to the litigating parties, but also to courts. They also grant a wide range of
discretion to judges (and juries where, as in Scotland, they still have a role in civil
trials) 260 in awarding damages and consequently in sending messages to consumers
and manufacturers.
As previously mentioned, in France and Italy medical experts score the level
of physical impairment (both transient and permanent) the victim has suffered,
while orientation tables schedule monetary values. By integrating the two evalua-
tions, whoever has the task of estimating damages for health impairment has an ob-
jective uniform basis upon which to do so. In the United Kingdom and Germany,
collections of leading cases on quantum261 are a substitute for tables of monetary
256. Contra id at 174. However, these authors pledge that one of the weakest pointpoints
of the tort system for non-pecuniary losses consists in the "lack of information provided to ju-
ries." Id. at 175.
257. See JEFFREY O'CONNELL, THE LAWSUIT LOTTERY: ONLY THE LAWYERS WIN 8-9
(1979).
258. Despite general vertical equity, plaintiffs with small losses tend to be over-
compensated and those with large losses tend to be under-compensated. A. Conrad, Testimony
Before the New York Joint Legislative Committee on Insurance Rates Regulations, U. Mich. L.
Quadr. Notes, 14, 15 (1970) (stating that "[I] f there is one thing which [all] surveys have shown
conclusively, it is that the tort system overpays the small claimants who need it least and under-
pays the large claimants who need it most").
259. Similar conclusions were reached by the European Tort Law Group in devising the
Principles of European Tort Law. EUROPEAN GROUP ON TORT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF TORT LAW,
art. 10:301 (2005), available at http://www.egtl.org/Principles/index.htm.
260. Civil juries, where they still exist, always assess damages for the first time, hence they
inherently lack this information.
261. Collections of leading cases on quantum in Germany are offered to the public in form
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value in suggesting to the court the ranges of amounts for non-economic damages
supported by medical evidence. Having this information, courts can then adapt the
framework to the case before the court by choosing a value and increasing or de-
creasing the recommended amount according to the particular facts. In each sys-
tem cited, every departure from the given range requires rational justification, by
distinguishing the case in hand with a view towards affirmation, should it later be
appealed or reviewed.262 In other words, courts are not strictly bound by their past
decisions, but past judgments can be used as a preliminary informative framework,
saving the costs of accumulating the same information every time.
Because of this foundation, standardizing processes work properly in Euro-
pean legal systems, where they take slightly different forms, in accordance with to
the existing set of legal institutions, rules, and traditions from which their evolu-
tionary path originates.263 The amounts recovered in past cases are the outcome of
previous experiences in evaluation, and the collection of these awards in some
manageable form has proved extremely useful. 264 All of these patterns of relying
upon shared information (either in form of synergy between disability scoring and
schedules of monetary values or through precedental decisions) have led to more
certainty in predicting the possible award.
Statutory intervention is not needed to implement these innovations, nor to
supply information, even in the United States. For instance, in jurisdictions with
civil juries, the legal artifice of special verdicts could be required to supply the ju-
risdictions with such a range of values. Judges could shape the specific question in
a form that asks the jury to determine where in the offered range a plaintiff's injury
fits. 265 In this way, all players have all of the information needed for a decision
and the decision itself would still be on a case-by-case basis.266 Once parties began
to argue their case on previous monetary evaluations and widely accepted scoring
systems, a market for databases providing such information would quickly de-
velop. All lawyers would need these databases and they would ask for these data-
bases to be implemented. Private parties would then develop the information tools.
of descriptive Schmerzensgeld-Tabellen. See supra note 208.
262. Similar standards do exist in the United States. See, e.g., Steinke v. Beach Bungee,
Inc., 105 F.3d 192, 198 (4th Cir. 1997), stating:
In determining on remand whether the jury's verdict was rendered in accordance with
South Carolina law, the district court should look to South Carolina cases to determine
the range of damages in cases analogous to the one at hand .... If the court believes a
departure from the range is justified, it should provide the reasoning behind its view. If
the court determines that there are no other comparable cases under South Carolina law,
it should explain this determination as well. Such a decision in the district coirt will re-
duce the risk of caprice in large jury awards and will assure a reviewing court that the
trial court exercised its considered discretion under the applicable state law.
263. A good example of a path dependency can be the style of decision-writing needed to
develop an award system based on leading cases on quantum.
264. In the U.K., multiple publications are used to collect data on past recoveries. See
KEMP & KEMP, supra note 72; MUNKMAN, supra note 57.
265. See, e.g., Stephen A. Salzburg, Improving the Quality of Jury Decisionmaking, in
VERDICT, supra note 5, at 341, 349-71.
266. Another manageable vehicle for supplying information could be jury instructions.
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Moreover, decision-makers, called upon to justify an award which diverges
from the precedent on quantum, would not be able to abuse their discretion, even if
they were so inclined. While guidelines would not be binding for juries, because a
review process is already in force (e.g., additur and remittitur, judgment non-
obstante-verdicto),267 the jury itself would de facto arrive at a possible divergent
evaluation on the evidence presented, without the need to justify the award explic-
itly. 268 Attorneys would not likely appeal a decision that was actually based on
clear evidence and obviously well founded. Even if the jury does not have to jus-
tify its decision, it will still be based on the evidence presented and an attorney or a
judge will still have to decide whether the verdict is or is not consistent. In sum-
mary, greater and better information would start a virtuous circle in which all of
the players (e.g., litigants, attorneys, judges, juries, and insurance companies)
would behave at the same time as controller and controlled. On the contrary, con-
tinuing to withhold such information from some players resembles an argument
that ignorance is better than information.269
European countries have chosen to share judicial evaluations to serve justice
and efficiency, without sacrificing the former to the latter, and the United States
could do likewise.
267. The literature on additur/remittitur review in personal injury cases is quite extensive.
For preliminary information, see Baldus et al., supra note 240, at 1109 (proposing a method for
additur/remittitur review involving comparison of awards in similar cases); and Francis X. Busch,
Remittiturs and Additurs in Personal Injury and Wrongful Death Cases, 12 DEF. L.J. 521, 526
(1963) (arguing there is no suitable "rule of measurement" for pain and suffering that would per-
mit the conduct of an effective review). See also Comment, Appellate Remittitur, 33 Mo. L. REV.
637 (1968); Leo Carlin, Remittiturs andAdditurs, 49 W. VA. L.Q. 1 (1942); Note, Constitutional
Law - Right to Jury Trial - Judicial Use of Additurs in Correcting Insufficient Damage Verdicts,
21 VA. L. REV. 666 (1935); Comment, Correction of Damage Verdicts by Remittitur and Additur,
44 YALE L.J. 318 (1934); Fleming James, Remedies for Excessiveness or Inadequacy of Verdicts,
1 DuQ. L. REV. 143 (1963); Richard Kinder, Comment, Statutory Authorization of Additur and
Remittitur, 43 Miss. L.J. 107 (1972); Christian J. Mixter, Note, Appealability of Judgments En-
tered Pursuant to Remittiturs in Federal Courts, 1975 DuKE L.J. 1150; Thomas R. Newman,
Damages: A Call for Meaningful Precedents, 3 PACE L. REV. 605 (1983); Michael A. Newsome,
Comment, Additur and Remittitur in Federal and State Courts: An Anomaly?, 3 CUMB. L. REV.
150 (1972); Note, Remittitur of Jury Verdicts in Iowa, 48 IOWA L. REV. 649 (1963); Comment,
Remittitur Practice in Alabama, 34 ALA. L. REV. 275 (1983); Irene D. Sann, Remittitur (and Ad-
ditur) in the Federal Courts: An Evaluation with Suggested Alternatives, 38 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 157 (1987); Irene D. Sann, Note, Remittitur Practice in the Federal Courts, 76 COLUM. L.
REV. 299 (1976); Eric Schnapper, Judges Against Juries - Appellate Review of Federal Civil Jury
Verdicts, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 237, 320-24, 327-36, 340-47, 353-57 (1989); William H. Wagner,
Note, Procedures to Lessen Remittitur's Intrusion on the Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial,
1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 639.
268. Additur and remittitur are based on the evidence of the case at trial.
269. The intrinsic worth of providing information to judges and juries can scarcely be ques-
tioned. See Baldus et al., supra note 240, at 1186 ("There is no justification in principle for deny-
ing jury access to comparative awards information. Indeed, such a practice could increase the
consistency of awards and reduce the need for judicial oversight.").
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3. Predictability and Less Arbitrary Choices: The Reasonable Justice of
Judges and Juries as "Markets"
This article's analysis has shown that there are both historical-social justifica-
tions and some logical-economical grounds for non-economic damage compensa-
tion in the case of ascertainable injuries wrongfully caused. Moreover, it has pro-
vided some additional reasoning as to why the tort system has, in fact, become the
best alternative for protecting individual interests in health.
270  The alternative
route of using insurance might not have been practicable,
27
' because it would have
had to overcome asymmetries of information and contracting costs.
272 The grant-
ing of non-pecuniary damages for serious harm to health is not a low-damage-level
context, which is why it is not worthwhile to make ex ante contractual provision or
agree to an ex-post general liability rule.273 On the contrary, while this article ac-
knowledges that some losses correspond to interests which deserve both legal rec-
ognition and protection, society must decide who should bear the losses and how
these losses should be redressed.
270. See Croley & Hanson, supra note 6, at 1896-1917 (reaching similar conclusions). But
see Priest, supra note 10, at 1536 (reading the absence of a first party insurance market for non-
pecuniary loss as evidence that society does not want them compensated).
271. Indeed, history and accidents have brought about liability rules and the consequent de-
velopment of a third party insurance market and any attempt to force other tools (namely first
party insurance) into the picture should face this fact: third party insurance following liability
rules dominates the market for non-pecuniary losses, attracting any willingness to buy insurance
there might be in society. Arguments such as social norms preventing people from buying first
party insurance for pain and suffering and the existence of liability rules as a rational reason for
not buying first party insurance are made by Bovbjerg et al., supra note 240, at 933. On the con-
trary, several scholars advocated the substitution of tort law with first party insurance. See, e.g.,
PATRICK ATIYAH, PERSONAL INJURIES IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: THINKING THE
UNTHINKABLE, IN WRONGS AND REMEDIES IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 1, 33-46 (Peter
Birks ed., 1996); Priest, supra note 10, at 1550-63; see also John Fabian Witt, Toward a New His-
tory of American Accident Law: Classical Tort Law and the Cooperative First Party Insurance
Movement 114 HARv. L. REv. 690 (2001) (offering a complete account of the so called first party
insurance movement).
272. This issue has sparked a fierce debate amongst scholars. For further debate on product
liability, see Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived Case For
Enterprise Liability, 91 MICH. L. REV. 683 (1993); Croley & Hanson, supra note 46, at 1; Jon D.
Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The First-Party Insurance Externality: An Economic Justification For
Enterprise Liability, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 129 (1990); and George L. Priest, Can Absolute Manu-
facturer Liability be Defended?, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 237 (1992). Margaret Jane Radin gives a
different reading in Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE L.J. 56, 70 (1993), and ar-
gues that any ex ante purchase of first party insurance is precluded by incommensurability more
than by irrationality; individuals would signal the incommensurability between non-economic
damages and money. Note also that the existence of compensation for non-pecuniary losses un-
der tort law may to some extent prevent first party insurance for non-economic damages. See
Bovbjerg et al., supra note 240, at 933 ("Informed consumers know that pain and suffering is
compensable in tort cases; they are already covered when someone else is to blame for their in-
jury. Given that they thus have a limited need for such coverage, its absence is not proof of its
lack of value.").
273. Nevertheless, because of the lack of information in the pre-accident context, people are
less willing to contract even in a high-damage-level context. This explains why there is not a
wide first party insurance market for non-economic damages.
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In some sense, health integrity is under the shadow of an inalienability rule 274
because no amount of money can buy good health or life. Nevertheless, life ex-
poses everyone to certain degrees of risk of damages to one's health. In this con-
tract-forbidden scenario, the entitlement is already allocated 275 and liability rules
must protect the individual's interest in avoiding un-redressed damage to health.
Tort law provides compensation when contracts are forbidden as well (i.e., enti-
tlements are inalienable) but, despite the inalienability rule, rights are shifted (i.e.,
infringed) and a price for the damaged inalienable entitlement ought to be found.276
The protection of liability rules usually relies on market values to assess the impor-
tance of the suffered loss and the correct level of damages.
However, in the case of non-pecuniary loss, there is no clear rule setting the
right amount of damages, because, by definition, a market does not exist.277 Nev-
ertheless, this article argues that markets are ideal forums for sending messages to
individuals and in reaching stipulated evaluations.278 Indeed, a market is nothing
274. See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089 (1972).
275. The notion of corrective justice is implicitly evoked. It focuses on the individual and
requires adequate compensation from the wrongdoer. It assumes that persons have a pre-existing
entitlement to, for instance, bodily integrity, and that when that entitlement is violated, morality
requires that the claimant be restored as close as possible to his or her pre-wrong position. See
generally Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, 37 ARIz. L. REV. 15, 15-27
(1995).
276. Health is protected to some extent by inalienability rules, but since some accidents do
occur, even if not preventable, liability rules have entered into the picture to protect such inter-
ests.
277. See Levin, supra note 8, at 308.
278. That is socially agreed upon. See id. at 272 ("[The tort system] prices goods for which
there is, and in many cases, is permitted, no market. In other words, the tort system acts as a kind
of 'shadow pricing' mechanism, determining the cost of certain inputs (injuries), so that correct
cost/benefit decisions may be made both by the relevant enterprise and the consumer."). Full
compensation for non-pecuniary losses remains a myth. See Ingber, supra note 39, at 775. See
also Wells v. Wells, [1998] 3 W.L.R. 329, 361 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (opinion of Lord
Clyde), stating:
In respect of pain and suffering money can only be a conventional medium of compen-
sation and the assessment of it to cover the past and the future must necessarily be im-
precise and open to differences of view. But the accumulation of precedent and experi-
ence and the careful analysis of the nature and effects of particular injuries can go a long
way towards establishing levels of award which may be generally recognized and ac-
cepted as reasonable in particular circumstances. If necessary those levels may be open
to adjustment or even correction from time to time by those courts which are best quali-
fied to review what must in essence be a factual assessment of the kind sometimes re-
ferred to as a jury question.
In 1999, the U.K. Law Reform Commission, in suggesting an increase for non-economic dam-
ages for serious personal injuries was needed, noted that:
It is plain that responsibility for making that value judgment must be given to someone.
In our view whoever bears the responsibility for setting levels of damages for non-
pecuniary loss in personal injury cases, should fix conventional levels which to some
extent conform with general perceptions of the sums of money that are commensurate
with the different non-pecuniary losses suffered. Otherwise the tort system will not, in
practice, be a system of corrective justice, since damages awarded will not generally be
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more than the sum of subjective evaluations which we deem as a whole, an aver-
age objective indicator or a best-informed result. Conversely, non-pecuniary dam-
ages do not comfort279 the average victim, but they affect the individual one be-
cause they do not redress imaginary losses but actual losses. On one hand, a pure
market evaluation in the case of non-pecuniary damages can even understate a per-
son's evaluation of their own impaired health.28 ° On the other, a market can fail
"when it too clearly prices that to which we would like to ascribe infinite 
value." 281
The problem is still more complicated because none of the possible suppliers
of a subjective evaluation can be fully trusted. There are strong incentives for the
wrongdoer to underestimate the loss and for the victim to overestimate the 
loss. 28 2
The impasse seems to be complete; 283 but in fact it is not, because in a way, courts
function by being in both the wrongdoer's and the victim's shoes at the same time.
As one author has rightly posited, "[t]he problem ... is determining the 'correct'
or 'efficient' price., 28 4 In some way, non-pecuniary damages awarded by judges
and juries285 tend to turn the subjective evaluations of the parties into a superior
"objective" evaluation, tempering the countervailing evaluations made by the par-
ties and covering the gap of information between pre-accident and post-accident
worlds.286 In other words, the court arena works as a place in which individual
choices and evaluations meet each other in an adversarial manner.
In this descriptive market-simulation, the countervailing signals flowing from
the players do not automatically create a value for the intangible loss at hand. The
court itself establishes the value, as a social arbiter. From this point of view, the
accepted as restoring a victim's losses. This approach is reflected in the case-law,
which requires that the fairness and reasonableness of damages for non-pecuniary loss
be assessed in the context of the social, economic and industrial conditions prevailing at
the time.
THE LAW COMM'N, supra note 34, at 32-33.
279. Indeed, society and tort law do not care about the average, but rather, the actual injured
person.
280. See Croley & Hanson, supra note 6, at 1849.
281. See GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 49 (1978). This argu-
ment, however seems to be more meaningful concerning a first party insurance market. See
Croley & Hanson, supra note 6, at 1875-76.
282. This is a sort of expost moral hazard in the form of exaggerated damages claims.
283. As stated previously in this comment, first party insurance markets cannot be relied
upon. Hence, it is excluded from the range of possibilities.
284. See Leebron, supra note 8, at 272.
285. For the moment, this comment will not distinguish between judges and juries in the
assessment of non-pecuniary damages.
286. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 92 (1991). Easterbrook and Fischel stated it in a different context:
Court systems have a comparative advantage in supplying answers to questions that do not
occur in time to be resolved ex ante. Common law systems need not answer questions unless
they occur. This is an economizing device. The accumulation of cases dealing with unusual
problems then supplies a level of detail that is costly to duplicate through private bargaining.
To put it differently, 'contractual' terms of many kinds of problems turn out to be public
goods!
(quoted in Croley & Hanson, supra note 6, at 1897).
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awards granted are in a sense arbitrary, because unambiguous criteria to evaluate
non-pecuniary damages do not exist287 and there are no criteria to compare the
value of one body part with another. "There is simply no equation between para-
lyzed limbs and/or injured brain and dollars. 288 However, a fifteen percent reduc-
tion of flexibility of an arm is a fifteen percent reduction for every human being,
and when an accident has occurred, juries and judges can form their opinion based
on evidence and previous decisions in similar cases. This is an excellent starting
point to serve both vertical and horizontal justice.
Because no party seems to have better information or information that is ac-
ceptable to the other parties concerned, this article assumes that, on average, there
is no overestimation or underestimation and courts are assessing non-pecuniary
damages quite well. If non-pecuniary damages assessed in tort perform as an ex
post contract, in which the content of the agreement is written by the court, we
should focus on the criteria needed to write the payment clause of this "unsought
contract."289 From this perspective, the tort system compels a contract when one
party does not want to contract at all. 290 The real nature of tort law becomes ap-
parent: it has substituted contract as the source of the obligation, overcoming in-
formation costs when a contract is unfeasible. 92 Finally, tort law deals with losses
sustained by the victims and addresses them on an individual basis, reflecting the
subjective evaluation of the parties in conflict on a case-by-case basis.
Thus, historical, economical, and socio-political arguments suggest that once
forced by reality to choose an evaluation, we have sufficient reasons to choose the
less "arbitrary" action of the courts and accept clear distinctions in the category of
non-pecuniary damages where an objectively ascertained medical condition can
offer a simple dividing line. The recent European experience could be the pro-
logue for other legal systems. After all, it is self-evident that a reliable degree of
certainty regarding appropriate recovery is necessary in order to calculate insur-
ance premiums. In addition, the higher this degree of predictability is, the more
predictable the risk and the more efficiently it will be administered.293 Indeed, at
an organizational level, there is no reason not to choose the judicial system as the
main actor. After all, if the marketplace is a bad forum to set a monetary value for
non-pecuniary loss, the court may well be a proper place in which to do so.294
287. See ATIYAH, supra note 190, at 213 ("All such damage awards could be multiplied or
divided by two overnight and they would be as defensible or indefensible as they are today.").
288. Cecil A. Wright et al., CANADIAN TORT LAW CASES, NOTES AND MATERIALS 1431
(1985).
289. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 274, at 1107. In other words, this comment adopts
this line of reasoning that when transaction costs are high "an argument can readily be made for
moving from a property rule to a liability rule." Id. This ex post approach can overcome high
transaction costs as information costs.
290. Indeed, at least injurers would prefer a no-liability rule.
291. See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916).
292. See Croley & Hanson, supra note 6, at 1900.
293. The goal of making non-pecuniary damages more predictable is certainly not a new
one. See, e.g., Bovbjerg et al., supra note 240, at 924-27; see also Schuck, supra note 5, at 306-
40 (proposing methods to give guidance to the jurors).
294. According to Leebron,
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Furthermore, because of the very nature of damages for intangible loss, we
should maintain an individual approach as much as possible. Intangible losses dif-
fer from person to person, and the value of the tort system lies in the prospect of
confronting each individual case.295 Moreover, at a pragmatic level, changing the
case-by-case approach would require a radical reform of the system, most likely
engendering strong political opposition and triggering constitutional concerns.
2 9 6
On the contrary, the simple improvement of reducing asymmetric information and
sharing a common intellectual framework for non-pecuniary damages would meet
less opposition and would not need statutory intervention. Of course, a counter-
argument could be that the judicial system itself works arbitrarily to some extent.
Still, court assessment, if taken as an implicit market evaluation for "objective"
non-pecuniary damages, could be a good substitute for a market.
297 Finally, an
important point is that the "arbitrary" system and its arbiters (judges and juries) are
already in charge of the awarding process and, as the European experience shows,
the system works fairly well.298
4. The Impact of Standardization on Settlements and Litigation: A
Sample
European experiences offer clear guidelines and place full reliance on the de-
cisions of the courts.299 For instance, in the United States, the idea of providing
If we explicitly adopt a survey theory, rather than an exclusive fact-finding theory, of jury as-
sessment of non-pecuniary damages, a different vision of the proper role of judge and jury in
this task emerges. While judges, and in particular, appellate judges, are not in a better posi-
tion to determine price de novo, they are in a better position to aggregate, in a way the market
does for market traded goods, the preferences expressed by individuals.
Leebron, supra note 8, at 319. However, it is well worth ascertaining whether or not this state-
ment could be applicable at the individual case level as well. The most important concern at this
level is obviously to give equal treatment for reasonably similar cases and dissimilar treatment for
different ones (horizontal and vertical equity). The issue for the actual plaintiff and defendant is
whether it is possible to reconcile ex ante predictability with a case-by-case approach.
295. For a clear statement of this concept, see Peter H. Schuck, Scheduled Damages and
Insurance Contracts for Future Services: A Comment on Blumstein, Bovbjerg, and Sloan, 8 YALE
J. ON REG. 213, 215 (1991) ("Individualized jury determinations of damages promote the law's
most noble ambition - to vindicate individual rights by producing exquisitely individualized
contextualized judgments tailored to the unique circumstances of each individual rather than mass
produced according to crude functional categories created to serve social needs.").
296. See infra Part IV. For an analysis of the political dimension of tort law evolution either
by judges or legislators (and scholars), see generally Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig,
Taming the Tort Monster: The American Civil Justice System as a Battleground of Social Theory,
68 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (2002).
297. For the concept of implicit market evaluation, see Stephen G. Gilles, The Invisible
Hand Formula, 80 VA. L. REV. 1015, 1030-34 (1994).
298. According to one commentator, "If a survey is the best available pricing mechanism,
the jury seems to be well suited to this task. As part of its task of determining liability, the jury is
in a position to gather facts at least with respect to a specific case." Leebron, supra note 8, at
318: see also Croley & Hanson, supra note 6, at 1837-41 (arguing that jury behavior can be read
as evidence of consumer demand for insurance against pain and suffering).
299. It is suggested in this comment that the example of the level of settlements can apply to
the litigation process as well.
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information to jurors about previous awards has been suggested on many other oc-
casions. 300 American lawyers may still regard this last suggestion as complete
nonsense, because they frequently put most of the blame for the explosion in non-
pecuniary damages on the judicial system (mainly on the civil juries). However, to
understand fully what the potential impact of these suggestions could be, and be-
fore analyzing their feasibility in the United States, it might be worthwhile to make
a simple but illustrative comparison between tort litigation and a (normal form)
game, where the hypothetical plaintiff and the hypothetical defendant are play-
ers.
30 1
Indeed, scholars - at least experts in law and economics - seem to agree
that if parties are likely to behave strategically they will reach an efficient result.
Moreover, they agree that we can overcome strategic behavior "by giving an abso-
,,302lute entitlement to the victim and setting liability equal to damages. Therefore,
we only need to know actual damages to let the system work efficiently. Yet, cal-
culating the actual amount of damages is the problempar excellence in every non-
pecuniary loss assessment.
To fully illustrate the positive effects of the framework to be grasped by a
rather formalized comparative analysis, we will make some assumptions:
a) Both parties (wrongdoer and victim) are rational and informed (both of
them share the following assumptions).
b) The likely outcome of an out-of-court settlement would be - e.g.,
$10,000.
c) The cost of litigation for each party is - e.g., $2,000.
d) Courts in a similar disputed case would award - e.g., $10,000.
e) However, when parties are unwilling to settle for a reasonable amount -
300. See, e.g., 2 A.L.I. 220-27, 230 (Paul C. Wieler 1991) (stating that the development of
"meaningful guidelines based on a scale of inflation-adjusted damage amounts attached to a num-
ber of disability profiles that range in severity from the relatively moderate to the gravest inju-
ries," and suggesting a threshold of seriousness before making an award); Kenneth S. Abraham,
Robert L. Rabin & Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise Responsibilityfor Personal Injury: Further Reflec-
tions, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 333, 343 (1993) (suggesting that by implementing their proposed
inflation adjusted monetary scale for granting pain and suffering damages, with such damages
awarded pursuant to a scale according to which "the amount to be awarded for lesser injuries
would be prorated downward from the figure that was fixed for the most severe injuries," and
"eventually the scale would terminate at the legal floor for any pain and suffering damages," and
"severity would be defined not just with reference to the nature of the injury... but also the age
of the victim"); see also Baldus et al., supra note 240, at 1109; Blumstein et al., supra note 205,
at 171; Bovbjerg et al., supra note 240, at 908; Leebron, supra note 8, at 322-23; Eric Schnapper,
Judges Against Juries: Appellate Review of Federal Civil Jury Verdicts, 1989 WIs. L. REv. 237.
301. Of course, this comment does not claim to formally apply game theory in all its nu-
ances. The explanation is only a descriptive feature for the argument that settling the framework
and sharing this information may force effective results in the tort system. Normal form game (or
strategic form game) consists of three elements: (1) the players (victim and wrongdoer in our ex-
ample); (2) the strategies available to the players (here: settle or litigate); (3) the payoff received
for each combination of the strategies. See generally DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER
& RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 6-30 (1994).
302. See M.A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICs 24 (2d.
ed. 1989).
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i.e, what is close to court's own usual evaluation, judges would increase or reduce
the regular amount ($10,000) by $1,000 against the party refusing the settle-
ment.3"3
Under this scenario, both parties' dominant strategy3°4 is to settle the case.
Based on the starting point of a reliable prior court decision, they behave accord-
ingly, using the same set of beliefs and information. 30 5 In fact, regardless of the
other player's decision, each one is better off settling. Because the most efficient
result for each one, as shown in Table 1, is to settle the case and save the costs of
litigation (Scenario 1).
Scenario 1 Victim settles Victim litigates
Wrongdoer settles W)- $10 W) - $11
V)+ $10 V) + $7
Wrongdoerlitigates W)- $13 W) - $ 12
V) +$9 V) + $ 8
Now, let's suspend the assumption that the parties share full information un-
der (a) above.30 6 Further, they do not know how a court would adjudicate at trial,
or, in other words, this outcome is not predictable as showin in (d) above. Also,
the parties likely have quite different estimations of the loss - e.g., the defen-
dant's expected result (subjective estimate of the loss) is $10,000 and the victim's
is $20,000. They each see that the settlement point is no lower and no higher than
halfway between their evaluation - e.g, $15,000.
The rules used by the courts for assessment are the same as that under Sce-
nario 1. Because there is no reliable court evaluation in Scenario 2, assumption (e)
does not apply. Both the defendants' (and his insurer) and the plaintiffs' payoff
matrix now look rather different from before because they have divergent evalua-
tions of the possible verdict. As shown in Scenario 2, from their point of view,
303. I am indebted to Miss Orme (an English lawyer living in Italy) who pointed out:
that the 'payment-in' system under the English civil procedure rules counters this unwilling-
ness to settle perfectly: D, on the advice of his lawyers, pays into court a certain sum, which is
judged to be extremely close to the anticipated award in damages. The 'payment in', as it is
usually called, remains a secret from the assessing judge. If the adjudicated award 'beats' the
payment in, all is well, and P gets his costs. If the award is lower than the payment in, even by
a penny, D gets all the costs of the trial from the date of the payment in, which, as it usually
includes the lawyer's brief-fee for appearing in court, can be huge. The advantages of making
an early payment-in are, therefore, obvious.
304. BAIRD ET AL., supra note 301, at 306 (defining dominant strategy as "[a] strategy that
is the a best choice "for a player in a game for every possible choice by the other player").
305. But see Schuck, supra note 295, at 218 (noting that the use of earlier awards may "im-
pound and then compound what they themselves characterize as distortions of the past, thereby
projecting those distortions into the future").
306. This is arguably a fair assumption.
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now both the victim and the defendant have an "iterated dominance" 30 7 to litigate
the case. They no longer reach the efficient result of a settlement.
Scenario 2 Victim settles Victim litigates
Wrongdoer settles W) - $15 W) - $12
V) +$15 V) + $18
Wrongdoer litigates W) - $12 W) - $ 12
V)+$18 V)+$18
The essential point in showing a different result under the second scenario is
that neither party knows the possible outcome of the case in the courtroom, nor is
the court itself familiar with preceding outcomes. Once we eliminate both of the
following assumptions: (1) that the court's assessment is equal to the actual value
of the injury sustained; and (2) that full/reliable information about prior court deci-
sions is being offered to the players, the parties no longer reach an efficient result.
Due to the lack of information, both the parties forfeit something and society, as
whole, wastes resources.
The deficiency of shared information is mainly due to the parties' lack of a
common starting point in the settlement process. On the contrary, if we let them
share the same information and act upon it accordingly, then in their own interest,
they will reach an efficient result. It is not even essential that the shared informa-
tion (i.e., the amount of non-economic damages awarded in court) is the "correct"
evaluation of non-pecuniary damages. The shared information works as a tran-
scendental illusion, making it possible to reach an efficient result 308 even if we as-
sume it is not the most correct evaluation. How plausible the assumption is - that
court evaluation is equal to what actual damages may be (i.e., how far from reality
is our transcendental illusion) - is a question without an answer. Nevertheless,
theoretically it is no more, but also no less, plausible than an assumption that either
the victim or the defendant is right - i.e., no more but no less than any other "ar-
bitrary" assumption. The only thing known is that these losses need to be re-
dressed in the best way, without wasting resources, and to do so requires setting
liability equal to actual damages. 30 9
307. Iterated dominance is a solution concept based on the idea that a player will adopt
strictly dominant strategies and refuse strictly dominated strategies, and that player believes that
the other player would behave the same way. BAIRD ET AL., supra note 301, at 309.
308. It is a transcendental illusion we need: e.g., as shaving after a warm shower. The im-
age goes as follows. After a warm shower, our mirror is misted and we dry only a small portion
of it (say one tenth the size of our face). We will shave looking at our image in that undersized
portion of the mirror and behave as if it were the true size of our face. We know it is not, but by
behaving as if it were, we can shave "efficiently."
309. When we assume that non-pecuniary loss damages are excessive because of the lack of
willingness to buy first party insurance we implicitly assume that damages are greater than actual
damages and that this will lead to inefficient allocations. See POLINSKY, supra note 302, at 20
(analyzing this concept with respect to the strategic behaviors of the parties).
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The vicious circle of asymmetric (or even absent) information has to be bro-
ken at some point, to give socially efficient dominant strategies to the players in
the game of tort law. Once it is realized that correct evaluations of non-pecuniary
damages are available, only one of the estimations can be selected as the right one.
As explained above, neither the wrongdoer nor the victim can be fully trusted.
Hence, it seems reasonable to choose valuation by the courts as the socially ac-
cepted "correct" valuation and behave consequently: spread information conceding
that assessments made in the courtroom are, on average, proper ones.310 By as-
sumption, it cannot be known whether the chosen evaluation is more accurate than
the ones proposed by the litigants, but it is, at least, less arbitrary because it takes
them into account. All that needs to be done is to make the estimation of the court
equal to damages, to provide this information to all parties, and to allow guidelines
for the decision-maker. In a formalized way, this is what non-economic damages
awarding systems have done in the United Kingdom, Italy, and France.
B. An Experimental Proposal for America: The Normalized Values Schedule
Another possible problem presented by the European approaches is that they
still show horizontal disparity when comparing assessment in different districts of
court of appeal. In principle, this disparity could be perceived as reflecting differ-
ent local social perceptions of the proper value of a specific intangible loss, be it
evaluated according to the "disability schedule and value table" approach or ac-
cording to the "descriptive" approach. Nevertheless, there is at least one way of
developing better horizontal equality without forgoing these differences if, as the
American jury system seems to do, it is assumed they are worth being conserved.
A research experiment was carried out some years ago that might illustrate
this point and offer valuable suggestions for the United States. After a period of
"anarchical" jurisprudence when each judge was the arbiter who stated his/her own
equitable criterion for assessing non-economic damages in respect of the Italian
non-pecuniary damages known as "danno alla salute, " a research project run un-
der the auspices of the Italian National Research Council ("CNR") developed a
proposal for a National Orientation Schedule of monetary values ("NOS") built
upon a Normalized Values Schedule ("NVS"). 311 Both schedules were developed
310. When parties of a settlement process share enough information and expect similar re-
sults in court, their settlement should be reached at low transaction and administrative costs. See
Kathryn E. Spier, A Note on the Divergence Between the Private and the Social Motive to Settle
Under a Negligence Rule, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 613, 616-20 (1997) (arguing also that more in-
creased litigation would be proper for deterrence goals). But see Steven Shavell, The Fundamen-
tal Divergence Between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL
STUD. 575, 577 (1997). See generally Mitchell Polinksy & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Deterrent
Effects of Settlements at Trials, 8 INT'L. REv. L. & ECON. 109 (1988).
311. In Italian, it is called "Tabellazione Indicativa Nazionale-TIN". The results of the
research are published in the collective work of RAPPORTO SULLO STATO DELLA
GIURISPRUDENZA IN TEMA DI DANNO ALLA SALUTE (Marino Bargagna & Francesco D. Busnelli
eds., 1996). On this research and on the model developed, see G. Turchetti, Gli sviluppi dello
studio sulla determinazione del valore monetario base del punto di invaliditu, in RAPPORTO,
supra note 220, at 171; Giovanni Comand6, La sperimentazione di una Tabella Indicativa
Nazionale tra esigenze di prevedibiliti ex ante del danno e di liquidazione equitativa ex post, in
2005]
HeinOnline  -- 19 Temp. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 309 2005
TEMPLE INT'L & COMP. L.J.
on the basis of relevant data derived from cases decided all over the country. This
approach has shown its suitability to provide uniform nation-wide common ground
for monetary assessments of danno alla salute, leading to more vertical and hori-
zontal justice without imposing uniform awards.312
This article draws on that experience for at least two reasons. Certainly this
article does not propose the acceptance of monetary values (NOS) emerging from
an Italian study to award damages for loss of enjoyment of life in United States.
Nevertheless, some features of the construction and operation of the model pro-
posed can shed light on possible evolutionary paths for the United States. The idea
to develop an NVS that gives a higher degree of vertical and horizontal equality is
a step that courts in each U.S. jurisdiction could accept without any deep or ques-
tioned change. In addition, the way the overall system has developed might reveal
instructive patterns for the U.S. judicial system and for further scholarly research.
1. The Background Idea and Goals of the NVS and its Experimental
Ancestor, the NOS
The central pivot upon which the aforementioned research project turned was
the idea that "real," concrete, economic parameters can never be achieved for
health, because it is an irreplaceable attribute which cannot be substituted with a
sum of money. Nonetheless, repugnant though such a concept is, this substitution
must be made in order to compensate the victim. 313 The research project sprang
from the need to arrive at a definitive settlement of the issue of compensation for
personal injury arising from civil liability, without sacrificing the tailoring of ex
post damages to the needs of (accurate) ex ante predictability of compensation
awards. With this in mind, the parameters used in developing the NOS and the
NVS were defined using judgment awards from case law. This process revealed
many efforts to reconcile two apparently opposing principles within the compensa-
tion goal, namely basic uniformity of awards and the necessity for equitable ad-
justment to the specific features of the case at hand. These attempts indicated
widespread difficulty in the courts about the issue of effective quantification of
awards for personal injury.
From this viewpoint, recent case-law developments in Italy have clearly dem-
onstrated two useful indications for reducing the friction between these diametri-
cally opposed needs. The first one identifies, in the scheduling tables of usual
valuations produced by each court, an extremely useful scheme for ensuring rec-
RAPPORTO, supra note 220, at 201 ff. Part II.B draws upon this experimental research which was
carried out and from the publications a colleague (with economic expertise) and myself produced.
312. The NOS was already welcomed by several courts and it might become an interesting
reference point for the legislature when it decides to answer the increased call for a statute regu-
lating danno alla salute (or "biologico"). Orientation tables such as the NOS described above are
developed taking into account life expectancy according to the age of the victim. Very rarely ac-
tual life expectancy for the victim in each case is investigated. Clearly enough it is not the best
solution, but it seems to work well. However, a common table for all tribunals would be wel-
come.
313. Cass., sez. III, 14 apr. 1995, n.4255, in 60 RESPONSABILITA CIVILE E PREVIDENZA 519
(1995).
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ognizably predictable margins of awards for damages, while at the same time pro-
viding a uniform basis for the awarding of compensation for personal injury. The
second indication concerns the structure of the scheduling tables adopted. The ta-
bles developed by case law are completely consistent; this is one of the most obvi-
ous differentiations as far as award values are concerned, namely between disabili-
ties assessed at less than ten percent and moderate or serious disabilities, indicating
a movement towards a more equal distribution of resources and an effective case-
by-case evaluation of the disability.
From these starting-points, the objective was to develop a valid methodology
of general application from observations conducted nation-wide, in order to tackle
problems of vertical and horizontal justice, leaving aside the monetary value as-
signed to each percentage point of permanent disability.
2. The Methodology to Set up the NOS and the NVS
As mentioned above, in Italy non-economic damages for intangible loss
known as danno alla salute are awarded using the scoring and scheduling, value
approach. In order to overcome disparities between jurisdictions and to increase
vertical justice, the research project experimented by using a proposal for a mone-
tary NOS that implements an NVS.31 4
The construction of the NVS developed by the Pisa Personal Injury study
group in 1995-1996 was based on the identification of the following principles
gathered from case law:
1. The value of the point is an increasing function of the percentage of dis-
ability;
2. The value of the point is a decreasing function of the age of the victim;
3. The effect of disability on the life of the victim progresses more than pro-
portionally with respect to the percentage increase allocated to permanent impair-
ment (not only in absolute but also in relative terms: for example, if the increase in
value in the passage from percentage point X% to the next (X+1)% is equal to Y%,
then in the passage from (X+1)% to (X+2)%, the value must be higher than Y%);
and
4. The reference point for utilizing the table (point unit) has been convention-
ally established on the basis of a 20-year-old victim and a harm of 10%.
All the above mentioned rules of construction are based on agreed medico-
legal scientific evidence, 315 and they guided the first attempts at experimental data
elaboration to be operated by individual courts.
The NVS is the outcome of the mathematical elaboration and rigorous appli-
cation of the criteria mentioned, in addition to other indications from the medico-
legal disciplines deriving from observation and analysis of the trends of Italian
case law. In fact, the procedure adopted was to collect significant examples ofju-
314. See Turchetti, supra note 311, at 180-188; Comand6, supra note 311, at 203-05.
315. See A. Bassi Luciani, Lepiccole permanenti, in RAPPORTO, supra note 220, at 119-32
(arguing on empirical data that there is a disproportion in evalutions related to small injuries as
opposed to more serious ones).
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dicial awards and store the data; the belief was that the set of case law based as-
sessments obtained from analysis of the judgments logged could express a socially
accepted evaluation for personal injury in tort, freed from the particular viewpoint
of the individual adjudicating body, and thus, capable of producing the basic aver-
age monetary value. All things considered, refining abnormal assessment data and
allocating it to one single basket of values can even theoretically express the result
of a weighted socially accepted evaluation which, while not purporting to express
certainties, can furnish indications that are not arbitrary.
In this way, a large number of case law judgments, which awarded compensa-
tion for personal injury according to the method indicated in Part (I)(C) of this arti-
cle were collected on a random basis. In the sample judgments analyzed, personal
injury damages were awarded by the court on the basis of medical scoring systems
scientifically approved and applied at trial by medical experts; these systems as-
signed a percentage point for the permanent disability of the victim and multiplied
this numerical value by the unitary monetary value for each point which the court,
in its discretion, considered just and equitable to assign to the case at hand. At this
stage, the courts were only just beginning to demonstrate the direction they were
taking by the use of tables, such as the one illustrated (see supra Part (I)(C)(6)),
and to establish the practice of using uniformly-based monetary values.
The judicial data collected served both to draw up the NVS and the NOS dis-
ability points. The largest number of judgments available came within the broad
class of eleven to thirty years of age (1 - 15%). In drawing up the Table, account
was taken of the Mortality Tables reference to men and women, as published in the
Italian National Statistics Institute's yearly statistics.3 16
Because it uses a binary table, the Table of Monetary Values is the same in
every way as the representation of the monetary values corresponding to the age-
percentage of permanent disability and illustrated in Part (I)(C)(6). The Normal-
ized Values Schedule of invalidity points is presented in the same way, but it cor-
responds to normalized values, rather than to effective monetary values. Normal-
ized values are indicators that are consistent with the rules for constructing the
table. The operative monetary table is obtained by multiplying the basic monetary
value, which each court or jury believes to be representative of the socially ac-
cepted valuation of the intangible loss corresponding to an ascertainable injury to
health, by the corresponding normalized value.
Due to the characteristics of less serious permanent disability in comparison
to more serious disability (conventionally above 10%), it was thought advisable to
differentiate between these two types of disability in a way that takes the differ-
ences between them into account, for example, the greater potential of the former
for full post-injury recovery.
The operation was completed by identifying two similar curves, one in the 1-
10% range, and the other in the 10% - 70/80% range. In order to determine the
values of 13o, 031, 132 of the exponential function used (f(x) = e °+B' x+# x' ) in work-
ing out the system in the application illustrated here, the following limits were es-
316. In the original study, the Mortality tables referring to year 1990 were used. See Italian
National Statistics Institute, http://www.istat.it (last visited Nov. 23, 2005).
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tablished and supported by the analysis of case law samples that were collected
and expert evaluations from medico-legal science:
a. In both the 1-10% range and the 10-80% range, a corresponding growth
rate in the value of the point equal to 1:3 was established, on the basis of the early
indications of tables developed from case law;
b. In the 1-10% range, the value of the point increases from 1/3 to 0.6 in the
passage from a 1% degree of disability to one of 6%. Among other things, this
pattern allows a function for less serious permanent disability to be identified,
which, starting with relatively limited values for the first 2-4%, increases steadily
on reaching 5% disability. In this way, a distribution of award values is achieved
which compensates in particular the more disabling injuries as compared to those
of a lesser impact, frequently involving full post-injury recovery; and
c. In the 10-80% range, the value of the point increases by I to 1.7, in passing
from a 10% degree of disability to one of 45%.317
Using these limits enabled the disability points in the NVS to be defined. It
futher reflected the basic rules outlined previously: (1) the seriousness of an injury
is a decreasing function of age (set out in the mortality tables); and (2) the effect of
the disability on the life of the injured person increases to a greater extent when the
percentage attributed to the harm endured similar increases.
The translation from the Normalized Values Schedule to the NOS Monetary
Value Table for the disability point is made simply by multiplying the normalized
value of the relevant point for each age/degree of disability combination by the ba-
sic monetary award extrapolated from the case law data. In early experimental ef-
forts, this value corresponded to a twenty-year-old man with a ten percent disabil-
ity - i.e., the so called "reference victim" at the central point of the broad class
(11-30 years of age; 1-15%) in which a high percentage of the judgments collected
at that time fell. 318 The monetary value was determined by calculating the average
weighted value of the damages awarded for injuries falling within the broad class,
having removed abnormal cases.
3 19
The method described allows for the evolution of case law, and takes into ac-
count the general perception of the proper amount of recovery that the type of in-
jury merits, as well as the inflationary trend. All that is required, is to check peri-
odically whether the base reference value is up to date. If this has to be altered -
either increased or decreased - a new table of monetary values is obtained by
multiplying the normalized value of the point relevant to each age/degree of inva-
317. These formula have been elaborated within the research group by Professor Giuseppe
Turchetti. See Turchetti, supra note 311, at 180-82.
318. The research is ongoing and periodically the Research Group publishes the results of
its studies. See generally Osservatorio della giurisprudenza in tema di danno alla persona in
responsabilit civile, in DANNO E RESPONSABILITA, 1999, 121 (M. Bargagna & F.D. Busnelli
eds.).
319. In the latest data elaboration carried out by the CNR Research Group of Pisa, the basic
monetary value (for a man aged twenty with a 10% disability) which has a basis of reference in
national case-law, was equivalent to €1.716,77 (value pro-rated to March 2002 according to
ISTAT's April 2002 coefficients).
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lidity combination with the re-rated base value applicable to the twenty-year-old
with a ten percent disability.
3. Operating with NOS and NVS
Because it has not submitted to monetary figures, the NVS does not suffer any
limitations on time or space. It enables compensation amounts founded upon dif-
ferent point values that are calculated on the basis of varying economic and politi-
cal conditions in each national system, and without leading to iniquitous results.
Providing rates of increase of the point's normalized values - determined on the
basis of a mathematical calculation - the NVS is able to assure similar treatment
for all victims, while leaving out any difference in the monetary value attributed to
the point.
The principles proposed, which the NVS arose out of, allow the requirement
of uniformity in the base monetary value for damages awards to be safeguarded,
without reducing individualization in an unacceptable way.320 Once normalized
values have been translated into monetary values, the NOS allows margins of pre-
dictability which are indispensable for ensuring the system's stability. It further
guarantees improved vertical justice (among lesser and greater injuries) and hori-
zontal justice (among similar personal injuries), and avoids turning the personal
injury victim into a faceless number. The forecasting of uniform base monetary
parameters in the NOS offers predictable values which are easily adaptable to the
case at hand, thereby delivering better horizontal justice. Obviously, all of the
monetary values in the elaboration were indicative and susceptible to equitable ad-
justment, according to the specific case before the court. Thus, the indispensable
margin of discretion for the adjudicating body was retained, given that a flexible
instrument for valuation should not be turned into a perilous vehicle for making the
assessment of personal injury awards standardized and sclerotic. In fact, other
happenings may contribute to the equitable adjustment of the pre-selected value for
the specific case before the court. For example, the occurrence of disabilities of a
different nature, affecting the aesthetic aspect or disabilities which impede more
specific functions; or the effect of the injury on someone with a pre-existing condi-
tion versus a person in good health.
Two criteria for adapting the uniform base value to the circumstances of the
case at hand have, therefore, been internalized in an objective way and they con-
tribute to the determination of the value in the NVS: the seriousness of the injury
expressed in percentage terms and the achievement of a monetary value in the light
of life-expectancy statistics corresponding to the victim's age. On the other hand,
the NOS only gives indications on damages awards that can be personalized, with
increases and decreases in the quantum already obtained by combining permanent
disability and age in the table. In other words, there are two possible steps in mak-
ing the awards personalized: (1) an objective personalization resulting from the
combination of age and disability in the schedule; and (2) the case specific person-
alization according to the facts of the case. The method allows different injuries to
320. As illustrated supra in Part I.C.5-6.
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be treated coherently in different ways and similar ones to be treated in similar
ways, despite their individual and unique aspects.
4. What Can the American System Learn?
Clearly, what is being put forward for the United States is neither the whole-
sale adoption of the NOS, nor its method of construction. The Italian experience
with the NOS is, however, significant to the evolution of an American model be-
cause it emphasizes a real possibility of evolution which has not been forced by
legislative action,321 but rather by the synergy of the stakeholders in the judicial
arena. The case law material used was both the product of first-hand unbiased re-
search by the study group, and was not supplied by interested parties such as
judges, insurers, and lawyers. The inter-disciplinary development of the model
was carried out entirely in an academic environment and was spontaneously
adopted by the courts, meeting approval because of its basis in the scientific
method. In addition, leaving monetary values aside, the development or adoption
of the NVS guarantees full parity of treatment (horizontal and vertical) between
victims of injury, quite apart from any pre-selected monetary value. Therefore, its
adoption is fully compatible with the continued use of a diversified assessment
among the various States in North America, and even within each State. The NVS
could in fact be developed and used to bring within equal horizontal and vertical
parameters the socially accepted assessments arrived at by jurors in local commu-
nities, who would assign the unitary base value and adjust the result to the actual
case before the court. In this way, a step-by-step procedure would be established,
and would ensure that the principle of vertical and horizontal equality is fully re-
spected without compelling the jury (or the trial judge) to choose between fixed
monetary values.
Overall, a comparison sends several messages:
1. The increasing significance of non-economic damages in personal injury
litigation is not a uniquely American feature, nor it is without a social and eco-
nomic foundation.
2. All surveyed countries have struggled with similar problems, mainly in as-
sessing non-pecuniary damages and in filtering claims for damages that are either
frivolous or difficult to prove.
3. A fruitful option for both filtering claims and improving the process of as-
sessment is to distinguish, in the field of personal injury, damages for non-
economic loss that have an "objective, 322 uniform basis for evaluation (i.e, a dis-
ability or illness ascertainable by medical science), and those that do not have such
a basis.
321. In fact, the proposed criteria were later adopted by the Italian legislature in drawing up
scheduling tables for minor traffic accident injuries. See art. 138 of Decreto legislativo 7 of sept.
2005, n.209.
322. See Collins Dictionary, supra note 2 (defining "objective").
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4. Relying on this framework, European legal systems, in both the civil and
the common law traditions, have experienced a remarkable evolution in their as-
sessment processes.
5. These innovations were achieved through the judicial system without trig-
gering statutory intervention.
6. Most patterns followed by the European systems could find a place in
America, at least with the development of a Normalized Values Schedule.
The comparison also indicates that American courts could potentially imple-
ment several of the possible alternative approaches which are emerging, without
creating too many problems. This article refers to these different evolutionary pat-
tems as "judicial scheduling," in order to contrast them with other proposals that
have been put forward in the United States. The aim of Part III is to argue that the
United States could use judicial scheduling, namely Normalized Values Schedules,
and to anticipate possible criticisms of such use.
III. FRAMING U.S. JUDICIAL GUIDELINES FOR NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGES IN
THE EURO-AMERICAN DEBATE
Because non-economic damages do exist and have gained a role in tort law, 323
this article deals with their assessment. As argued previously, there are very good
reasons why these damages appeared under the umbrella of tort law and to explain
their peculiar development in several legal systems. 324 This article now will ad-
dress whether the "comparative lessons" sketched above would fit into the evolu-
tionary patterns illustrated, patterns which the United States is already following.
To do so requires tackling the American debate in the context this article has
framed. This article will also consider both the debate about which institution is
better suited to award these damages and how such an institution should go about
323. See Bovbjerg et al., supra note 240, at 935 ("From a legal perspective, intangible dam-
ages have clearly won a place in legal theory and practice. Modem jurisprudence has generally
expanded the recovery for non-economic damages in tort.") (footnote omitted). See also Croley
& Hanson, supra note 6, at 1908-09, stating:
The practice of quantifying even the most painful types of pain and suffering in dollar
terms for the purpose of tort compensation has survived, indeed perhaps flourished, to
the present. Economic compensation for non economic losses is now a common aspect
of the modem tort regime. Yet, there is seemingly no suggestion that such practice vio-
lates important social norms. The fact that none of the proposals to eliminate damages
for pain and suffering rests on the proposition that quantifying pain and suffering in tort
is contrary to social norms suggests that ex post pricing of pain and suffering through
the tort system is indeed socially acceptable.
(citations omitted).
324. See supra Part I. See also Bovbjerg et al., supra note 240, at 933, stating:
[P]otential victims of negligence may feel that, ethically, it is not their responsibility to
pay for pain and suffering inflicted upon them by others. All that can be legitimately in-
ferred from the seeming lack of demand for pain and suffering coverage is that people
seem willing to assume the risk of such losses where others are not legally responsible.
This is not evidence that pain and suffering lack importance in the context of tortious in-
jury.
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325 326doing so - e.g., by using schedules, caps, minimum or maximum thresh-
olds,327 the case-by-case approach, or something else.
In light of the accounts given above, a preliminary and honest answer to both
issues may be that the best institution and the best method do not exist. Keeping
this in mind, this article might cautiously revise some of the issues debated in
American legal literature from the basis of a discourse about them. A final pre-
liminary note is worth stressing. Having argued in support of the existence of non-
economic damages, this section is mainly confined to an analysis of American lit-
erature328 containing proposals which are aimed at better management of non-
pecuniary loss assessment. This article does not enter the debate as to whether the
existence of non-economic damages for personal injury is acceptable,329 although
these issues will inevitably repeatedly reappear.
A. American Debates and the Lack of Monetary Standards for Non-Economic
Damages
One of the main features of American tort law that may have restrained elabo-
rate comparison with the European experience is the persistent role of the jury in
civil trials. The right to a trial by jury, protected by both State Constitutions and
the U.S. Constitution,330 has also sparked the hottest criticisms to proposals for giv-
325. See infra Parts III.A.2, III.B.
326. According to Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 11, 60-61, as of 2002, several states had
passed some form of statutory cap on damages for non-pecuniary harm, a reform that has some-
times been struck down on state constitution grounds. See also Elizabeth Stewart Poisson, Ad-
dressing the Impropriety of Statutory Caps on Pain and Suffering Awards in the Medical Liability
System, 82 N.C. L. REV. 759, 779-80 (2004) (discussing caps for non economic damages and
concluding that, "[u]ntil judges, legal scholars, and attorneys clarify the proper methods for jurors
to use, legislators are in no better position than jurors to decide what constitutes a just pain and
suffering award"). She further argues,
[T]he legal community should make substantive and procedural changes to provide ju-
rors with more guidance in determining pain and suffering awards. These solutions in-
volve judges, jurors, attorneys, and legislators in the endeavor of compensating only
meritorious claims and legitimately proven injuries with reasonable pain and suffering
awards.
Id. at 787.
327. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Serious Tort Law Reform, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 795, 807,
823-25 (1987) (proposing not only a threshold on pain and suffering damages, but also a ceiling
to be adjusted regularly for inflation).
328. Of course completeness cannot be claimed, but this comment has tried to present the
overall picture of the ongoing debate in the United States. Moreover, the arguments are aimed at
managing the existing assessment of non-pecuniary damages.
329. A long list of authors have argued that since a first party insurance market for non-
pecuniary losses does not exist, it is unjust and illogical to force people to buy it via the tort sys-
tem. See HUBER, supra note 11, at 3-17 (purporting the system is forcing a "tort tax"); STEVEN
SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 228-31, 245-47 (1987); Schwartz, supra
note 45, at 362-67. Still it could be argued that the actual development of non-pecuniary losses
can be read as an expression of willingness to pay, since the legal right to compensation for non-
pecuniary losses would have already been overturned by an overwhelming political will or it
would have not developed at all.
330. U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("In suits at common law, where the value in controversy
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ing instructions to juries in assessing damages. 331 Those criticisms have often
harped on the theme of possible unconstitutionality embedded in the proposals
332which modify the status quo. The status quo, though, is that the American sys-
tem offers almost no guidance to jurors in awarding non-economic damages:3 33 ju-
rors must convert their impression at trial into a monetary award without the sug-
gestion of a method by which to do so.334 Jurors can only rely on their common
sense and good judgment in determining a fair and appropriate award.335
This rather absurd33 6 status quo turns assessing non-pecuniary damages into
"one of the most difficult decisions... facing the jury in a personal injury case., 337
According to some scholars, even jurors have complained about not having re-
ceived instructions for this difficult task.338 Meanwhile, judges can use informa-
tion about decisions by other juries in prior cases to revise jury decision-making.339
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by ajury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules
of the common law."); see supra Parts II.A.2-.3 and accompanying footnotes.
331. Slocum v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 387-88 (1913).
332. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970) (stating that the Seventh
Amendment provides a right to a jury trial on legal claims and that questions about damages are
legal questions). But see Geressy v. Digital Equip. Corp., 950 F. Supp. 519, 521 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)
("If the jury is to accomplish its task under the Seventh Amendment, it is entitled to be informed
of its role."). The wave of constitutional challenges to tort reform in the twentieth-century is put
in historical context by John Fabian Witt, State Constitutions And American Tort Law: A History(Mar. 7, 2004) (unpublished Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law Research Paper No. 04-67), available
at http://ssm.com/abstract=515662.
333. See generally Allen J. Hart, Roselle L. Wissler, & Michael J. Saks, Multidimensional
Perceptions of Illness and Injury, 2 CURRENT RES. SOC. PSYCHOL. 30, 30-37 (1997); Edith
Greene & Brian Bornstein, Precious Little Guidance: Jury Instruction on Damage Awards,
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & LAW 743-68 (2000).
334. See, e.g., ALABAMA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL § 11.05 (Ala. Pattern Jury
Instructions Comm. 2005); ALASKA CIVIL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 20.06 (Civil Pattern
Jury Instructions Comm. 2005); ELEVENTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL
CASES: DAMAGES INSTRUCTION § 2.1 (West 2000); FIFTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL CASES: COMPENSATORY DAMAGES § 15.2 (West 1999); NORTH
CAROLINA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR CIVIL CASES § 810.30 (Inst. of Gov't 1998);
UTAH MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL § 27.2 (Utah State Bar 1998); WYOMING CIVIL
PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 4.02 (Wyoming Bar 2003).
335. See, e.g., HAWAI'I JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL §§ 8.5, 8.61 (Hawai'i State Judiciary
1999); NEW JERSEY MODEL JURY CHARGES, CIVIL § 6.1 IF (N.J. Judiciary 1996); NORTH
CAROLINA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR CIVIL CASES § 810.30 (Inst. of Gov't 1998);
UTAH MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL § 27.2 (Utah State Bar 1998).
336. Wissler et al., supra note 246, at 804 (concluding that reduced consistency injury ver-
dicts is likely attributable to the fact that in assessing the value of a single case, jurors lack the
frame of reference created by other cases that is readily available to judges and lawyers).
337. 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 260 (1988).
338. See generally Shari S. Diamond, What Jurors Think: Expectations and Reactions of
Citizens Who Serve as Jurors, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 282 (Robert E.
Litan ed., 1993).
339. See generally Schuck, supra note 5, at 306-40; Michael J. Saks, Lisa. A. Hollinger,
Roselle L. Wissler, David L. Evans & Allen J. Hart, Reducing Variability in Civil Jury Awards,
21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 243, 243-56 (1997).
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Indeed, as the European experience suggests, 340 it is the lack of a monetary stan-
dard or guidance, and not the different appreciation of the degree of harm associ-
ated to an injury341 that creates inconsistencies. Without guidelines, what appears
to one juror a fair and appropriate amount, might seem too high or too low to an-
other juror. According to the European experience, this conclusion is equally ap-
plicable to judges if they are prevented from having and using information on pre-
vious awards.
Obviously, a proposed solution to this situation is to give such guidance in as-
sessing damages, by signaling required or recommended upper and lower limits for
the type of injury being evaluated, or by providing jurors with injury scenarios and
their associated non-economic damages awards.342 Indeed, some studies show that
merely providing jurors with proper information about previous pertinent awards
for injuries similar to those under discussion reduced the variability without affect-
ing the size of the award.343 Therefore, it is quite understandable that a large part
of the debate on assessing non-economic damages has dealt extensively with the
proper role of juries and the proper ways to improve their operations without trig-
gering constitutional concerns.
1. Building on the Existing Literature: Driving the Jury Debate
In the United States, the debate has concentrated on the intellectual and logi-
cal foundations and the justifications for non-economic damages, more than on
their evaluation. 34 4 However, the issue of awarding damages for non-pecuniary
loss has been on the tort reform agenda for a long time,345 mainly with the aim of
340. See supra Part I.C.
341. See Roselle L. Wissler, David L. Evans, Allen J. Hart, Marian M. Morry & Michael J.
Saks, Explaining "Pain and Suffering" Awards: The Role of Injury Characteristics and Fault At-
tributions, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 181, 181-205 (1997).
342. Remember that a similar method is used by English courts. For a discussion of the two
proposals analyzed in the text, see Bovbjerg et al., supra note 240, at 908-76. See also Schuck,
supra note 5, at 326 (discussing the possibility of advising jurors of the ratio of general to special
damages in the comparison of cases or the ratio of compensatory to punitive damages). But see
Kenneth S. Abraham, What Is a Tort Claim? An Interpretation of Contemporary Tort Reform, 51
MD. L. REv. 172, 177-78 (1992) (pointing out that evidence of awards made to others with simi-
lar injuries "not only is not binding - it is not even admissible")
343. See Saks et al., supra note 339, at 243-56; Diamond, supra note 338, at 282-305;
Baldus et al., supra note 240, at 1109; see also Roselle L. Wissler, Patricia F. Kuehn, & Michael
J. Saks, Instructing Jurors on General Damages in Personal Injury Cases: Problems and Possi-
bilities, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 712, 719-20 (arguing that "the problem of variable general
damages awards is due, in part, to the lack of guidelines for converting perceptions of harm into
dollar awards, providing jurors with some guidance may reduce the variability;" and further con-
cluding that "giving jurors guidance in the form of information about awards in comparable cases
appears to reduce the variability in awards without distorting their value"). But see McCaffery et
al., supra note 246, at 1342, 1372 (concluding that an instruction telling jurors to consider "how
much one would have to be paid to subject herself to an injury in the first place" produces an
award twice as large as an instruction telling jurors to make the plaintiff whole).
344. See supra Part I.B.
345. See Geistfeld, supra note 11, at 776 ("The absence of well-defined standards for de-
termining tort damages for non monetary injuries largely explains why such damages have been
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curtailing this title of damages, 346 proposing its abolition, 347 or reducing the role of
civil juries in its assessment.348 Juries themselves are often perceived as the real
problem in assessing non-economic damages, even though several studies show
such a marked variability between awards by judges and juries does not exist.3 49
Several scholars have elaborated suggestions for managing non-pecuniary dam-
ages, mainly by giving information to the jury.350 For instance, an American Bar
Association Report suggested "options should be explored to provide more guid-
ance to the jury on the appropriate range of damages to be awarded for pain and
suffering in a particular case." 351
The less drastic, and comparatively more recent, approach to non-pecuniary
damages is the attempt to grant equal treatment to equally injured victims and to
make damages more foreseeable via a scheduled system of payments. Quite a few
research proposals rest on some sort of scheduling based on injury severity and
prior awards for injuries in each category. 352 Scheduling defines ex ante a subset
and continue to be a focal point in the debate over tort reform.").
346. See, e.g., supra Part I.
347. See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS & WRONGS 420-29 (1992); John E. Calfee &
Paul H. Rubin, Some Implications of Damage Payments for NonPecuniary Losses, 21 J. LEGAL
STUD. 371 (1992); Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Syn-
thesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 411 (1988) (all proposing to abolish pain and suffering in tort cases).
348. See Lars Noah, Civil Jury Nullification, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1601, 1606-07 (2001) (argu-
ing that in civil cases, juries do not have a legitimate role in protecting a litigant from oppres-
sion). Indeed, the role of juries in awarding non-economic damages has been bitterly questioned.
See generally Neil Vidmar, Pap and Circumstance: What Jury Verdict Statistics Can Tell Us
About Jury Behavior and the Tort System, 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1205, 1224 (1994). See also
Oscar G. Chase, Helping Jurors Determine Pain and Suffering Awards, in REFORMING THE CIVIL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 339, 342 (Larry Kramer ed., 1996) (asserting an unexplainable variation among
awards for pain and suffering in wrongful death cases); Kirk B. Johnson et al., A Fault-Based
Administrative Alternative for Resolving Medical Malpractice Claims, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1365,
1369-70 (1989) (asserting unjustified variation in awards for comparable injuries caused by
medical malpractice and other tortious acts).
349. Indeed, most studies comparing judges' and jurors' evaluations did not find significant
differences in their decision-making. See Vidmar & Rice, supra note 39, at 883-84 (concluding
that there are not significant differences in the decision-making processes and outcomes of judges
and juries, though the latter could provide more stable outcomes).
350. See Wissler et al., supra note 343, at 715 (concluding, on a study of twenty-five jury
instructions from several jurisdictions, that "it would not be surprising if awards for an identical
injury varied depending on the content of the instructions"); Kenneth S. Abraham & Glen 0.
Robinson, Aggregative Valuation of Mass Tort Claims, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137, 141-
46, 149-50 (1990) (discussing three strategies to limit the excess of jury discretion: (a) submis-
sion of case profiles with actual awards to juries, (b) establishment of rebuttable limits for pre-
scribed case categories, and (c) "fixed schedule of damages" with jury task limited to classifying
cases into the schedule).
351. AM. BAR ASS'N, REPORT OF THE ACTION COMMISSION TO IMPROVE THE TORT
LIABILITY SYSTEM 15 (1987); see also Blumstein et al., supra note 205, at 178-79 (proposing
that prior damage awards should be given precedented value for future damage awards, awards
that are within the middle range of prior awards are given presumptive validity, and awards that
differ significantly from prior cases are subject to a "burden of explanation by the jury and
heightened review by the court").
352. But see Geistfeld, supra note 11, at 792 ("If the system has been providing overly arbi-
trary pain and suffering awards, and if we have no method for determining the appropriate award
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of characteristics for the comparison. Generally, theses characteristics are injury
severity level and the plaintiffs age.353 According to these schemes, judges might
instruct juries to focus on those characteristics before deviating from the given lim-
its. Schedules may prescribe either a fixed amount, a range, or a fixed amount
with flexibility. 354 Hence, the main apparatus of a damages schedule explored by
U.S. scholars is comprised of: (1) a case classification system or scale that meas-
ures the severity of harm suffered; (2) a fact-finding procedure for classifying
cases under the scale; and (3) a schedule to translate harm into monetary damages.
For example, Viscusi 355 would offer juries an advisory damages schedule, but
would limit its use mainly for deterrence purpose. 356 Frederick S. Levin, as well,
proposed binding "guidelines [that] would inform juries of the value for pain and
suffering assigned by a large number of juries to injuries similar to those before the
factfinder." 317 Levin's contribution reveals an important intuition - among sev-
eral others - by drawing attention to a landmark in the study of any standardizing
process that aims at reducing uncertainty and inequality without curtailing jury dis-
cretion or acceptable levels of personalized justice. What Levin stated was that:
Although guidelines based on the decisions of many juries would not
replicate a market for pain and suffering, it would have some of the ad-
vantages of market pricing because of the greater number of persons par-
ticipating in the value assessment. The guidelines provide the jury with
a benchmark to focus on in determining whether the circumstances of the
case before it warrant departure from the standard. Discretion is not
taken away from the jury, but the guidelines help the jury exercise its
discretion in an informed manner.
358
The year 1995 marks a milestone in the United States in the debate on non-
economic damages, because several important publications on the topic were pre-
in the first instance, why should we make prior awards the cornerstone of future awards."). A
similar alternative to scheduling methodology is called "scaling". In scaling proposals, juries se-
lect all the characteristics of the case deemed relevant to make their assessment. See Glen 0.
Robinson & Kenneth S. Abraham, Collective Justice in Tort Law, 78 VA. L. REV. 1481, 1490
(1992). An analysis of alternatives and proposals such as "case scaling" is contained in Baldus et
al., supra note 240, at 1249-64.
353. See Baldus et al., supra note 240, at 1124; see also Schuck, supra note 295, at 215-19
(discussing the Blumstein et al. proposal of scheduling models).
354. An example on which they are often modeled is federal sentencing guidelines. See
Baldus et al., supra note 240, at 1124 (arguing that both scaling and scheduling of damages are a
departure from current practice, because jurors currently are not given any external standards or
ranges to guide their damage assessments and current practice prohibits the submission to the jury
of award amounts in other cases, either actual or hypothetical). Baldus et al., however, fear that
"[t]he development of a damages scheduling system with the rigor and precision of the federal
sentencing guidelines likely will require substantial conceptual and empirical research with data
and measures that are significantly better than those which are presently available." Id. at 1126.
355. VisCusi, supra note 10, at 113-16.
356. Id. But see Croley & Hanson, supra note 6, at 1804-06 (criticizing this proposal).
357. See Levin, supra note 8, at 310.
358. Id.
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sented. These publications mainly dealt with recommending greater information
for juries. Several scholars advocated devising information tools for both judges
and juries in different ways and even, in some sense, conflicting ways. This article
focuses on three articles dealing at different levels with horizontal equality and in-
formation providing tools.
For instance, one of the main concerns for Professor Geistfeld 359 was to in-
crease horizontal equality. He argued that the current system "fails to treat simi-
larly situated plaintiffs alike" in awarding pain and suffering damages.360 While
acknowledging that the easiest way to remedy this is to provide the decision-
makers with evidence of prior awards, he proposed instead that juries assess dam-
ages from an ex ante perspective that asks how much a reasonable person would
have paid to eliminate the risk that caused the pain and suffering injury.36' This
model, he suggested, would avoid the problems involved in acquiring the data that
other proposals for offering information to the jury would require, and the risk of
perpetuating vertical and horizontal inequalities which may be endorsed by jury
awards. 362 Geistfeld also criticized the need to determine injury categories. Again,
while acknowledging that relying on injury categories provides an objective and
non-speculative measurement of the non-economic injury suffered by the plaintiff,
he contested the idea of a possible objective measurement failing to distinguish ob-jective and subjective non-economic losses. However, denying in principle the
possibility of standardizing non-economic damages, Professor Geistfeld seems to
go against his own assumption that it is possible to give evidence of the increased
risk ex ante: the basis of his assessment methodology. 363
Another contribution published in 1995 proposed "that jurors in all personal
injury actions in which non-pecuniary damages are sought be informed of the
range of awards made by other juries in the same state for such damages during a
contemporaneous time period., 3 64 The author, Professor Oscar Chase, suggested
that a non-binding chart be used, summarizing the range of awards - low, median,
359. See Geistfeld, supra note 11, at 791-93, 805-07.
360. Id. at 791.
361. See id at 805-07. Professor Geistfeld defines "full compensation" "by reference" to an
ex ante perspective and seeks to ascertain how the plaintiff would have measured the cost of the
pain-and-suffering injury when she faced the risk that caused the injury. Id The author called his
awarding methodology "ex ante full-compensation award." Id. at 779. On the general difference
significance of the shift from ex post to ex ante legal reasoning, see generally Frank. H. Easter-
brook, Forward: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REv. 4, 10-12 (1984).
362. See Geistfeld, supra note 11, at 792. On horizontal and vertical equality, see LanceLiebman, The Definition of Disability in Social Security and Supplemental Security Income:
Drawing the Bounds of Social Welfare Estate 89 HARV. L. REv. 833 (1976) (criticizing the dis-
tinction between personal injury damages and other forms of permanent impairment causes such
as discrimination, racism or technology).
363. Henceforth, his following affirmations seem to be somewhat tautological: "The diffi-
culty of achieving justice in the individual case while introducing uniformity via the use of
schedules is illustrated by the federal courts' implementation of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines. That experience indicates that scheduling pain and suffering damages may not be an
improvement over the current system." Geistfeld, supra note 11, at 792-93.
364. See Chase, supra note 348, at 347 (arguing for a pain and suffering schedule or grid
and describing criticism of non-economic damages in tort claims).
[19.2
HeinOnline  -- 19 Temp. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 322 2005
A GLOBAL MODEL FOR PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES
and high - made by other juries (after any judicial reduction or reversal) in the
same State during a contemporaneous time period for different categories of injury
severity. 365  The author used a "widely-accepted nine-point injury severity"
scale.366 Further, the proposed chart, when offered with proper judicial instruc-
tions, would permit comparison with similar cases. Special verdicts supported by
the chart would be easily upheld. Though not binding, the information was sup-
posed to be used in a reasonable way.
This interesting proposal exposes itself to similar criticisms that were made
about Bovbjerg, Sloan, and Blumstein. 367 However, it is important to note the dif-
ferent paths discussed for implementing Chases's proposed solution. The author
called on courts to introduce the novelty, but alternately suggested that attorneys
may introduce this information by way of expert testimony,368 and advocated the
use of competing grids to convince the jury (as happened in France and Italy) for
evaluating the severity of injury.369 Despite the fact that the proposed main ave-
nues for innovation in the system are in the judicial arena, Chase preferred to leave
the decision to the legislature.
370
Finally, professors Steven Croley and Jon Hanson did not deal directly with
assessment criteria for non-economic damages, but rather challenged the conven-
tional wisdom that tort awards for non-pecuniary loss are undesirable from an in-
surance standpoint. 371 In addition, they suggested contrary evidence for actual de-
mand of insurance for non-pecuniary loss damages. 372 Indeed, for this very reason
it is important to recall Croley and Hanson's specific contribution; the article offers
convincing evidence for the underlying assumption that non-economic damages
may, at least to some extent, be an answer to the actual demand to protect body and
health integrity. It also forcefully links the evolution of non-economic damages to
social evolution and attitudes towards non-economic damages.
373
365. This proposal is rather similar to one of those proposed by Bovbjerg et al., supra note
240, at 908.
366. The same scale is used by Bovbjerg et al., supra note 240, at 920, 940-53.
367. See infra Part III.A.2.
368. For a general discussion concerning expert and opinion evidence regarding permanent
injury or future pain and suffering, see 31A AM JUR 2D Expert and Opinion Evidence, § 271
(2004).
369. Chase acknowledges the problems this option might entail. Chase, supra note 348, at
356.
370. Arguably, it could be presumed to be a "more democratic" process.
371. See Croley & Hanson, supra note 6, at 1791.
372. See id. at 1841 ("If, on the other hand, jurors are behaving in accordance with their in-
terests as consumers and with their instructions to be fair to all parties to the action, then jury-
awarded pain-and-suffering damages constitute some evidence that consumers do demand insur-
ance for such damages.").
373. Still, this outcome seems to be an unwitting one.
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2. The Scheduling and Scaling Debate: Distinguishing Notes
Scheduling has often been proposed as an alternative to "abolishing or arbi-
trarily limiting non-pecuniary damages. 374 Indeed, as anticipated, various propos-
als for the scheduling of non-economic damages have been placed on the table.
Those proposed by Bovbjerg, Sloan, and Blumstein are probably among the most
often discussed and articulated propositions for guidelines in assessing non-
pecuniary damages in the United States.375 Their models for structuring the calcu-
lation of pain and suffering damages rely either on a binding schedule of awards, a
set of scenarios, or a system of flexible ranges of monetary awards.376
Under the first option, these authors would standardize awards according to a
matrix or schedule of dollar values based upon the victim's age and the severity of
the injury (either temporary or permanent).377 However, due to the reduced num-
ber of proposed categories, these are too broad and all-inclusive. Correctly, each
resulting cell of their matrix would offer a value for non-economic damages ob-
tained by averaging previous awards for such injuries, but because they propose a
binding schedule, juries would not be free to vary the award set out in the cell that
they decided was appropriate for the case. This is problematic because it fetters
the discretion of juries and such an externally imposed restraint could be easily
overcome by juries by way of selecting a cell with a higher value.378
Bovbjerg, Sloan, and Blumstein's small set of paradigmatic injury "scenarios"
of hypothetical injuries and their corresponding non-economic awards would serve
as non-binding guides to valuations for juries.379 Though non-binding, in contrast
to their other suggestions, again the reduced number of paradigmatic scenarios
seem far from being able to capture all of the complexities of non-economic dam-
ages.
Their third, but no less important, 380 proposal is "a system of flexible floors
and ceilings" of monetary awards, varying both according to the severity of the
victim's injury and his/her age. Under this proposal as well, categories would be
constructed from prior award averages, using age and severity of injury.38'
374. See Bovbjerg et al., supra note 240, at 938 (advocating the improvement of the system
for awarding non-economic damages by the introduction of information forcing "devices"). But
see Marc Feldman, The Intellectual Ordering of Contemporary Tort Law, 51 MD. L. REv. 980,
1000-08 (1992) (questioning the validity and effectiveness of schedules).
375. See Bovbjerg et al., supra note 240, at 938-39 (proposing alternative approaches to
perfect the valuation of non-economic damages within the framework of the current liability sys-
tem).
376. Id. (seeming to use the term pain and suffering to encompass all non-economic dam-
ages).
377. See Bovbjerg, supra note 240, at 939, 941-42. This is the proposal most similar to
many developed by the judiciary in Europe.
378. Suspicions of this kind have been induced in Italy after a statute reduced the flexibility(and the amount recoverable) for minor injuries caused by automobile accidents.
379. See Bovbjerg et al., supra note 240, at 953-56.
380. Id. at 956-60. Bovbjerg et al. consider this third option as inferior to the ones previ-
ously discussed. Id. at 975.
381. Indeed, these scholars offer a fourth, more complex proposal in a separate article. See
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In summary, this group of scholars has suggested developing an evaluation
system relying on the victim's age, the seriousness of the injury, and the part of the
body affected. The amounts in this schedule would be obtained from past awards,
and would be adjusted by using life evaluation studies based on economic the-
ory.382 This schedule, so plotted, would have offered a value point for each given
combination of the named three factors (or a range, in the adjusted version of this
proposal) within which the court could have chosen according to the actual facts of
the case. For exceptional occurrences, they suggested the institution of an ad hoc
post-trial administrative tribunal.383 Correctly, under this model, there would have
been no diminution in the amount awarded, because the compulsory range of
evaluation was to be drawn up using past awards.
384
From this article's analysis, 385 there is no doubt that a clear set of guidelines
relying on age and the severity of the injury made available to judges and juries
would prove extremely useful, but a compulsory valuation grid seems to be exces-
sively rigid 386 and would lose the flexibility vital for a case-by-case evaluation.
Moreover, mandatory scheduling would be difficult to implement, once again leav-
ing any change in the real world to a difficult political and constitutional debate.
38 7
It also seems that "achieving greater precision across cases .... simplifying litiga-
tion, and assuring all litigants that their awards are relatively fair compared with
other similarly situated" is an insufficient rationale for abandoning fine-tuning and
ad hoc decisions.388 These proposals merely freeze the status quo ante in contrast
to the preliminary assumption that this status quo is wrong.
These prominent scholars assert the need for a "common law" of damages.
They suggest developing a reporting system to record damage awards that would
have value as precedent for future awards. Indeed, one of their proposals for the
use of prior awards as precedent requires more accountability from juries by offer-
ing them "more explicit and objective standards" through a complete recording
system of awards both at trial and appeal, but it attributes presumed validity to
Blumstein et al., supra note 205, at 178-79.
382. See Bovbjerg et al., supra note 240, at 939.
383. Id. at 948.
384. Instead, proposals by other scholars tend to push the amount for non-pecuniary losses
downward. See, e.g., Danzon, supra note 35, at 101, 118-19, 122; see also Levin, supra note 8, at
303 (developing a thesis based on previous assessment by judges and juries).
385. See discussion supra Part II.
386. For a commentary defending a flexible system of guidelines, see Levin, supra note 8,
at 313-28.
387. See Schuck, supra note 295, at 213-15 (illustrating the political opposition such a pro-
posal would receive). The possible inefficiencies of an out-of-date scheduling for a deterrence
perspective are fully investigated by GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS 203 (1970).
For a description of the political and constitutional conundrum related to tort reform see generally
Paul DeCamp, Beyond State Farm: Due Process Constraints on Noneconomic Compensatory
Damages, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 231 (2003); Kevin J. Gfell, Note, The Constitutional and
Economic Implications of a National Cap on Non-Economic Damages in Medical Malpractice
Actions 37 IND. L. REV. 773 (2004); George L. Priest, The Constitutionality of State Tort Reform
Legislation and Lochner, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 683 (2001); Martin H. Redish & Andrew L.
Mathews, Why Punitive Damages Are Unconstitutional 53 EMORY L.J. 1 (2004).
388. See Bovbjerg et al., supra note 240, at 947.
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previous middle range awards. 38 9 Further, at least one of their proposals stated that
significant departures from previous awards would require more strict scrutiny,
and if juries selected the upper level of previous awards, they would need to justify
their choice by identifying the specific factors which precipitated their decision.390
Obviously, all of these constraints are easy targets for criticism because of the
across the board cutting of actual awards and because jury discretion would be un-
duly fettered. Indeed, though highly debated, these proposals were not imple-
mented. According to their creators, one persuasive explanation of this is the pro-
posals required legislative implementation.
391
Indeed, all of the American approaches we have so far described require at
least special verdicts for non-pecuniary damages and an accurate national reporting
system on which a compulsory revision of awards by trial and appellate judges
would operate. 392 The body of debate on the assessment of non-economic damages
deals more with review of jury awards either by trial judges or by appellate courts.
The core of this dispute rests on the comparability of injuries and intangible loss
and the proper role of judges in the process.
3. The Comparability Debate in the United States: Reviewing Jury
Conduct and Its Opponents
It is remarkable to observe that a common law system, that by its very nature
is built on incremental judge-made law, seems to be extremely doubtful about al-
lowing the judicial system to evolve by way of the interaction of its various com-
ponents. This skepticism is emphasized when talking about comparability review,
and at times even becomes a hotly debated issue politically. There seems to be a
significant trend in legal literature to sustain (and contrast) comparability review
for damages accompanying intangible loss.393 This trend has been depicted as a
"comparability review" movement aimed, unwittingly or intentionally, at hamper-
ing both plaintiff rights and jury prerogatives. 394 It is important, however, to dis-
389. Id.
390. See Blumstein et al., supra note 205, at 179, in which the authors stated, "An unex-
plained outlier should constitute a prima facie case for either remittitur or additur by the trial
judge or an appellate holding of inadequacy or excessiveness of the judgment."
391. See, e.g., Bovbjerg et al., supra note 240, at 938.
392. See id. at 960, 962.
393. See generally Baldus et al., supra note 240, at 1112-67.
394. See JoEllen Lind, The End of Trial on Damages? Intangible Losses and Comparability
Review, 51 BUFF. L. REv. 251, 270 (2003). She concluded that:
[C]omparability review threatens the traditional system of tort compensation for intan-
gible losses. It drastically reduces the power of juries. It significantly usurps the function
of the trial judge both as overseer of the jury and as trier of fact in a bench proceeding. It
undercuts the remedial principle that damages must be particularized to the individual
plaintiff. It threatens the due process rights of litigants not to be bound by proceedings
in which they did not participate. It evades democratic deliberation over contested val-
ues, while at the same time it may undermine the substantive tort policies of the states.
Id. Lind further added that "[b]ehavioralists want to shift to a system of bureaucratic rationality in
order to remove decisions regarding tort compensation from democratic processes." Id. at 297;
see also JoEllen Lind, "Procedural Swift": Complex Litigation Reform, State Tort Law, and De-
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tinguish "intangible loss comparability" from "comparability review" for revising
jury decisions. The expression "comparability review movement" indicates an at-
tempt to promote a comparability review of damages for intangible loss at both
trial and appellate level. 395 Scholars criticize this trend on the assumption that it
will disrupt the American tort system as it stands today, replacing it with an admin-
istrative regime similar to workers' compensation plans.396 Nowadays, some au-
thors attribute part of the responsibility for this skepticism to behavioral law and
economics scholars.
39 7
The analysis and the approach sustained in this article cannot claim any rela-
tionship with those of behavioral law and economics. It is useful, however, to dis-
cuss some arguments against increasing comparability of damages awards for re-
view purposes in order to anticipate possible criticisms of this article's results. For
instance, in addressing an objection that award comparison hampers jury discre-
tion, it is reasonable to ask in reply: why are the judicial control systems of addi-
tur/remittitur, with the traditional "shock the conscience" standard or revision on
appeal, any less invasive of the jury system and its constitutional basis? Likewise,
it is quite easy to anticipate and contrast the potential allegations that the method-
ology proposed by this article strips powers from the jury and undermines jurors'
abilities to give justice and to fulfill the Seventh Amendment of the United States
Constitution and the States' constitutional mandates. Critics assert that the pro-
posed approaches represent an "undue encroachment" on the traditional exercise of
jury discretion and on traditional tort law.3 98 To the contrary, the policy reasons
behind this article's suggestions aim to empower judges and juries as conscious
decision-makers. Of course, this empowerment produces the side effect of also
being of assistance on review - which is beneficial. In addition, it limits the pos-
sibility of an arbitrary judicial reduction or increase in awards made by juries.
The accusation made, that comparability of awards overlooks the assumption
that intangible loss "affects the most unique aspects of our being and cannot in
principle be equated from case to case," is not applicable to our inferences because
they are actually based on this very assumption.
mocratic Values, 37 AKRON L. REv. 717, 720-29 (2004) (criticizing the creation of a regime of
complex litigation designed to crudely reduce the amount of money paid by repeat defendants,
because it causes negative externalities and reduce democracy).
395. See, e.g., Baldus et al., supra note 240, at 1125-88 (cautioning about complexities in
both designing and applying non-economic damage schedules, and suggesting prototype damage
schedules/guidelines to be used in awards review on Additur/Remittitur).
396. See, e.g., Lind, The End of Trial on Damages?, supra note 394, at 251.
397. Id. at 251-52; see also Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously? The
Unwarranted Pessimism of the New Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1907
(2002) (generally criticizing the psychological research relied on by legal behavioralists to form
their arguments portraying pervasive irrationality). But see Sunstein et al., supra note 19, at
2137-38 (claiming that the arguments made for consistency in punitive damages apply equally to
intangible losses).
398. See, e.g., Abraham, supra note 342, at 173-75, 178, 180 (perceiving damages schedules
as a departure from the "traditional conception of the uniqueness of every tort claim" intended to
"capture for tort law some of the efficiencies and equities generated by non-tort compensation
systems").
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Finally, scheduling - hence, comparability of awards - has been called a
thwarting of the individualized assessment of both tort law and the jury system,
and therefore has moved towards bureaucratic justice.399 Criticisms have been
made about some of the proposed features of jury assessment, such as the fact that
standards are set by external bodies, and that each case is evaluated only on a lim-
ited number of distinctive features and by applying an averaging process of previ-
ous assessments.4 °°
Of course, these critiques do not touch a system that was created mainly by
the same evolution of the jury assessment process, but still may have a grip on
those such as Bovbjerg, Sloan, and Blumstein. Similarly, the claim that compara-
bility challenges the tort system in an undemocratic way (by means of changing
review standards) 40 1 is inconsistent with the very history of intangible loss com-
pensation in tort, which has never triggered the enactment of legislation but has
affected judicial evolution.40 2
Finally, the potential improvements that this article's comparative research
has revealed would be implemented solely by the judiciary.4 3 After all, judicial
scheduling would be automatically guided by previous judge or jury decisions and
self-implemented by courts. Moreover, denying information to judges and juries
seems inconsistent with the established practice of allowing a reviewing court to
consider evidence and information that was not available to the jury in an addi-
tur/remittitur proceeding. However, the core issue for the different camps in the
comparative awards debate is the constitutionality of comparing awards. In fact,
the issue triggered is the attempt to revise the right to trial by jury.
4. Comparing Awards and the Constitution(s)
There are at least two main constitutional issues to be dealt with in reference
to comparing awards. The first one that was mentioned is the risk about undue re-
straint of the right to trial by jury. The second one is a possible alteration of the
interplay between the Federal and the State levels of government. On the first is-
sue, it is sufficient to recall that the U.S. Supreme Court, although it has not spe-
cifically ruled on remitting compensatory damages awards solely for their dissimi-
larity to awards in other cases, seems ready to approve even this practice. 4° The
399. See, e.g., Baldus et al., supra note 240, at 1124-25 (perceiving damages schedules as a
"significant move toward 'bureaucratic justice"'); see JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC
JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS (1983) (discussing the concept of
bureaucratic justice).
400. See Baldus et al., supra note 240, at 1125-26. Of course these censures do not touch a
system created by the very same evolution of the jury assessment process that created the cen-
sures, but still may have a grip on those such as the Bovbjerg-Sloan-Blumstein.
401. See Lind, The End of Trial on Damages?, supra note 394, at 254.
402. See supra.Part I.B-C.
403. See Bovbjerg et al., supra note 240, at 969.
404. See Lind, The End of Trial on Damages?, supra note 394, at 279-82. Lind argues that
when "[r]ead holistically," BMW of America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996), and State Farm Mu-
tual Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003), "signal the Court's openness to compara-
tive standards as a means to concretize damages for intangibles." Id. She also debates the impli-
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second issue, which has been linked to intangible loss and the use of comparative
review techniques, takes a rather more contorted turn4 5 because it triggers the in-
terplay between State and Federal law, on one hand, and a possible pattern for cre-
ating cryptically uniform law on the other.
Regarding the possible pattern of creating cryptically uniform law, it is quite
easy to imagine that federal courts sitting in diversity would have a tendency to re-
solve (under State law) the cases before them in a similar way. This would pro-
duce uniform results in each State's common law and in the outcomes achieved in
diversity jurisdiction under other States' common law. Of course, this would fur-
ther be the case when applying the criteria to revise awards for intangible loss as
well, but it is doubtful that the practice could be questioned in any legally mean-
ingful way.4 °6
With regard to the second issue - the interplay between State and Federal
law - substantive tort law, including non-economic damages, is generally a State
issue and Erie Railroad v. Thompkins40 7 precludes any general federal common
law. Yet, the tendency of federal courts to allow comparative review in diversity
jurisdiction may alter the interplay between procedural and substantive law, be-
cause of the fact that procedural uniformity is a matter of "uniquely federal inter-
est."4 °8 Although not contradicting this author's analysis, it is worth noting that a
more uniform assessment does not need to be promoted across the States and a
more uniform assessment is useful even within a State or even a single jurisdiction
or court.
Indeed, we suppose that even scholars in asserting "the need for a 'common
law' of damages,, 40 9 were not technically referring to a "general federal common
law" in Erie terms. They only advocated comparability review: a reporting system
to record damage awards that would have precedential value for determining future
awards as a way of creating a "common law" of damages. 4'0 After all, these schol-
ars suggested several ways of dealing with conveying more information and pro-
posed different methods for adopting them at the State level .'1
cations of comparing intangible loss awards for the purpose of review in light of Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), criticizing the "infiltration of comparability review into diversity
actions" as an attack at the core of the federal system. Id.; see also Robert L. Rabin, Federalism
and the Tort System, 50 RUTGERS L. REv. 1 (1997) (generally analyzing the interplay between
state and federal powers in the tort system).
405. See Lind, The End of Trial on Damages?, supra note 394, at 268-86 (criticizing this
issue). However, the arguments set forth by Lind do not seem so pertinent to comparative as-
sessment at the trial level.
406. Federal circuit courts are split over whether judges should have the power to control a
jury's damage award for intangible losses by comparing the award rendered with damages given
in other cases. See generally J. Patrick Elsevier, Note, Out of Line Federal Courts Using Compa-
rability to Review Damage Awards, 33 GA. L. REv. 243, 251-52 (1998).
407. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
408. See Lind, The End of Trial on Damages?, supra note 394, 268-70.
409. See Blumstein et al., supra note 205, at 172-85.
410. Id.
411. Id.
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Since additur is unconstitutional in federal courts,4 1 2 a third constitutional is-
sue arises: the risk of asymmetric results in federal courts. Revising practice
would work in only one direction by reducing damages awards that are outside the
range of any given sample of cases making up the similarity grouping.413 How-
ever, these censures of comparative review are not relevant to information-forcing
tools of judges and juries, such as the ones emerging from this article's analysis
because they only aim to improve judicial decision-making. In addition, the
American legal system already makes use of comparative analysis of approved
awards in similar cases to inform the court concerning the appropriate quantum of
damages for additur/remittitur practice.4 14 As one New York state court opinion
summarized:
Where the exercise of discretion is at issue, certain standards of uniform-
ity should be adhered to. This is not to say that the amount of damages
awarded or sustained in cases involving similar injuries are in any way
binding upon the courts in the exercise of their discretion. However,
prior verdicts may guide and enlighten the court and, in a sense, may
constrain it.
4 15
Yet, another New York state case stressed the value of cumulative expertise
of previous decision-making processes and its correct use:
A long course of practice, numerous verdicts rendered year after year,
orders made by trial justices approving or disapproving them, decisions
on the subject by appellate courts, furnish to the judicial mind some indi-
cation of the consensus of opinion of jurors and courts as to the proper
relation between the character of the injury and the amount of compensa-
tion awarded. 16
After all, a judge may even be required to compare awards in a bench trial 417
and it seems absurd to prevent actual juries from accessing the same informa-
418tion.
412. See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935).
413. See Blumstein et al., supra note 205, at 178-79 (arguing that the revising practice
might only work one way: reducing damages outside a middle range).
414. See Senko v. Fonda, 384 N.Y.S.2d 849, 851-52 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976).
415. Id. at 851 (citations omitted).
416. See Fried v New York, 170 N.Y.S. 697, 704 (N.Y. App. Div. 1918).
417. See Jutzi-Johnson v. United States, 263 F.3d 753 (7th Cir. 2001). As Judge Posner
stated in his opinion,
[W]hen the trier of fact is a judge, he should be required as part of his Rule 52(a) obliga-
tion to set forth in his opinion the damages awards that he considered comparable. We
make such comparisons routinely in reviewing pain and suffering awards as do other
courts. It would be a wise practice to follow at the trial level as well.
Id. at 759 (citations omitted).
418. See Shari Seidman Diamond & Neil Vidmar, Jury Room Ruminations on Forbidden
Topics, 87 VA. L. REv. 1857 (2001) (concluding that jurors are not passive recipients of court-
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Paradoxical as it may seem, these brief remarks should have made clear that
even those who oppose comparability review should not oppose comparability for
assessing damages, at least for the same normative reasons they question compara-
tive review. Using the words of an antagonist of comparability review, those rea-
sons are summarized as follows:
Remember also that the trier of fact, be it judge or jury, has the only op-
portunity to directly witness the testimonial facts that the litigants bring
forward. It is at trial, and only at trial, that there is an immediate ability
to judge the demeanor, credibility, and competency of witnesses. Sec-
ond, it is only at trial that the full narrative account of each party's view
of events unfolds. This is particularly important for intangible losses, for
it is only at trial that the victim can explain the full impact of a wrong on
her or his personal identity, or on important goals the victim had been
pursuing. Moreover, it bears critically on the question of how nonpecu-
niary harms are to be rationally evaluated, if they are so personal and
unique. This is because the narrative form of proof which is inherent in
the testimony of plaintiff and defendant, and their attendant supplemen-
tary witnesses, opens a logical space for the process of narrative rational-
ity to take place.
In short, it is this argument that states that there is no actual measure for non-
pecuniary losses. While this article agrees with the general character of the state-
ment, it replies with reference to those experiences in which some level of com-
parison among similar cases has proved useful and effective. 420 Indeed, no two
plaintiffs are ever the same and no quantum study or scheduling system can lead
one to believe that non-economic damage awards are susceptible to precise estima-
tion.421 Nevertheless, the richness of each jury analysis should not be dispersed,
and ways for making use of it should be found. Comparison sustains methods for
introducing a degree of procedural equality and promoting greater uniformity in
damages awards for plaintiffs with similar injuries. 422
5. A Brief Note Distinguishing Tort and Alternative Approaches to
Intangible Loss
It is important to clarify from the outset two main points in reference to the
interplay between tort and its alternatives in dealing with intangible loss. First, tort
law requires full compensation, while tort alternatives, despite their focus on com-
pensation, are an occasion to eliminate non-economic damages. Indeed, workers'
compensation and no-fault insurance schemes are the archetype for statutorily
room communications and the traditional approach of merely forbidding evidence on certain top-
ics is of limited value: jurors are influenced no more than judges by information).
419. See Lind, The End of Trial on Damages?, supra note 394, at 334.
420. See supra Parts IC, II.
421. Quantum Study, Louisiana Personal Injury Awards, 46 LOY. L. REV. 651, 652 (2000).
422. See infra Part III.B.4.
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limiting non-economic damages recovery in exchange for guaranteed recovery of
economic losses. 4 23 It is not the aim of this article to adopt a similar perspective.
Second, all instances in which European legislators have tried to follow a
similar path, unduly restricting non-economic damages under tort law, have trig-
424gered strict constitutional scrutiny. In addition, compensation plans share some
features used in assessing non-economic damages under European tort law that are
possibly useful in the United States as well, but this sharing does not lead to equal-
izing tort law and compensation schemes on this account either.
Certainly other personal injury compensation systems could be taken into ac-
count in two ways when setting tort compensation for non-economic damages, but
in both instances only in so far as the two systems are genuinely comparable. First
of all, other compensation schemes might be a point of reference for monetary
awards, but as already explained this is not the case. The amount of social security
benefits or damages for work related injuries should not be influential because they
are not designed to achieve corrective justice, and therefore are not fully reparative
in the way that tort law, in principle, endeavors to be. Compensation schemes ei-
ther eliminate payment for non-economic damages or reduce them in a quid pro
quo exchange. 25
More convincingly, alternative compensation schemes may be of help in as-
sessing non-economic damages under tort law. They already use scales of injury.
The expertise, and of course the shortcomings experienced, should be taken into
account in selecting the guiding criteria for assessing injury levels.
Although the assessing models that have emerged in Europe today share some
features with workers' compensation schemes, such as the scoring of the severity
of injury suffered by the victim, 426 they are not a quid pro quo. In other words,
guidelines and, broadly speaking, standardizing processes in tort law, for example,
are not an exchange for easier and certain compensation. On the contrary, the
guidelines developed under European tort systems rationalize the emergence of the
increased demand for compensation in cases of damages to health and bodily in-
423. See Larson's Worker's Compensation Law (MB) § 1 (June 2005). See generally
ROBERT E. KEETON, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM (1965); 7A AM. JUR. 2D
Automobiles & Highway Traffic § 357 (2004) (offering a general discussion regarding damages
for pain and suffering under no-fault insurance statutes); Francis M. Dougherty, Annotation,
What Constitutes Sufficiently Serious Personal Injury, Disability, Impairment, or the Like to Jus-
tify Recovery of Damages Outside of No-Fault Automobile Insurance Coverage, 33 A.L.R. 4TH
767 (1984); Jeffery F. Ghent, Annotation, Validity & Construction of "No-Fault" Automobile
Insurance Plans, 42 A.L.R. 3D 229 (1972).
424. See Spain, for instance, where the automobile reform has been challenged as unconsti-
tutional. See Elena V. Domingo, La Corte Costituzionale spagnola sulle tabelle dei danni alla
persona. Nota a C. Cost. 29 giugno 2000, n 81, DANNO E RESPONSABILITA, 2001, at 23-30.
425. A somewhat different story might be told about criminal injury compensation schemes.
426. Indeed other authors in America have already stressed that for determining disability,
the experience gained under state welfare programs may be very helpful. See, e.g., Sunstein et
al., supra note 19, at 2125. In discussing guidelines for punitive damages, Sunstein concluded
that, "An even more relevant model can be found in the 'grid' used for social security disability
determinations, which uses age, educational attainment, and residual functional capacity to pro-
duce standardized judgments about disability." Id.
[19.2
HeinOnline  -- 19 Temp. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 332 2005
A GLOBAL MODEL FOR PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES
tegrity. Moreover, even the suggested amounts in the monetary guidelines are
usually derived from the award histories of courts and are not arbitrarily selected
like caps, which have been applied by American States in tort law.
427 In contrast
with tort law,428 the alternatives, such as workers' compensation plans, limit the
amounts provided and do not assess them on an individualized computation of the
victims' pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses. 429 Still, as shown in Parts I and II
above, using the various judicial guidelines adopted in Europe would not take
away the traditional tort feature of individualized justice. The next sections of this
article clearly exemplify this.
B. Judicial Scheduling for America
European systems, as they developed over time, have succeeded in rationaliz-
ing their award systems for non-economic damages in personal injury without re-
ducing the level of protection given to the victims of accidents. Indeed, they de-
scribe ways of determining a starting point, from which, in a coordinated way, all
of the players can conduct themselves accordingly. From a theoretical standpoint,
it does not need to be claimed that the assumed starting point is less arbitrary than
other possible ones.4 30 Better information would ease the life of all of the players,
breaking out of the vicious circle of alleged unmanageable expansion in awards for
intangible loss, turning it into a virtuous one. Consider that victims are interested
in knowing how courts have decided similar cases before, and insurance compa-
nies and the wrongdoer need to know the levels of expected damages. However, if
they cannot rely on court evaluations, the information they rely upon is only one-
way (each one has a different estimate and perception of the loss) and there are
fewer possibilities for settlement. The solution is the opposite when previous court
assessments are made certain and trustworthy. If, and only if, the victim knows the
reasonablly expected outcome of litigation will he or she be able to evaluate a set-
tlement offer intelligently. 431 Correspondingly, wrongdoers and insurance compa-
nies must know the predictable outcome of a lawsuit, and that this information is
427. Paradoxical as it may seem, caps are no less arbitrary than the "arbitrary" determina-
tion of non-pecuniary damages they pretend to substitute. After all, caps are based on the infer-
ence that there is no possible measure for non-pecuniary damages. See Abraham, supra note 342,
at 187-88 (noting that when caps are placed on pain and suffering awards "the unique circum-
stances of those seriously injured victims whose pain and suffering would [exceed the cap] there-
fore are ignored"). See id. at 190 (noting that individuals whose "claims might lie outside the
high end of any particular schedule [of damages] bear the risk that they will be less than 'fully'
compensated because their special characteristics are not taken into account;" and further discuss-
ing how statutory caps on pain and suffering awards conflict with traditional tort principles).
428. See Abraham, supra note 342, at 173 (describing "the right to custom-tailored compen-
sation for the actual loss suffered by the claimant" as a notion that lies at "the core of our tradi-
tional conception of a tort claim").
429. See, e.g., ROBERT KEETON ET. AL., TORT AND ACCIDENT LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 867 (3d ed. 1998) ("In general, worker's compensation aims to provide full recovery
of medical and rehabilitation expense, but only limited recovery of wage loss, and no recovery for
pain and suffering as such.").
430. See supra Part II.A.3-4.
431. As described by ATIYAH, supra note 8.
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also held by the victim to make it likely they will extend a reasonable offer for set-
tlement. Both parties will, thereby, save the costs of trial by reducing the level of
litigation and managing non-pecuniary loss compensation in the best way.432
The overall approach garnered from Europe indicates a good level of per-
formance, both in general as well as on a case-by-case basis. Indeed, insurance
premiums are fixed using ex ante macro-evaluation according to previous average
payment (damages) regarding macro-evaluation of aggregate liquidation of non-
pecuniary loss per class of injuries. Nevertheless, courts assess damages on an ex
post case-by-case basis and should continue to do so in the United States as well.
If insurers and potential wrongdoers could rely on the prospective awards in
courts, their behavior would probably follow accordingly in spreading the risk and
setting activity and care levels. If damages recovered are, by assumption, equal to
actual damages, the system will work efficiently.433
The awarding systems in the European countries which have been examined
have succeeded in upholding and guaranteeing the stability of the compensation
system. However, to work elsewhere, these European insights require some neces-
sary conditions (not necessarily reforms). Above all, they presuppose a clear bi-
furcation between non-pecuniary damages that can be ascertained objectively on
pathological grounds, and those that cannot. This differentiation, already existing
in the United States, has offered a basis for improving both predictability and case-
by-case assessment in Europe. Indeed, the traditional common law invitation to
the jury to rely on the "enlightened conscience of impartial jurors acting ... to
compensate the plaintiff with fairness to all parties ' 434 does not mean reliance on
their arbitrary judgment.435 Jurors need information to "enlighten their conscience"
as impartial decision-makers.
The lesson from all of the examples offered by Europe is to neither reduce nor
constrain the discretion of the judicial system, but to make it an informed process.
Justice differentiates between discretionary and arbitrary or blind decisions, and
the less arbitrary choice should be selected.436 A choice that, by the way, may even
be more efficient. The aim of these last sections is not to propose a full change in
the American system, but more modestly to test one possible innovation of judicial
scheduling in the United States: adopting a Normalized Values Schedule at the
432. See supra Part II1.A.4.
433. See POLINSKY, supra note 302, at 15-25 (providing a a more detailed explanation of
this statement in economic terms).
434. See NEW MEXICO SUPREME COURT, UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL § 18.7
(State of N.M. Sup. Ct. 1980).
435. See Croley & Hanson, supra note 6 (explaining the interest of jurors to behave as ra-
tional consumers).
436. Legal literature often refers to arbitrariness and excessiveness of awards for pain and
suffering and loss of enjoyment. See, e.g., DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., COMPENSATION FOR
ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE UNITED STATES 13, 99-101, 106-08, 174-75 (1991); Bovbjerg et
al., supra note 240, at 919-27, 936-38; Leebron, supra note 8, at 256, 288-92, 309-19, 322-25,
349-55; W. Kip Viscusi, Pain and Suffering in Product Liability Cases: Systematic Compensation
or Capricious Awards?, 8 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 203, 203-08, 214-19 (1988).
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court level to increase horizontal and vertical equality without necessarily prevent-
ing variability of awards among different jurisdictions.
1. Refraining the Results: Basic Elements
The United States could follow either of the two main approaches emerging
from the European experience for judicial scheduling, at different levels. 437 Both
of these approaches rely on the fact that certain non-economic damages assessed in
cases of personal injury present a reliable objective basis for description in medical
terms, by way of medical scoring or descriptive tables. Similarly, the historical
evolution of non-pecuniary damages in America reveals a pattern of a more con-
vincing, predictable, and equitable assessment, by giving more information to the
decision-maker. The path the American experience is following is capable of tak-
ing either direction without too much disturbance of settled practices and rules.
However, this Part will only explore one simple possibility: let juries and judges be
in some way informed of previous verdicts, and let them use an NVS to determine
the unitary base value point, either according to previous decisions or by their own
valuation.
The creation of guidelines for non-economic damages by the judicial system,
such as the NVS, requires definining the categories of injuries, and relying upon
objectively assessable factors, such as age and severity of the injury. Beyond their
statistical suitability, age and severity of injury are also objective measures easily
applied in practice, and medical science has developed internationally reputed
scoring systems for assessing them.438 After all, the Restatement (Second) on
Torts: § 905 Compensatory Damages for Non-Pecuniary Harm suggests that
"Compensatory damages that may be awarded without proof of pecuniary loss in-
clude compensation (a) For bodily harm, and (b) For emotional distress. 439
Further, the Comment on (a) describes bodily harm as:
[A]ny impairment of the physical condition of the body, including illness
or physical pain. . . . It is not essential to a cause of action that pecuniary
loss result. Furthermore, damages can be awarded although there is no
impairment of a bodily function and, in some situations, even though the
defendant's act is beneficial. 440
This rule captures the result described in Italy as non-economic damages for danno
alla salute.
The suggestion of emphasizing the diversity among injuries and providing
this information is not a new one. It was proposed after empirical research was
done on non-economic damages award procedures441 for helping jurors to form a
437. See supra Part I.C.
438. See infra Part III.B.2.
439. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 905 (1979).
440. Id. cmt. a.
441. See, e.g., Wissler et al., supra note 246, at 817.
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reference scale with which to compare the case in their hands." 2 The idea of pool-
ing information on jury awards made for similar injuries and making them avail-
able to juries as guidance for reaching their damages awards for intangible loss
proved to be rewarding as well in several experiments with juries 443 and judges. 444
Still, some features of an NVS make this article's proposal more effective than
previous ones: (1) it does not require statutory intervention; (2) it promotes both
vertical and horizontal equality in different ways and at different levels; (3) it of-
fers greater precision and ability to consider the pre-injury state of health, the post-
injury recovery possibilities, lifestyle, occupation, and social circumstances; (4) it
encapsulates them in an easy schematic way; (5) it can be adopted and adapted by
any jurisdiction without necessarily requiring the imposition of monetary schedul-
ing on juries. Finally, note that features (1)-(4) are already factors judges and ju-
rors are required to take into account.445
2. The Basic Elements at Work in the United States: Severity of Injury,
Medical Evaluation and Age as Guidelines
Severity of injury is already a good predictor of the award in legal systems,
especially if some medical scoring system expresses it in a way that is scientifi-
cally reliable and easily understandable by the decision maker." 6 Section 905 of
the Restatement indicates the severity of the injury, its permanence, and the age of
the plaintiff (which affects the duration of pain and suffering associated with per-
manent injuries) as predictors of award size. Studies both on empirical data and
mock jurors show that measures of injury type, severity, and permanence are con-
sistently the strongest predictors of awards. 44 7
Moreover, in the United States, severity of injury is already a very important
ingredient in judicial non-economic damages assessment." 8 According to infor-
442. See Sunstein et al., supra note 19, at 2104.
443. See Saks et al., supra note 339, at 243.
444. See Baldus et al., supra note 240, at 1109.
445. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 905 cmt. i (1979).
446. However, the U.K. Law Reform Commission refused the proposal to give more credit
to recognized medical scoring systems to assess the claimant's injury, and then to assign tariff
values to the various scores. See THE LAW COMM'N, supra note 34, at 98; see also Ellen Smith
Pryor, Flawed Promises: A Critical Evaluation of the American Medical Association's Guides to
the Permanent Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, 103 HARV. L. REv. 964 (1990) (assessing
critically the latent value judgments, validity, and bias in permanent impairment guidelines).
447. See Jane Goodman, Edith Greene & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Runaway Verdicts or Rea-
soned Determinations: Mock Juror Strategies in Awarding Damages, 29 JURIMETRICS 285, 289,
308 (1989) (further arguing that jurors try to make equitable awards, but not necessarily based on
legally permissible means of computing damages); Valerie Hans & M. David Ermann, Responses
to Corporate Versus Individual Wrongdoing, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 151 (1989); Saks et al.,
supra note 339, at 243; Vidmar & Rice, supra note 39, at 896; Wissler et al., supra note 361, at
181. Still the same studies found "vertical equity" (high correlations between injury severity and
awards) but substantial "horizontal inequity" (considerable variation in the amounts awarded for
injuries at the same level of severity).
448. See Wissler et al., supra note 343, at 736, stating:
Research has found injury seriousness and duration to account for between half and
three fourths of the variation in awards (vertical equity), concern has focused on unex-
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mation reported by scholars449 in several jurisdictions, instructions offered to juries
indicate that they should also consider physical or bodily injury in determining
general damages. 450 In other jurisdictions, the instructions note that "disability"
should be considered in determining damages,451 while others mention "physical
• ,452 rneto
impairment, "impairment of faculties, ' '4 51 inability of part of the mind or body
to function in a normal manner, 454 or loss of the use of a part of the body.
455 Of
course, still other jurisdictions' instructions do not mention this aspect of the in-
jury.
Indeed, sometimes courts already make express reference to a percentage of
disability.45 6 In addition, some studies have rated the severity of the injuries on
plained variation within levels of injury seriousness (horizontal inequity) and on other
possible errors in the assignment of general damages awards .... Providing jurors with
information about awards in other, similar cases has been shown to reduce award vari-
ability without altering the size of awards.
See also Leebron, supra note 8, at 256 (concluding that the variability observed, however, is con-
sistent with the view of the jury as a survey mechanism).
449. See Wissler et al., supra note 343, at 715-16.
450. See, e.g., Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil Cases: Damages Instruction
§ 2.1 (West 2000); Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil Cases: Compensatory Damages
§§ 15.2, 15.4 (West 1999); Louisiana Civil Law Treatise, Civil Jury Instructions § 18.01 (H.
Alston Johnson 2000); New York Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil Cases § 2:280 (West 1998).
451. See, e.g., ALABAMA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL § 11.04 (Ala. Pattern Jury
Instructions Comm. 2005); ELEVENTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL CASES:
DAMAGES INSTRUCTION § 2.1 (West 2000); FIFTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS,
CIVIL CASES: COMPENSATORY DAMAGES § 15.4 (West 1999); HAWAI'I JURY INSTRUCTIONS,
CIVIL §§ 8.3, 8.60 (Hawai'i State Judiciary 1999); ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS,
CIVIL § 30.04 (I11. Sup. Ct. Comm. on Jury Instructions in Civil Cases 1995); LOUISIANA CIVIL
LAW TREATISE, CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 18.01 (H. Alston Johnson 2000); NINTH CIRCUIT
MANUAL OF MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 7.2 (West 1997); WASHINGTON PATTERN
JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL § 30.05 (Wash. Sup. Ct. Comm. on Jury Instructions, 5th ed. 1992);
WISCONSIN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL § 1766 (Wisc. Civil Jury Instructions Comm. 2004);
WYOMING CIVIL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 4.01 (Wyoming Bar 2003).
452. See, e.g., ALASKA CIVIL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 20.06 (Civil Pattern Jury
Instructions Comm. 2005), available at http://www.state.ak.us/courts/juryins.htm; COLORADO
JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL § 6:1 (Colo. Sup. Ct. Comm. on Civil Jury Instructions, 4th ed.
2002); TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES: GENERAL NEGLIGENCE & INTENTIONAL PERSONAL
TORTS § 7.2 (State Bar of Tx. Pattern Jury Charges Comm. 1998).
453. See, e.g., IDAHO CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 910-1 (Idaho Pattern Jury Instruction
Comm. 1988).
454. See, e.g., IOWA CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 200.10 (Iowa State Bar Ass'n 2005).
455. See, e.g., NORTH CAROLINA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR CIVIL CASES § 810.35
(Inst. of Gov't 1998); see also 1 MELVIN M BELLI, MODERN TRIALS §§ 67.1-67.10 (1954) (A
leading plaintiff attorney's handbook for other practitioners); Williard H. Henson et al., A Quan-
tum Study of Pain and Suffering Awards for Personal Injuries in the Louisiana Appellate Courts,
31 LOY. L. REV. 889 (1986) (surveying Louisiana appellate court holdings for pain and suffering
awards). Note that in Germany Schmerzensgeldtabellen started as private attorneys' handbooks.
456. Examples of cases referring to percentage of disability assigned to the plaintiff in per-
sonal injury cases are easily available by perusing studies on quantum in State and federal courts.
See, e.g., Louisiana Personal Injury Awards, supra note 421, at 651. For furhter information, see
generally the biennial Survey ofAdmiralty Personal Injury of THE MARITIME LAWYER.
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scales with six, eight, or nine points.457 Quite often they use the Severity of Injury
Scale developed by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, which
ranges from one (emotional injury only) to nine (death).458 Clearly such a schedule
is far too tight, because each point on such a scale necessarily must capture a range
of injuries having different degrees of severity and quality. 459 Another descriptive
injury typology, universally available, is the coding format that is used by the
medical community to classify injuries as produced by the World Health Organiza-
tion, known as the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10). 460 In any
event, several scientifically-based and reputed scoring systems are available to
(and sometimes used by) courts.
With reference to age as a factor for differentiating awards for non-economic
damages, it is again § 905 of the Restatement which stresses its importance.46' In-
deed, there are various reasons for selecting age as a principle variable. One main
reason is duration. The younger the victim, the more he or she will cohabit with
the intangible loss according to his or her life expectancy. Other considerations
suggest taking age into account. For example, the injury may affect child devel-
opment or the recuperative powers of an older victim. Age is also the most objec-
tive factor, and is virtually impossible to cheat or manipulate. In an NVS, for in-
stance, it can statistically reflect some features of the incidence of the intangible
loss. Finally, the suggested use of age and severity of injury as the main factors in
framing the intangible loss has found empirical support in the European experi-
ences.
46 3
457. See, e.g., Randall Bovbjerg, Frank A. Sloan, Avi Dor, Chee Ruey Hsieh, Juries and
Justice: Are Malpractice and Other Injuries Created Equal?, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5(1991) (discussing a study using a six point scale); PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 74-75 (1985).
458. See Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs (1980) Severity of Injury Scale (ranging from I for
emotional injury only to 9 for death). See generally Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs, www.naic.org
(last visited Nov. 23, 2005).
459. See Gary T. Schwartz, Proposals for Reforming Pain and Suffering Awards, in
REFORMING THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM, 416, 419 (Larry Kramer ed., 1996).
460. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL STATISTICAL CLASSIFICATION OF
DISEASES AND HEALTH RELATED PROBLEMS chs. XIX-XX (10th rev. 2003), available at
http://www3.who.int/icd/voll htm2003/fr-icd.htm (providing classifications for external source
injuries, morbidity, and mortality). This version is the latest in a series that was formalized in
1893 as the Bertillon Classification or International List of Causes of Death. World Health Org.,
Int'l Classification of Diseases, http://www.who.int/classifications/icd/en/ (last visited Nov. 23,
2005); see, e.g., Rachel Rosser & Paul Kind, A Scale of Valuations of States of Illness: Is There a
Social Consensus?, 7 INT'L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 347 (1978) (identifying 29 possible physical states
of permanent injury, ranging from healthy to comatose).
461. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 905 cmt. i (1979) (discussing ramifications
of the injured's age on the measure of recovery).
462. Of course, reduction of life expectancy due to the harm is another loss, but this com-
ment does not address this type of loss.
463. See supra Part .C and II.A. Moreover, several empirical studies show that severity of
injury is a good predictor of the size of a pain and suffering award. See, e.g., Bovbjerg et al., su-
pra note 240, at 923 (showing that severity of injury explains about 40% of variation); see also
AUDREY CHIN & MARK A. PETERSON, DEEP POCKETS, EMPTY POCKETS: WHO WINS IN COOK
COUNTY JURY TRIALS 56, 57 (1985); Chase, supra note 348, at 787; Frank A. Sloan & Chee
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Undoubtedly, the NVS requires damages to be itemized in some way. Ameri-
can case law, however, already shows a trend requiring the jury to distinguish the
amount of general damages for non-pecuniary harm and the amount of special
damages for pecuniary harms.4 64 Several States already use itemized verdict forms
that require the awards for each title of damages to be indicated separately.
465 This
procedure is supposed to be helpful in reviewing awards on appeal, though evi-
dence of its incidence on variability of the awards seems scarce.466 Still, to work
out a monetary schedule to be coupled with a NVS requires the acquisition of a
certain amount of data. The next section will test the availability of such a basis.
3. Building Database(s), Reporting System(s) and Guidelines
There are at least two possible ways to build a monetary award system that re-
lies on existing substantive law.467 One possibility is to look backwards and col-
lect information on previous awards. An alternative path would be to start collect-
ing this information going forward. While the first pattern offers an immediate
basis; the second lacks an existing starting basis for judicial assessment. In any
event, both could be performed on a court-by-court level, a jurisdiction-by-
jurisdiction level, or at a level that is more extensive and covers more than one
State.468 None of these alternatives necessarily requires statutory intervention.
Each can easily be fostered by courts and private independent research at universi-
ties, as the Italian, French, and British experiences demonstrate. All of the players
in the personal injury compensation game have an interest in, and shoule contrib-
Ruey Hsieh, Variability in Medical Malpractice Payments: Is the Compensation System Fair?, 24
LAW & Soc'Y REV. 997, 1007-08 (1990); Laura R. Willett, Adam P. Wilczek, Richard Trout &
Jeffrey L. Carson, The Influence of Standard of Care and Severity of Injury on the Resolution of
Medical Malpractice Claims, 117 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 780, 781 (1992).
464. See Baldus et al., supra note 240, at 1174.
465. See, e.g., COLORADO JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL § 6:IA (Colo. Sup. Ct. Comm. on
Civil Jury Instructions, 4th ed. 2002); TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES: GENERAL NEGLIGENCE
& INTENTIONAL PERSONAL TORTS § 7.2 (State Bar of Tx. Pattern Jury Charges Comm. 1998).
466. See Wissler et al., supra note 343, at 720.
467. Both patterns would require a protocol to ensure unbiased data and uniformity.
468. Some authors already advocated a comprehensive reporting system to record personal
injury damages awards as their core proposal. See Blumstein et al., supra note 205, at 180-81,
proposing that a reporting system should report and tabulate for each verdict:
(a) nature and extent of injuries; (b) some finding on each element of pecuniary damage
that the law recognizes for the case such as past wages, medical, and other losses; the
value of future wages, medical, and other losses; assumptions about future inflation of
such losses and discount rate chosen to bring future losses to present value; (c) types of
noneconomic losses and total dollars allowed for them; and (d) adjustments made for
comparative negligence, prior settlements by other defendants, joint and several liabil-
ity, or other factors. Where awards are judicially altered or upheld on review, the new
results should be noted. It would be prudent to include a short qualitative description of
each case as well; statistically unusual cases often seem less odd when their context is
clearer..
(citations omitted). To cover small states lacking either data or resources, Blumstein et al. further
proposed to let them use comparable data from other states or to build a national reporting system
that would be used by all states. Id. at 180. Both alternatives could allow "for reporting data by
state, region or locality." Id.
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ute to, the establishment of an unbiased set of data because it would be helpful not
only during litigation but also in preventing litigation by facilitating the estimation
of the value of a claim and settlement at the pre-trial stage. The European experi-
ences give us an idea about this pattern.
Perhaps one possible criticism of looking at previous or current awards may
reiterate the theme that it is impossible to credibly maintain that previous awards
of non-economic damages are correct. But, it is equally impossible to argue they
are undoubtedly incorrect. On the one hand, reliance on the basic principles of jus-
tice in the American system would give credibility to the jury system.469 On the
other hand, extensive horizontal variability would undermine previous jury awards
as a basis for calculation.470
Still, we should in some fashion codify the mass of evaluation performed by
the jury system and use it meaningfully. It is true that the very lack of guidelines is
what triggers the suggestion to improve the system, but the current system is al-
ready a basis to build on: a basis that other legal systems show can save resources
and is susceptible to improvement. 47' At least, this is the actual way in which, af-
ter World War II, several European legal systems refined their mechanisms for
awarding non-economic damages.472 It is important to stress again that it is one
thing to hamper the jury decision-making process by imposing rigid schedules or
guidelines and another to capitalize continuously on the work of current and past
juries by extracting information from their efforts, thereby improving the ability of
subsequent juries and judges to act upon them.
All of the European jurisdictions and courts examined have proceeded on a
trial and error basis, treating the previous steps as a foundation which can be
worked on and improved by smoothing out irregularities and errors.473 Still, Euro-
469. After all, several studies conclude juries' vertical variability is no greater than judicial
one. See generally Croley & Hanson, supra note 6, at 1906-14 (concluding that expost quantifi-
cation of non-pecuniary losses by the tort system does not seem to violate any of the social norms
that are transgressed by the quantification of non-pecuniary losses ex ante).
470. But see Sugarman, supra note 15, at 594 ("The idiosyncrasies of jury composition
combine to hand similar victims altogether dissimilar results.").
471. To use two meaningful formulas: "[T]he use of the aggregate wisdom of past practice
is quite reasonable - certainly more so than reinventing dollar values in each case... Linkage to
past awards, in short, provides a helpful empirical foundation upon which to base - and justify
- policy judgment." See Bovbjerg et al., supra note 240, at 961.
472. See supra Part I.C.
473. Note that the Judicial Studies Board periodically revises its Guidelines. See World
Health Org., supra note 460. Italian courts periodically revise their tables publicizing their up-
dated versions as well. Law reviews collect updated guidelines and tables and publish them,
sometimes with criticisms, finding controversial issues and debating them. See e.g., II calcolo del
risarcimento a Torino, in GUIDA AL DIRITTO, June 2005, at 34-37; l calcolo del risarcimento a
Torino, in GUIDA AL DIRITTO, June 2005, at 44-73. A subsequent version by the courts may in-
corporate such commentaries and the dialogue will go on ameliorating the overall result. Medical
tables vary as well. See Sunstein et al., supra note 19, at 2128, stating:
There is a great deal to be said for the incremental step of civil sentencing, building on
current practice and ensuring, in every jurisdiction, a serious oversight role for judges,
calling not for individual judicial judgments about individual cases, but for judicial
comparisons among various similar cases, so as to ensure against dramatic outliers.
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pean experiences have shown that one important feature of relying on previous
awards is the availability of proper databases to work from. Of course, it is also
debatable whether the actual dimension of databases available to courts, and even
the reported cases, are representative of the actual universe of cases and decisions.
However, this article has sought to demonstrate both that a coherent principled sys-
tem is possible and that it does not necessarily replicate any real evaluation.
Even accepting the criticism that the proposed approach may incorporate pre-
vious wrong or excessive awards, whatever plausibility these claims might have,
the proposed methodology will bring about invaluable stability and predictability
to the system, and in the long run any discrepancy would be ironed out. Indeed,
databases and reporting systems have developed in Europe in a gradual and inde-
pendent way by incremental steps.474 Moreover, the NVS model would not require
such a large set of cases, and each court can easily develop its own basic monetary
award with a quick search of its own records or even let the jury fix it case-by-
case.
Last, but not least, building the database would serve the single purpose of
setting a preliminary basic monetary award to operate in conjunction with the
NVS. For instance, juries could even continue to be prevented from having infor-
mation on previous awards - i.e., the previous basic monetary award - and the
use of the NVS would still convey rationality and both horizontal and vertical
equality in the awarding system.
Bearing this in mind, the American status can be briefly outlined with refer-
ence to existing sources of data. To some extent, the United States is even better
positioned than were the original European jurisdictions which were examined. It
is true that in the United States officially reported decisions refer almost exclu-
sively to general principles or approaches, 475 and a reduced number of cases are
released for publication pursuant to the policy to publish mainly cases with value
of precedent. A reversal of this policy would be beneficial, and it might only in-
volve the publication of the needed data (an enhanced statement of facts related to
damages and the amounts actually awarded).476 Further, almost no systematic offi-
474. Another counterargument is that expanding retrospectively the pool of cases to be
compared involves the risk of undercutting the results because of inflation. For instance, taking
into consideration previous awards clearly requires all monetary values be adjusted for inflation.
However, to remedy this potential shortcoming, it is sufficient to adjust the awards for inflation in
the earlier cases, as it is regularly done in the UK and continental Europe. See generally Michael
A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, Effect of Anticipated Inflation on Damages for Future Losses -
Modern Cases, 21 A.L.R. 4TH 21 (1983) (adjustment for cases tried in the U.S.).
475. There are several jury verdict-reporting services, including the NEW YORK STATE
JURY VERDICT REVIEW AND ANALYSIS (B. Kessler ed.); LAW REPORTER (Association of Trial
Lawyers of America); PERSONAL INJURY VALUATION HANDBOOK (Jury Verdict Research, Inc.).
Furthermore, the NEW YORK JURY VERDICT REPORTER is published monthly and collects and
reports approximately 90% of all jury verdicts in personal injury cases tried to verdict in the met-
ropolitan New York area and 75% of all such verdicts in the remaining counties of the State. It
must be noted that the prime source for the awards reported are documented submissions by at-
torneys.
476. See William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent -
Limited Publication and No Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L.
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cial record is now kept of all of the fact-finders' deliberations or findings to help
inform future decisions.
Still, according to information cited in legal literature, ten years ago it was es-
timated that in several jurisdictions intermediate appellate opinions were published
at least at some levels (e.g., Indiana 30%; New Jersey, 25%; Tennessee, 10%),
while federal circuit courts of appeal publication rates varied "from 31% in the
Eighth Circuit to 82% in the Third Circuit., 477 These levels of publication, which
at first sight may appear unpleasantly low, are much higher than the analogous
level of publication available from the outset in Europe. In addition, in 1989,
scholars who proposed much more articulated reporting systems asserted that the
basis for such databanks existed in some jurisdictions.478 The situation has dra-
matically improved since then.
479
Just in browsing the Internet, it becomes apparent that several websites of
journals and compilations claim to have thousands of jury verdicts related to non-
economic damages.480 At first glance, every State has at least one (sometimes
more than one) private publication covering verdicts for personal injury dam-
ages.48 l Of course, this article does not claim that these private compilations are
necessarily without bias or complete: it only claims that they exist, unlike the situa-
tion in Europe before courts fostered the evolution of their national systems.
482
Stimulated by the result, searches on LexisNexis and Westlaw were run. The out-
come was once again surprising; most of the materials on which the European so-
lutions have relentlessly evolved are present and readily available. Most of the
needed information is accessible: summary of facts, awards, the age of the victim,
specific injury information, and so forth. Often verdicts are already divided by
REv. 1167, 1188-89 (1978) (summarizing arguments for and against policies limiting publica-
tion).
477. Baldus, supra note 240, at 1175 n.165 (arguing an opinion publication rate of about
35% to 45% in tort and civil rights cases).
478. See Blumstein et al., supra note 205, at 181 n.41, stating:
In April 1989, Tennessee enacted legislation that requires civil clerks and masters to re-
port the following data monthly to the Judicial Council: (1) The number of cases filed
claiming money damages for personal injury or death; (2) The number of such cases ac-
tually proceeding to trial; and (3) For each such case actually proceeding to trial, the
number of cases in which the plaintiff was awarded some money damages for personal
injury or death, the amount of the verdict given in a jury case, the amount of judgment
in a case without a jury, and any additur or remittitur awarded in the case by the trial
judge. TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-21-11 (Supp. 1990). The Tennessee Judicial Council is
to develop a reporting form, compile the data, and report on findings annually.
479. See, e.g., PERSONAL INJURY VALUATION HANDBOOK (offering a detailed typology
with approximately 100 categories classified by injury type, anatomical location of the injury,
cause of injury, premises where the injury occurred, and the age and gender of the injured party);
see also Jury Verdict Summaries from the Nat'l Ass'n of State Jury Verdict Publishers,
http://www.juryverdicts.com/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2005); MoreLaw.Com,
http://www.morelaw.com/ (last visited Nov. 23, 3005).
480. See supra note 479.
481. See supra note 479.
482. See supra note 479.
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jurisdiction, facilitating the research with enough data to work out, for instance, the
basic monetary award to use with a NVS in a specific court.483
This means that initial research and publication of data have started and can
be implemented more scientifically. What this means again is that private initia-
tive, as in Europe, is already paving the way for more consistent sets of informa-
tion to be distributed to judges and juries, and not only to lawyers and newspapers
484
as mainly happens now in the United States. The available "raw materials" in
the form of reported facts are probably more extensive than the available ones in
the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy even today.
As discussed, in Italy the self-imposed judicial guidelines provide a means of
comparing the case at hand with those that preceded it.485 The main attributes of
the case are charted on the x and y-axis.486 Each cell describes the attributes in
terms of percentage of permanent disability and unity monetary value.48 7 Courts
obtain the monetary value in different ways from awards in previous cases.488 De-
veloping a similar instrument in the United States is feasible, by each court incor-
porating in its instruction to the jury a NVS. Alternatively, lawyers use an NVS in
several jurisdictions, presenting it to the jury and looking at the appropriate matrix,
relying on the factors described by medical experts who collocated the plaintiffs
disability into the schedule. For instance, the experts may be asked to place the
injured in one widely accepted medical scoring system. After presenting evidence
regarding injury severity to the jurors, an attorney (or perhaps an expert witness)
should be able to explain to jurors how to compute the compensation award, as it is
a reasonable way for jurors to determine these damages based on their assessment
of injury severity.
In short, courts can implement a NVS approach to compensation for objective
non-economic damages without requiring a change in the current law.489 Under a
NVS, the jury would enjoy a reasonable double discretion. First, it would deter-
mine the presumptive award by deciding which matrix cell best describes the
plaintiff disability (note that it is the medical experts evidence based on scientific
guidelines that supports this choice). Second, jurors can adapt the corresponding
monetary value to accord better with the facts of the case, basing their decision on
previous awards - suggested by a national or local monetary schedule, if permit-
ted - or selecting a value anew.
NVS and related medical and monetary guidelines focus attention on the facts
of each case, warranting individualized treatment, but solving, to a certain extent,
the valuation problem due to lack of guidance. Obviously, other evidence brought
483. See supra note 479.
484. See supra note 479.
485. See supra Part II.B; see also Levin, supra note 8, at 318.
486. See supra Part I.C.5.
487. See supra Part I.C.5.
488. See supra Part I.C.
489. See 75A AM. JUR. 2D TRIAL § 554 (1991) (stating that counsel is permitted to suggest
to the jurors all reasonable inferences that they may draw from the evidence so long as they un-
derstand that the argument of counsel is not evidence).
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by the parties, evidence which has not always been included in the data used to de-
termine the guidelines, may supplement the factors reflected in the guidelines.49 °
Parties would naturally highlight those factors. 491
Indeed, as shown by the European experiences, guidelines do not go against
personalized justice if they are operated using proper flexibility. Under this arti-
cle's proposal, the guidelines do not prejudice the jury's independence because it
retains all of its autonomy: including the power to depart from a previous award if
the facts sustain such a decision.492 If the guidelines are applied and known in ad-
vance by juries, then review standards will be even less discretionary for the appel-
late courts or the trial judge than the usual remittiturladditur standards.493 Indeed,
departures from the norms represented by the schedule may well (and appropri-
ately) attract the attention of the court, but the review cannot avoid taking the le-
gitimate evidenced factors that moved the jury to its verdict into account and to al-
low them to stand ifjustified.494
490. See Leebron, supra note 8, at 322-23, stating:
An alternative approach would be to allow counsel to present in evidence jury awards in
other cases. This approach is attractive because it allows the jury to decide whether fac-
tual variations in a case justify a substantially higher or lower award. Thus the rele-
vance of prior awards would not be limited to similar cases. For example, an attorney
could present prior awards for the loss of a limb to argue the appropriate amount for an
injury to the limb, or even a different injury altogether. But at present every jurisdiction
regards it as improper to present or refer to amounts awarded in similar cases, the only
question being whether such reference is sufficiently prejudicial to require reversal. The
reason for this point of view is once again that each case is different and must stand on
its own facts.
491. Id.
492. See Coco v. Winston Industries, Inc., 341 So. 2d 332, 335 (La. 1976), stating:
Only after making the finding that the record supports that the lower court abused its
much discretion can the appellate court disturb the award, and then only to the extent of
lowering it (or raising it) to the highest (or lowest) point which is reasonably within the
discretion afforded that court. It is never appropriate for a Court of Appeal, having
found that the trial court has abused its discretion, simply to decide what it considers an
appropriate award on the basis of the evidence.
(citations omitted); see also Gorsalitz v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 429 F.2d 1033, 1046 (5th
Cir. 1970) (employing the so-called "maximum recovery" standard). The maximum recovery
standard allows the increase or reduction of damages awarded only to the lowest or highest
amount that the jury could have properly awarded based on the facts and evidence presented.
Lowe v. Gen. Motors Corp., 624 F.2d 1373, 1383 (5th Cir. 1980).
493. See, e.g., Leebron, supra note 8, at 323 ("States should require reviewing judges to
formulate acceptable ranges for awards, taking into account possible factual variations.").
494. Levin, supra note 8, at 322, stating:
Departures from the guidelines are permitted, and even encouraged, under appropriate
circumstances. This feedback component of the guidelines is significant in three ways:
(1) it assures that each plaintiff is given ample opportunity to receive individualized
consideration of his/her case; (2) it provides a check on the "correctness" of newly is-
sued guidelines; and (3) it permits the guidelines to respond quickly to changes in public
policy, the cost of living, or the consensus value of an injury.
See Chase, supra note 348, at 351 ("Courts confronted with attacks on verdicts, whether on ap-
peal or in post-trial motions, should have more confidence in the jury's result because it will have
been based on better information.").
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Each court could potentially begin to keep track of all jury verdicts and deci-
sions concerning awards for non-pecuniary damages, and monetary values could
be periodically revised to reflect the changes in social perception revealed by
documented departures from the guidelines.495 If each court adopts its own guide-
lines, the feedback offered by data collection would update the system by closely
reflecting jury sentiment on the appropriate award for a particular loss. Alterna-
tively, if more than one court or jurisdiction shared the same monetary guidelines
there would be a more widely shared sentiment on the monetary value and larger
horizontal equality among American citizens. Of course, it is also arguable
whether more reliable awards and more horizontal equality are good per se. In any
event, the proposed innovation does not impose such a large "common law" on
non-pecuniary damages. Indeed, a shared methodology which guarantees that the
same medically ascertainable impairment receives the same treatment regardless of
the monetary value attached to the normalized value in the NVS would assure
more equal treatment without necessarily imposing uniform amounts.
It is self-evident, however, that when the system is in place it will slowly ac-
quire precedential value, taking on "attributes of law."496 This status will also
make it appropriate for the judiciary to police the self-imposed standard, but this is
a further development that courts could and should take over at a later stage, as the
Court of Appeal in the United Kingdom and the Supreme Court in Italy eventually
did. Even if we do not take the view that consistency is a "first principle of law
and morals, 497 consistency in the law in general, and particularly in the law of
damages, has several beneficial instrumental effects - i.e., reducing inefficiency
(by reducing over-investment in liability avoidance that results in higher insurance
costs) 498 and lottery-like results that are often criticized in non-economic assess-
ment. It may also increase the incentives to settle.499
4. A Pattern Acceptable Under Constitutional Review and Policymaking
A concluding question to be addressed asks if judicial scheduling would pass
constitutional muster.50 0 This article does not pretend to run a complete constitu-
tional analysis of the purported innovations. To a certain extent it does not even
495. See, e.g., Prentice H. Marshall, A View from the Bench: Practical Perspectives on Ju-
ries, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 147, 158 ("It is appropriate for the jury to assess the harm allegedly
inflicted on the plaintiff in light of the values of the community in which it occurred. Jurors do
just that.").
496. See Levin, supra note 8, at 318-19.
497. See John E. Coons, Consistency, 75 CAL. L. REV. 59, 60, 82 (1987) ("It is hard to
imagine stronger evidence of the system's tolerance - or even an appetite - for inconsis-
tency.").
498. See E. Donald Elliott, Why Punitive Damages Don't Deter Corporate Misconduct Ef-
fectively, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1053, 1057 (1989) ("The central failing of punitive damages that ren-
ders them incompatible with modem tort law is unpredictability.") (emphasis omitted).
499. See Schuck, supra note 5, at 316 (suggesting that in certain circumstances uncertainty
may increase the likelihood of settlement).
500. See Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, Judicial Nullification of Civil Justice Reform
Violates the Fundamental Constitutional Principle of Separation of Powers, 12 RuTGERS L.J.
907, 917 (2001) (criticizing the line of cases striking down tort reform under state constitutions).
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need this analysis. This article is only proposing to provide the jury with addi-
tional information. In no way does the proposal restrict the jury's power or author-
ity in any respect. 50 1 Yet, it is prudent to sketch some constitutional issues that
might be raised and their likely solution because every innovation concerning tort
502law is perceived as tort reform and triggers constitutional attention.
More exactly, constitutional concerns usually raised against proposed tort re-
forms do not appear to be applicable to the improvement that has emerged here, as
discussed in Part (III)(A)(4). For instance, NVS does not take away traditional
common law prerogatives of plaintiffs without a compensatory quidpro quo given
in return: it does not unfairly single out a category of defendants for protection to
the detriment of "plaintiffs who face corresponding cutbacks in remedies." It also
does not "abrogate the sanctity of trial by jury. 50 3 Judicial scheduling neither caps
non-economic damages 504 nor constrains jury discretion. On the contrary, the role
of the jury would gain momentum and it would increase its effectiveness in resist-
ing judicial scrutiny because NVS would make any judicial review which at-
tempted to second guess jury findings less arbitrary.50 5
Among the positive features which help to defend judicial scheduling against
constitutional challenges is that, by nature, judicial scheduling is neither mandatory
nor invasive of the functions of juries and judges. Judicial scheduling shares fea-
tures with other proposals: being "advisory, flexible, and self-correcting."50 6 This
article's proposals do not treat differently the extreme position of the award sys-
tem 50 7 and do not withdraw any privilege or prerogative from litigants or decision-
501. But see supra Part III.A.3 (discussing potential arguments against increasing compara-
bility of damages awards for review purposes). In addition, if the suggestions this comment pro-
poses are judicially implemented, there should not be any constitutional concern.
502. See supra Part III.A.4 (discussing the constitutional issues related to comparing dam-
age awards - undue restraint of the right to a jury trial, and possible alteration of the interplay
between federal and state governments). If, the suggestions this comment proposes were judi-
cially implemented, there should not be any constitutional concern.
503. See also Bovbjerg et al., supra note 240, at 968.
504. E.g., Boyd v. Bulala, 877 F.2d 1191, 1194 (4th Cir. 1989) (rejecting the arguments
proposing that damages caps invade jury prerogatives); Davis v. Omitowoju, 883 F.2d 1155,
1161 (3d. Cir. 1989). Still, under some state constitutions, damages caps have been invalidated.
But see Kan. Malpractice Victims Coal. v. Bell, 757 P.2d 251, 260 (1988) (invalidating damage
caps under the state constitution); Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711, 719 (1989) (invalidat-
ing damage caps under the state constitution); Ethridge v. Med. Ctr. Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525, 535
(1989) (upholding a total damage cap of $750,000 for malpractice against a jury trial challenge).
505. This is different from just relying on additur/remittitur because intensifying the judicial
ability to review jury findings without empowering the jury to sustain its decisions de facto trans-
forms the review process into a second guess of the fact finder. See Chase, supra note 348, at
351.
506. Blumstein et al., supra note 205, at 186.
507. This is contrasted to the actual operation of damages caps. See Sofie, 771 P.2d at 721
(stating that imposing statutory caps to adjust the jury's award only "pays lip service to the form
of the jury but robs the institution of its function"). Similarly, if the system empowers judges to
review jury awards but still restrains juries from the means to sustain their decision-making proc-
ess, the system would pay only "lip service" to the right to a trial by jury and would implement
only second guessing.
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makers (judges and jury). In this framework, Judge Posner's opinion in Jutzi-
Johnson v. United States is useful:
[A] practice of consulting damages awards in comparable cases for pur-
poses of facilitating a more thoughtful, disciplined, and informed award
in the particular case [is not] the same thing as a rule limiting awards
within a range set by previous cases, one understanding of the state law
rule involved in Gasperini: an award of damages was not to "deviate ma-
terially" from awards that had been made in comparable cases. Nor is it
easy to characterize a practice of not consulting comparable awards as a
remedial rule, hence 'substantive' in the Erie sense, rather than as a rule
of evidence; or a practice of such consultation by a reviewing court en-
deavoring to carry out its duty to prevent abuses of discretion in the
award of damages as anything more than a rule of appellate procedure. °8
Unquestionably, the innovations suggested by this article would result finally
in a profound change in the actual picture of non-economic damages assessment,
promoting fairness of awards for all claims and confidence in the judicial system;
but, this would happen without the need for statutory reform. Far-reaching reform
of the assessment procedure for non-pecuniary damages, however, seems unlikely
to be passed and upheld in the case of a constitutional challenge. Indeed, this is
one more policy reason to prefer the patterns suggested by the comparative re-
search discussed in this article. They permit evolution without challenging the sys-
tem and triggering constitutional concerns.
Analogously, the policy censures fueled by almost all tort reforms or propos-
als do not have any role in the judicial scheduling that this article suggested. For
instance, there is no discrimination among different areas of tort law;50 9 there is no
reliance on a specific crisis or criticism of abusing the tort system to trigger
changes. More precisely, the proposition usually applied in tort reform is to use
pretexts for seeking special-interest legislation such as an alleged insurance crisis.
In contrast, an innovative proposition for judicial scheduling stems from the appre-
ciation of the tort system, of judicial performance, and, above all, the increased
role of non-economic damages for intangible loss. Indeed, the proposed system
continues to rely on juries to classify the level of injury severity in its fact-finding
capacity and to select the proper amount of money to award for the injury suffered
508. Jutzi-Johnson v. U.S., 263 F.3d 753, 760 (7th Cir. 2001).
509. Often reforms targeting a specific area as medical malpractice or product liability have
been held unconstitutional because they singled out one area. E.g., Loyal Amendment Life Ins.
Co. v. Mattiace, 679 So. 2d 229, 246 (Ala. 1996) (declaring caps on jury awards in medical mal-
practice cases unconstitutional).
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by the plaintiff in the case at hand. 510 Thus, for all of the above, the suggested im-
provements would not appear to suffer from constitutional frailties that have, in
some jurisdictions, invalidated tort reforms.
IV. SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH
This analysis confirmed the centrality that non-economic damages have
gained in personal injury litigation both in Europe and in the United States. It con-
tributed to connecting damages for intangible loss to evolving social and economic
grounds.
Indeed, handling non-economic damages is a shared quandary with a seem-
ingly paradoxical contradictory aim: to assess the invaluable and to filter damages
claims which are either frivolous or difficult to prove. In trying to solve this co-
nundrum, the surveyed countries were led by historically similar patterns in order
to distinguish in the field of personal injury those non-economic damages with an
objective uniform basis for evaluation in a disability or an illness and ascertainable
by medical science from non-economic damages that do not have such a basis.
This bifurcation proved to be a successful device to both filter claims and to im-
prove the assessing process.
European and American jurisdictions have developed different approaches for
helping the judicial process award non-economic damages accompanying intangi-
ble loss. European judicial scheduling methods, implemented by national courts
without statutory reform, further increased predictability and equality without
hampering judicial discretion. Comparative analysis proved that the American ju-
dicial system could achieve these or similar innovative assessing approaches with-
out triggering statutory intervention or constitutional concerns.
Indeed, most patterns evolved within the European experiences could find
their place in the United States. At a minimum, courts could adopt and adapt a
Normalized Values Schedule as Part (III)(B) exemplifies. Indeed, a NVS is not
submitted to monetary figures and it is able to assure similar treatment for all vic-
tims while leaving out any difference in the monetary value attributed to the point.
Still, this article has not yet developed a comprehensive collection of impor-
tant data to better develop monetary schedules, nor has it taken a position on se-
lecting one of the available scientific scoring systems in the United States. This
last selection process would be an enduring one, sustained by scientific respectabil-
ity and acceptance of each medical scoring system. The issue of local or national
development of monetary scheduling would, however, be linked to concerns about
equal treatment. Indeed, European jurisdictions have, in some sense, rooted non-
economic damages for intangible loss accompanying personal injury in the funda-
510. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 240, at 969, stating:
In operation, the schedules would directly and immediately achieve their main goal -
bringing standards to a previously standardless area of law and consistency to previ-
ously inconsistent judicial outcomes. Well-designed scheduling approaches have the
potential to improve both equity (fair valuation of each case and consistent valuations
across cases) and efficient (enhanced predictability that simplifies proof, facilitates set-
tlements, and each insurance rating).
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mental right to health and dignity, while assessment approaches have been tied to
the fundamental value of equal protection. Both of these choices will require
further research and analysis in the United States,511 based on different conceptions
of the relationship between fundamental rights and private law remedies.
511. Some of these issues are undergoing further research in the framework of international
research run under the auspices of the European Union Commission at nine universities in eight
European Union countries. For further commentary, see Marie Curie Actions, Fundamental
Rights and Private Law in the European Union, http://mc-opportunities.cordis.lu/show-
PRJ.cfm?objid=4435 (last visited Nov. 23, 2005); and Diritti & Regole Laboratorio Interdisci-
plinare, Home Page, http://www.lider-lab.org (last visited Nov. 23, 2005).
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